Political Parties and Problems of National Integration: a Case Study of the Federal Republic of -nigeria by Peretomode, Victor Finipaya
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL 
INTEGRATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA -
BY 
VICTOR FINIPAYA PERETOMODE 
'l 
Bachelor of Education 
University of Benin 
Benin City, Bendel 
1979 
Master of Science 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1982 
Doctor of Education 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1984 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
July, 1985 
DEDICATION 
This work is dedicated to my deceased grandmother, Mrs. Ebiavwo 
Ogbaudu, Who, during her lifetime, was always committed to the integra-
tion of the extended family. 
('fg~ 
3 7 () 
I 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL 
INTEGRATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE 





The author wishes to express his gratitude to his major adviser, 
Professor James J. Lawler, for his wise counsel, critical evaluation, 
and searching criticisms of my work. The author also appreciates 
Professor Lawler's words of encouragement, his patience in reading 
through handwritten drafts of the different chapters of the thesis before 
having them typed, and all other invaluable assistance throughout the 
period of the preparation of this study. 
The author also wishes to express his indebtedness to the other 
members of the thesis committee, Professor Harold V. Sare and Professor 
Franz A. Von Sauer, for their assistance. 
Finally, a note of genuine appreciation is also expressed to the 
Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
for its award of graduate assistantship which provided the financial 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION. . 
Analytical Framework • 
Hypothesis ••••••• 
Significance of Study. 
Research Method ••••• 








II. DEFINITIONS, CONDITIONS, THEORIES, AND STRATEGIES OF 
NATIONAL INTEGRATION. • • • • • • • • • . • 14 
III. 
Definitions of National Integration. 14 
Process of Political Integration • 22 
1. Territorial and Geographic Proximity • 22 
2. Degree of Homogeneity. . • • • . . . 23 
3. Mutual Knowledge or Cognitive Proximity. • • 23 
4. Government Effectiveness • • • • • . 24 
5. Functional Interests • • • • • • • • • 25 
6. Communal Character or Social Motive. 25 
7. Structural Frame • • • • • • 26 
8. Previous Integrative Experience. • 26 
Theories of National Integration • • • • • 27 
1. Theory of Charismatic Leadership 28 
2. The Political Party Brokerage Theory • 30 
3. The Elite-Mass Gap • • • • . • . • . • 32 
4. The Free Market Model. • • • • • . • • 36 
5. The Structural-Functionalist Thesis. • 37 
6. Social Communications-Transactional Theory • 38 
7. The Cross-Pressure Theory. . . . • . . • 40 
8. The Equitable or Balanced Development 
Approach • • • . • • • • • . . 41 
9. Consociational Democratic Theory • 42 
BACKGROUND TO NIGERIA • 
Introduction •••• 
Geography •• 
Precolonial History •• 
The Peoples of Northern Nigeria •• 
The Peoples of Western Nigeria • 










From Colonial ism to Independence. • • . . . • • • • • 70 
Introduction • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • . . . 70 
From 1861 Annexation of Lagos Up to Amalgama-
tion in 1914 . • . . . . • . . • • . . • • . 71 
Political and Constitutional Developments from 
Amalgation (1914) - Independence (1960) • • 72 
Principle Political Parties at Independence. 77 
Political Trends in Nigeria From Independence to 
the Present . . . . • • • • • . ,• . • . . • • • • • 83 
IV. THE MAJOR NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PROBLEMS 
OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION • • • . • . • • • . . • . . . 94 
Introduction ••••...•..•....•....• 94 
Identifying the Major Political Parties in Niger~a 
Up To 1966, and in the 1979 Elections • 
The Scope, Nature, and Political Bases of the Major 
Political Parties in the First Republic •• 
Political Parties and Conflicts and Crises in 
Nigeria . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . • 
The Self-Government Crises at the Center in 
1953 • . . • . . . . . . 
Census Conflicts from 1933-1964 ••••• 
The Election Crisis of 1964-1965 •••• 







1965 • • . . • . • • . . . . . . • . • . . • . 138 
V. SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Summary •••• 








SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • . • • • • . • • • . . . • • • • • • • . • 163 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
I. Size of the Fifteen Major Ethnic Groups in Nigeria. • 54 
II. Ethnic Distribution of Northern Region's Population, 
1963. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
III. Ethnic Distribution of the Population of Western 
Region, 1963. • . . • . . • • . • . • . • . • • 61 
IV. Ethnic Distribution of Eastern Region's Population. • 67 
V. Major Political Parties of the First Republic of 
Nigeria • • • . • . . • . • • . • 96 
VI. Ethnic Distribution of Major Party Leaders, Nigeria 
(in Percentages). . • . . . • . . • . • . . 100 
VII. Regional Distribution of the Members of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Major Parties, 1959. • 101 
VIII. Selected Communal Bases of Party Support in Situations 
of Interparty Competition • • • . • • . • • • . • . 102 
IX. The Results of Nigerian Elections, 1951-1965 and 1979 103 
X. Percentage Vote (Presidential Election) • • • 113 
XI. Growth of Population in Nigeria, 1901-1963. 124 
viii 
LIST OF MAPS 
Map 
1. Nigeria and Her Neighbors •• 
2. Vegetation and Rainfall Zones in Nigeria. 
3. Main Tribal Groups in Nigeria 





Area Which Came to be Known as Nigeria in 1914 • • • • • 56 
' 5. Principal Ethnic Groups in Northern Region. . . . . . . . . 58 
6. Principal Ethnic Groups in Western Region . . . . 62 
7. Principal Ethnic Groups in Eastern Region 66 
8. Ethnic Majority and Minority Areas of Regions 69 




National integration in Nigeria has proved a delicate and 
continuing process that broadly has involved the interplay 
of institutional and sociological forces ••. It has witnessed 
the interaction of coercive (military), identitive (socio-
psychological), and utilitarian (economic) factors .•• The 
present level of integration of this community and the 
success of future attempts to accelerate integration will 
depend on the judicious use of any or several of these 
factors ••. (Williams, 1968, p. 71) 
The political entity called Nigeria is a polyethnic society with 
more than 250 linguistic groups. It is an artifical creation of the 
British resulting from the amalgamation of northern and southern protec-
torates in 1914. 
Nigeria gained her political independence from Britain on October 
1, 1960 and became a republic on October 1, 1963. But, from the 1940s 
to the 1980s, there have been a series of threats to secede from the 
federation by each of the major ethnic groups--the Hausa-Fulani, the 
Yoruba, and the Ibo. There have been two actual secession bids, although 
the first was a minor issue that was quickly overcome. 
The first of the secession bids was in February 1966, when Isaac 
Boro, Sam Owanaro, and Nottingham Dick--some of the frustrated advocates 
of creating a rivers state out of the former Eastern Region dominated 
by Ibo-speaking people--" declared an illegal 'Delta People's Republic' 
and sought to defend it militarily" (Tamuno, 1970, p. 577). However, 
they were soon arrested by the Nigerian Army, tried and finally condemned 
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to death by the Federal Court for treason. They were later to be 
pardoned in 1967. 
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In May 1967, the people (the Ibo) of the Eastern Region of Nigeria 
under the leadership of the military governor of that region, Lieutenant 
Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared the formation of a new country, the 
"Republic of Biafra". The secession of the east led to a bloody civil 
war which lasted for about three years. 
Besides the secession threats and bids, Nigeria has witnessed a 
number of military coups d'etat and counter coups, the lastest coup being 
that of December 31, 1983 which toppled the four years and three months 
old civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. 
The series of secession threats, the several military coups and 
counter coups, the "ill-fated gamble" and the declared illegal "Delta 
People's Republic", and the secession bids of the east and the subsequent 
civil war that Nigeria has witnessed since Ln the 1940s up to 1983, as 
Osei-Kwame (1980) rightly points out, clearly demonstrates the "lack 
of internal ·political integration in that country" (p. 1). Tamuno 
(1970), a Nigerian scholar and professor of history and a keen observer 
of the Nigerian political trends, also alluded to the problem of national 
unity in Nigeria when he stated, "historically, it was easier to estab-
lish the Nigerian state than to nourish the Nigerian nation •.• The latter 
eluded both British officials and Nigerians for several decades there-
after" (p. 564). 
The question of national integration no doubt stands at the very 
core of the political problems in Nigeria. It stands out in the minds 
of serious and well-meaning Nigerians of all walks of life. It has been 
a problem in the past. It is still a problem and concern today and will 
continue to be a major concern in the years to come. Until this problem 
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is resolved, sectionalism, civil disturbances, threats of secession, 
and possibly another civil war may plague the country in the future. 
Coleman and Roseberg ( 1964) point out that "the problems of inte-
gration are the major issues and obstacles in the task of nation build-
ing, which is itself the primary preoccupation of the leadership (and 
elites) of the new states" (p. 8). This is also true with Nigerian 
political leaders and elites. This concern was vividly reflected in 
the opening statement of the 1979 Federal Republic of Nigerian Constitu-
tion which states: 
We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, having 
firmly and solemnly resolved; to live in unity and harmony 
as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation ..• 
provide for a constitution for the purpose of consolidating 
the unity of our people ( p-. 9). 
That fear of national disintegration is still a basic concern of 
most Nigerian leaders and intelligensia today can be seen in the increas-
ing call on the federal government to emphasize those things that will 
integrate the people of Nigeria and to avoid those that tend to bring 
about disunity among the various groups. 
Achebe (1985), for instance, points out that "Nigeria as a nation 
has not been founded up to now" (p. 34). Speaking to a writer with the 
same keeness of purpose and consummate intimacy of the problems of 
Nigeria as he often does in his literary works, he advised the current 
military leaders on the potentially "explosive" issue of "federal 
character" or "quota" system, not to be obsessed with quota to the exclu-
sion of other considerations. He called on the federal military 
government to serve every community as fairly as possible. For him, 
the answer to the transformation in those areas which are educationally 
behind others does not lie in "halting those who are already ahead." 
He added that "if you (the federal military government) want a country 
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which will even survive into the 21st century you cannot do that" 
(p. 34). 
Similarly, Ajayi (1985) also sees national integration as a serious 
probl~m in Nigeria. He argues that national integration is basic to 
the development of Nigeria. He, therefore urged the Federal Military 
Government to accord national integration a priority and to evolve a 
coherent policy and ideology towards the attainment of that goal. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that after 25 years of political 
independence in which Nigeria has witnessed a series of secession 
threats, four military coups and one attempted coup (in which the Head 
of State, Major General Murtala Mohammed was assassinated), two secession 
bids, a thirty month bloody civil war, and 15 years of military rulership 
(1966-1979, 1983 to the present), Nigeria is still in search of national 
integration. As long as Nigeria continues to grapple with this problem 
of unity and nation-building, integration in Nigeria will continue to 
be a fertile ground of study by students, scholars, and researchers who 
would want to explain the Why of the problem so as to get insight into 
How it can best be resolved. 
In the process of nation-building in the new states, the institu-
tionalization of certain organizations has been identified as critical 
for the attainment of that goal. Political party has been singled out 
as one of such vital and indispensible institutions (Huntington, 1968; 
Coleman and Rosberg, 1964; Wallerstein, 1961; Burnham, 1967). 
This study seeks to focus upon political parties and their role 
in the problems of national integration in Nigeria. 
From the major works of some of the distinguished authors on 
political integration or nation-building in the developing countries 
(Haas, 1958; Deutsch, 1961, 1968; Geertz, 1963; Etzioni, 1964; Weiner, 
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1965; Calleo, 1967; Ake, 1967; Morrison, 1973; and Neuman, 1976), the 
problem of national integration in Nigeria is conceptionalized in this 
study as essentially one of getting the peoples of the various socio-
cultural and discrete linguistic groups within the single territory 
called Nigeria, to identify more with and owe greater loyalty to the 
central government, show willingness to remain in the system, and not 
threaten or make bid to take the "exit" option, that is, to secede. 
Analytical Framework 
Political integration is a phenomenon that-has received great atten-
tion by scholars of international politics and the emergent states. 
In spite of its wide usage, no generally agreed upon framework of analy-
sis of national integration in the new states has emerged. The result 
of this state of affairs is that there are several propositions, 
theories, conceptual frameworks, and paradigms on national integration, 
almost as there are scholars on the subject. Several of these theories 
are discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
This study applies one of these theoretical propositions--the 
political party brokerage theory--in investigating the problems of 
national integration in Nigeria. An analytical framework based on the 
proposition has been evolved for the purpose of the investigation. The 
scope of the framework will be a focus on certain dimensions of the 
Nigerian party system and the linkage of these dimensions to major crises 
in Nigeria and how these crises situations hinder national integration. 
The framework of analysis consists of the following dimensions: 
1. The identification of the major political parties in Nigeria 
up to 1966, and in the 1979 elections. 
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2. The scope, nature, and political bases of the major political 
parties as determined by: 
a. The ethnic composition of the leadership group of each 
of the major parties. 
b. The regional composition of the leadership group of the 
parties. 
c. The communal bases of party support in situations of 
interparty competition, and 
d. The electoral returns for each of the major parties in 
regional and federal elections from 1951-1965, and 1979. 
3. The part played by political parties (by virtue of their scope) 
in major political crises in Nigeria from 1952 to 1965 and how these 
crises serve as impediments to national integration in Nigeria. 
Several studies indicate that stability and national integration 
in a heterogeneous and complex political culture or society depends on 
and can be enhanced to the extent that groups; particularly political 
parties' membership reflects the diverse ethnic groups of the society 
(Truman, 1951; Coser, 1956; Lipset, 1963; and Lijphart, 1971). Such 
broad-based groups can act as a kind of balancing mechanism which can 
hinder deep cleavages along ethnic axis. 
With regard to Africa, Coleman and Rosberg (1964) observed that 
political parties are "the most crucial political structures shaping 
the new African polities, and that the crises of national integration 
is the major hurdle in nation-building" (p. v). They theorized that 
."parties are destined, because of their central importance, to play a 
determinative role in the resolution of, or in the failure to solve, 
the problems of integration" (p. 8). 
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Similarly, Wallerstein (1961) stated that the integration of a 
country can be assured in the long run only if "majority of the citizens 
owe greater loyalty to the central government (than they do to their 
ethnic group or region) and begin to accept the state as the legitimate 
holder of force and authority, the rightful locus of legislation and 
social decision" (p. 88). Loyalty to the state can be measured by the 
sense of restraints its citizens feel in pursuing their demands or 
opposition to specific policies of the central government. According 
to Wallerstein, if the citizens "oppose the particular government in 
power but stop at a point short of destroying the state, (seceeding) 
or seriously weakening it, they can be said to be loyal" (p. 87). 
A mechanism or mechanisms that are national in scope and orientation 
which can attract and hold the loyalty of the citizens and serve as 
intermediaries between the citizens and the state, and are able to turn 
the loyalty of the members to the service of the nation, are indis-
pensible in the process of nation-building. Wallerstein identifies 
political parties as such mechanisms. He noted that "as one surveys 
the African scene today, one observes that where the party and the 
leaders are weak, so are the processes of national integration" (p. 95). 
Wallerstein made the case for the vital role that parties can play and 
does play in national integration when he added: 
Because the party, not the government, is the emanation of 
the people, that is, holds their loyalty and ties them to 
the state, the party integrates the nation and allows the 
integration to be accomplished by a method that maximizes 
the opportunity of every citizen to participate on a regular 
and meaningful basis in the decision-making process (p. 98). 
He also noted that there is a correlation between the strength of 
party and the leader and the degree of national integration and stabil-
ity. 
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Finally, Burnham (1967) also points to the integrative function 
that political parties play in democratic societies. He identified four 
broad functions which are performed by democratic parties as 
1. Office-filling function or elite recruitment, 
2. Political education or political socialization, 
3. Policy-making function, and 
4. Nation-building. 
According to Burnham, the nation-building function, also referred to 
as integrative function, involves 
the regularized amalgamation and priority ordering of 
conflicting regional, ethnocultural, group, or class 
interests through the mechanisms of the political party. 
In modern politics, broad acceptance of the legitimacy 
of (and loyalty to) the political regime as a whole 
depends in large measure on the successful performance 
of the integrative function by the political parties 
(p. 278). 
Burnham also asserts that a broad-based national political party is most 
likely to "accommodate an enormous variety of horizontal cleavages ... such 
as the clash of sectional subcultures, clash between' community' and 
'society', and the clash of ethnocultural groups" (pp. 282-285). 
To the extent that the above assertion is valid, it can also be 
argued that in a pluralistic society where the major political parties 
coincide with the dominant ethnic groups in the regions, the major clea-
vages are more likely to coincide and reinforce one another. Similarly, 
there is more likely to be a total devotion to the position of the group 
and region, and an intolerance of opposing groups. This is very true 
of Nigeria. As Diamond (1982) pointed out, it was the "progressive 
polarization of conflict between sectional parties that significantly 
contributed to the failure of the first Nigerian Republic" (p. 30). 
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One thing that is apparent from the above analysis is the seemingly 
diametrically opposite roles that political parties can play in devel-
oping countries. They can serve as instruments of political fragmenta-
tion and instability or as effective mechanisms for fostering stability 
and national integration in the emerging states. 
Hypothesis 
Nigeria is one of the new states in the continent of Africa with 
a number of political parties before and after it attained political 
independence. Since she achieved self-independence on October 1, 1960, 
Nigeria has witnessed a number of major political crises--coups d'etat 
and counter coups, threats of secession and secession bids, and a civil 
war which lasted for 30 months. These major crises situations are 
considered as indicators of problems of national integration in Nigeria. 
Nigeria, therefore, offers a fertile ground for the testing of the pro-
position by Coleman and Rosberg (1964) that "parties are destined, 
because of their central importance to play a determinative role in the 
resolution, or failure to solve the problems of integration" in the new 
states (p. v). 
This study addresses itself to the role political parties as insti-
tutional structures have played in the process of integration in 
Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, it can be hypothesized that, because 
the major political parties were not broad-based or national in scope 
(they were ethnoregionally based), they were most likely to constitute 
an impediment to political integration in Nigeria. This proposition 
will be examined in detail in Chapter IV. 
The underlying assumption of the above proposition is that where 
parties are genuine and truly national in scope, its membership will 
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clearly exceed the boundaries of any particular ethnic group or region. 
This feature (national scope) will enable the parties to be more tolerant 
of opposing views, adequately represent and think in terms of the 
interests of the diverse groups within its membership and hence think 
more of national interest rather than the interest of a particular ethnic 
group or region. In such a situation, with time, members will come to 
develop a firm consensus among themselves that their several destinies 
would be best served by working together as Nigerians and owing loyalty 
to the state that supercedes that to traditional institutions and even 
loyalty to the party itself. Thus, by virtue of their national base, 
the parties will come to serve as vital and indispensible instruments 
for fostering national integration in Nigeria. 
Significance of the Study 
The search for the factors that militate against national integra-
tion cannot be an idle academic endeavor. Most scholars will agree that 
an understanding of how certain factors, such as political parties, 
hinder efforts at political integration can provide an insight, at least, 
as to ways that can be evolved to curtail, if not eliminate, these 
"de-integrators." The logic of this argument is that if the factor( s) 
analyzed actually constitute a disease in the body politics of the 
country, then correct diagnosis--which implies an understanding of the 
causes - can possibly lead to a cure. 
Finally, the findings of this study will contribute to the body 
of theoretical knowledge in the area of national integration, partic-
ularly in the developing countries. It may also be of interest and 
importance to the intelligensia, practicing and non-practicing 
politicians, as well as those within the country who are committed to 
the unity of that potentially great country, Nigeria. 
Research Method 
ll 
The basic research method for this study is documentary analysis. 
The sources of data, therefore, are purely secondary and occasionally 
primary. Generally, data will be drawn from relevant published works 
on Nigeria and in the general area of integration; official documents 
including interviews or statements by the Head of State and other 
government officials, legislations, government reports and white papers, 
decrees, journal articles, newspaper comments and features and edito-
rials. Books constitute the other major souce of information. 
Definition of Critical Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the following concepts will be 
defined thus: 
First Republic: refers to that period between the years 1963 and 
1966; 1963 when Nigeria became constitutionally republic and 1966 when 
that republic came to an end in a military coup (Dudley, 1982). 
Minority States: refers to those states which formerly constituted 
minority areas in the then three regions prior to 1964. In this study, 
minority states include: Bendel State in former Western Region; Rivers 
and Cross-Rivers States in former Eastern Region; and Benue, Plateau, 
Kwarra, Niger, Gongola, Benue, and Borno in former Northern Region. 
Nationally Based Parties: have their membership clearly trans-
cending the boundaries of any particular ethnic group or region. In 
other words, the parties' membership represents a broad cross-section 
of the diverse ethnic groups of the country, thus reflecting the 
country's federal character. 
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National Integration: is the condition whereby the various soc1o-
cultural and linguistic groups within the single territory called Nigeria 
come to identify more with and owe greater loyalty to the central 
government than to particularistic group, show willingness to remain 
in the system and not threaten or make bid to take the "exit" option, 
that is, to secede. 
Parochial Political Parties: lack a national base in the sense 
that they draw most of their support from a constituency limited by tribe 
or region (Schwarz, 1965). 
Public Institutions: refer to those organizations, or structures, 
through which the political affairs of government are conducted and 
managed (Dudley, 1982, p. 41). 
Political Parties: are formal organizations which compete through 
the electoral process to control (either singly or in coalition with 
other similar organizations) the personnel and polices of government. 
Second Republic: refers to the system of rule which was inaugu-
rated October 1, 1979 and came to an end with the military coup of 
December 31, 1983. 
In Chapter II of the study, we will discuss the various definitions, 
conditions, strategies, and theories of national integration. Chapter 
III opens with a discussion of the background to Nigeria, stressing the 
geography, precolonial history, colonialism, and postcolonial political 
developments. Chapter IV investigates the nature of the major Nigerian 
political parties, how the rivalry and conflicts between and among these 
parties have generated certain crises situations which in turn impede 
political integration in Nigeria. The fifth and concluding chapter 
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summarizes what has been discussed in the previous chapters. In addi-
tion, a case will be made that a two party system will be most appro-
priate for fostering national integration in Nigeria. 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINITIONS, CONDITIONS, THEORIES, AND 
STATEGIES OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION 
Definitions of National Integration 
The concept of "integration" has been widely used as an "heuristic 
device" for the study of the emerging states. The result is that there 
is a vast, and still expanding, professional literature on integration 
with particular reference to "third" world countries. Consequently, 
"integration" is now part of the vocabulary of every student and scholar 
of political development, modernization and change and political insta-
bility. 
In spite of its popularity and wide usage, a generally accepted 
definition of national integration is yet to emerge. Often, scholars, 
students, researchers, authors and political leaders use the term dif-
ferently; sometimes narrowly, other times broadly, and yet sometimes 
synonymously and interchangeably with political integration, national 
or political unification, nation-building, political stability or poli-
tical development. Furthermore, the term has also been used relatively 
differently as a "process," as a "condition," and sometimes it is used 
in both meanings. 
In order, therefore, to arrive at an operational definition of 
national integration that will be used in this study, the author will 
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examine first some of the different meanings of the concept in order 
to elicit the broad themes common to most of the definitions. 
To integrate, according to Deutsch (1968) generally "means to make 
a whole out of parts--that is to turn previously separate units into 
components of a coherent system" (p. 158). He added that "an integrated 
system is cohesive to the extent that it can withstand stress and strain, 
support disequilibrium, and resist disruptions" (p. 160). In an earlier 
work, Deutsch (1961) had defined integration as 
the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal 
or informal institutions or practices sufficiently strong 
and wide spread to assure peaceful change· among members of 
a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of 
time (p. 98). 
Such an integrated community, 1.n Deutsch's terms, 1.s a "security commu-
nity." 
Morrison (1972) defines integration as: 
a process by which members of a social system develop 
linkages and cohesion so that the boundaries of the system 
persist over-time and the boundaries of subsystems become 
less consequential in affecting behavior (p. 925). 
Similarly, Binder (1964) views political integration as involving 
the creation of "a cultural-ideological consensus of a very high degree 
of comprehensiveness" ( p. 630). Like Binder, Coleman and Rosberg ( 1964) 
defined integration as the "progressive reduction of cultural and 
regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the 
process of creating a homogeneous political community" (p. 9). Coleman 
and Rosberg also defined it as "the progressive bridging of the elite-
mass gap" (Ibid). 
The definitions of Deutsch, Morrison, Binder, and Coleman and 
Rosberg emphasize shared culture or gradual elimination of subordinate 
cultures in order to achieve a homogeneous political culture and 
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national integration. This perspective has been referred to as assimi-
lationist definitions or models. 
The assimilationist perspective has been greatly criticized by 
scholars of integration. For instance, Etzioni (1964) taking issue with 
Deutsch's contention that a common culture is a prerequisite for unifi-
cation, argues that culturalism is not necessarily a prerequisite for 
integration. He advances two possible arguements to explain his point. 
First, he pointed out that many cultural characteristics may not be 
politically relevant because political culture is part of the general 
culture. He made the point that "sharing culture is not required for 
unification, nor does the lack of a shared culture prevent it; it simply 
has little effect on political unification" (p. 35). 
The second argument Etzioni made was that shared culture may not 
be a "prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be ful-
filled before the process can be advanced" ( 1964, p. 36). 
For Haas (1958), political integration is 
••• the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalities, 
expectations, and political activities toward a new center, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the 
existing national states" (p. 16). 
He views the end result of the process of political integration to be 
a new political community defined as a "condition in which specific 
groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political 
institutions than do any other political authority in a specific period 
of time and in definable geographical area" (pp. 13-14). 
The Haas' definition is an example where political/national inte-
gration is sometimes defined both as a "process" and a "condition." 
The Hass' definition or version of integration extends the meaning 
considerably away from an exclusive focus on institutions to the people 
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involved. In other words, there is a dual development which is inter-
connected; "the modification of behavior which goes together with the 
building-up of new, supranational institutions" (p. 301). 
Weiner (1965) has identified five specific usages of the concept 
of integration: 
1. National Integration: LS the process of bringing together 
culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit 
and the establishment of a national identity which overshadows sub-
ordinate parochial loyalities. This definition recognizes that national 
integration involves, in most cases, plural societies with distinct 
ethnic, religious, linguistic, and self-conscious cultural qualities, 
or other groups and strata. It also implies the subjective feelings 
that individuals in different groups or strata have toward the nation. 
2. Territorial Integration: is the establishment of national 
central authority over subordinate political units or regions. This 
implies objective territorial control (pp. 44-45). Osei-Kwame (1980) 
refers to territorial integration as "horizontal integration" (p. 1). 
3. Elite-Mass Integration: is the linking of government with 
the governed, assuming that there LS a gap between them. This type of 
integration has been referred to as "vertical integration" (Osei-Kwame, 
1980, p. 1). 
4. Value Integration: LS the minimum value consensus necessary 
to maintain a social order; the common myths, symbols, beliefs, and 
shared history of the people. 
5. Integrative Behavior: is the capacity of people in a society 
to organize for some common purposes. 
The Weiner's identification reveals the variety of meanings and usages 
of the concept of integration which are not always clearly defined. 
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Furthermore, Geertz (1963) defines national integration in contem-
porary new nations as: 
... the aggregation of independently defined, specifically 
outlined, traditional primordial groups into larger, more 
diffuse units, whose implicit frame of reference is not the 
local scene but the 'nation' - in the sense of the whole 
society encompassed by the new civil state (p. 163). 
Similarly, Cal leo ( 1967) defines national integration as "the process 
by which member states give up making key public policies independently 
and instead make them jointly within a supranational cadre or pass them 
on to a new supranational administration" (p. 56). The central theme 
of Calleo's definition is the co-existence of this new supranational 
authority with pre-existing ones of the nation-state. This is more or 
less a focus on institutions. 
Furthermore, Neuman (1976) points out that national integration 
is not a measure of social homogeneity, but of 
the ability of a political unit (a state for the purpose of 
this study) to conduct its important and necessary business 
without disaffecting large bodies of its constituents so that 
they are no longer willing to have their affairs regulated by 
or to participate in that political system (p. 20). 
In other words, a state, whether homogeneous or not, is integrated so 
long as none of its constituents has taken or threaten to take the 
"exit" option. The Neuman Schema is more explicit because it clearly 
provides "an easily identifiable index or indicator of national inte-
gration and that is nonrecourse to the 'exit' option by members of the 
political system" (Olugbemi, 1978, p. 18). The Neuman's framework also 
makes it possible to distinguish between political instability and mal-
integration. Thus, a state may face internal political crises without 
being malintegrated. Moreover, he does not equate integration with 
cultural homogeneity, nor the absence of conflicts with integration. 
Finally, Etzioni (1965) considers a community integrated if: 
(a) it has an effective control over the use of the means 
of violence, 
(b) it has a center of decision making capable of affect-
ing significantly the (authoritative) allocations of 
resources and rewards throughout the community, and 
(c) it is the dominant focus of political identification 
for a large majority of politically aware citizens 
(p. 4). 
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Etzioni equates "political integration" with political community and 
political community, to him, is one that possess the three dimensions 
(a-c) above. He added that 
••• a community is established only when it has self-
sufficient integrative mechanisms; that is, when the 
maintenance of its existence is provided for by its own 
processes and is not dependent upon those of external 
systems or member units (p. 9). 
From the above analysis of the definitions of integration, three 
broad themes common to most of the definitions can be identified. These 
include: 
1. The existence of an identifiable territory or political entity 
inhabited by the peoples to be integrated, 
2. The existence of a central government within that political 
system, and 
3. Loyalties of the peoples to the central government that should 
supercede loyalties to their parochial institutions. 
In this study, the term national integration is used interchange-
ably in Weiner's first and second senses, and as used by Neuman and 
Etzioni. In this respect, national integration in the case of Nigeria 
can be seen as the condition whereby the various sociocultural and 
discrete linguistic groups within the single territorial unit (the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria) 
1. Identify more and owe greater loyalty to the central government, 
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2. Participate in the Nigerian political system, 
3. Show willingness to have the central government regulate their 
affairs, and 
4. No longer threaten or make bid to take the "exit" option, that 
is, to secede. 
This reseacher considers the Werner, Neuman, and Etzioni defini-
tions as adequate for this study because he considers the assimilationist 
definitions of national integration as being unrealistic in the context 
of Nigeria specifically, and Africa in general. Smock and Bentsil-Enchil 
(1976), for example, have noted that given the tenacity of ethnic iden-
tities and the inevitable role they will continue to play in the politi-
cal process of African countries, any attempt or effort at achieving 
homogenization will be unrealistic. 
Nordlinger (1972) also critizes the assimilation definitions and 
approaches when he contends that it is fruitless and even dangerous for 
government leaders in plural societies (like Nigeria) to vigorously 
attempt to inculcate a national identity. To him, plural societies can 
only remain viable if their leaders emphasize conflict regulation and 
concession rather than mobilization. Osei-Kwame (1980), himself an 
African and a political scientist, made the point even clearer when he 
pointed out that in spite of the fact that 
most Africans today are learning new norms and behavior 
through formal education, intermingling with other ethnic 
groups ... increasing physical mobility and intermarriage ... 
they do not seem to be abandoning old indigenous norms and 
behavior (p. xxii). 
This, to him, demonstrates that Africans are unlikely to give up 
everything of their past in favor of new mores. The dominant political 
process, he observes, going on in Africa is "not assimilation but an 
accommodation and interpenetration of new institutions, norms, and 
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behavior" (p. xxii). He believes, unlike the proponents of the assimi-
lation models, in the possibility that "strong intragroup cohesion can 
co-exist alongside equally robust levels of cross-ethnic or state 
loyalty' in Africa (p. xviii). Finally, he made the interesting point 
that in the developed countries like the United States of America (like 
~n most developing countries such as Nigeria), ethnic differences 
continue to be increasingly politicized, especially in elections. If 
in the United States there seems to be nothing necessarily incompatible 
between stressing one's Italian, Polish, Irish, or Jewish identity and 
one's American citizenship, he wonders why it has to take a different 
pattern in Africa. 
Thus, the accommodation definitions/models of national integration 
are most appropriate to analyzing and explaining problems of political 
integration in Nigeria than the assimilationist models. The author 
regards the assimilation approach to integration as another form of 
colonization, this time, of major ethnic groups over smaller ethnic 
groups within a defined territorial unit. However, it is possible to 
note that 
states that have attempted to promote homogenization have 
also made some concessions to the intergroup accommodation 
model, and the states at the other end of the continuum have 
expressed some interest in promoting depluralization (Smock 
and Bentsil-Enchil, 1976, p. 23). 
Finally, Mazrui (1972) also made a similar point when he asserted 
that national integration necessitates both some depluralization of 
society and the simultaneous establishment of mechanisms for intergroup 
conflict resolution. He noted that some concessions to the ethnically 
plural character of African states seems essential if their political 
systems are to remain viable and peaceful. 
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Process of Political Integration 
There are a number of conditions which do affect national inte-
gration. Etzioni (1965), in his book, Political Unification: A 
Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, considers the question of 
the conditions under which the process of integration/unification is 
initiated from four viewpoints by raising the following questions: 
1. What is the state of each societal unit that is to become a 
member of the union? 
2. What is the nature of the aggregate of these units? 
3. Are the environmental factors favorable for integration? 
4. To what degree was there interdependence and integration before 
a specific process of national integration was initiated? 
Deutsch (1966) suggests twelve factors, while Phillip and Toscano (1964) 
suggest ten factors that appear to exert an integrative influence upon 
people and political communities. 
For the purpose of this study, the several conditions of integra-
tion that have been identified are subsummed under eight of the ten 
factors identified by Phillip and Toscano as follows: 
1. Territorial and Geographical Proximity 
According to Phillip and Toscano (1964), the closer people live 
together geographically, the more likely they are to develop integrative 
relationships among themselves. Similarly, the closer communities are 
to each other, the greater the likelihood of their political integra-
tion. They, however, pointed out that this hypothesis is usually 
indirect and must be mediated through other variables such as homo-
geneity, interaction or transactions, and mutual knowledge among the 
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groups. In other words, territorial contiguity of member units give 
them some definite advantages but does not guarantee an automatic 
success of the integrative effort. Geographical proximity and the 
absence of natural barriers such as seas and oceans or high mountain 
ranges between the protectorates of Nigeria helped to make the 1914 
amalgamation possible. 
2. Degree of Homogeneity 
The hypothesis here holds that "the more that communities are simi-
lar, the more successful are attempts to build integrative relationship 
among them, and conversely, communities whose members are very different 
from one another will have a very hard time achieving or maintaining 
political integration" (Phillip and Toscano, 1964, p. 18). Thus, social 
and cultural homogeneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility 
of national integration. Where this advantage is absent as in Nigeria, 
characterized by heterogeneity, pluralistic ethnic groupings, and frag-
mented political culture, the achievement and maintenance of political 
integration may not be easy to come by. 
3. Mutual Knowledge or Cognitive Proximity 
Phillip and Toscano (1964) also point out that mutual knowledge 
or understanding among people and groups of people is essential to their 
functioning together effectively as a political community. They argue 
that unless people are aware of each other and know a good deal about 
one another, they are not likely to enter into social or political 
partnership, however much alike they may be in terms of elements of 
homogeneity. This condition is also appropriate to Nigeria. Although 
the various ethnic groups in Nigeria have been living close together 
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before the advent of colonialism, they have very little contact with 
one another and virtually no mutual understanding among themselves until 
they were forcefully brought together under one colonial experience. 
This is one of the reasons why the different ethnic groups do not trust 
one another. They are basically suspicious of one another to the extent 
that a totally functional integration of these diverse groups has become 
a major problem in the country. 
4. Government Effectiveness 
This refers to the capacity of the government to satisfy social 
expectations of the different groups. The proposition here is that 
"governmental effectiveness is necessary to retain the loyalties of the 
members of the community, and such loyalty is necessary to maintain 
internal integration in the community" (Phillip and Toscano, 1964, 
p. 43). They also point out that "government ineffectiveness, on the 
other hand, will engender pressures for new, different, or external forms 
of integration" (Ibid). This variable is particularly important in 
analyzing the degree of integration in societies where the governments 
are the chief employers of the salaried labor force and the principal 
controller and distributor of economic goods and social services. 
The ability of such a government to satisfy the needs of the 
diverse groups will depend on its distributive capacity, which in turn, 
may depend on three categories of integrative powers--"coercive, 
utilitarian, and identitive" (Etzioni, 1965, p. 37). Coercive power 
refers to the use of force by the government to compel or impose its 
will or norms on the member units. This capacity stems from the govern-
ment's monopoly over the instruments of coercion and its legitimate use. 
The use of force or the threat of force may sometimes be sufficient to 
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guarantee compliance in normal times. In Nigeria, the coerc~ve 
capacity has been resorted to a couple of times, such as in the three 
year civil war, the TIV riots, and the western region crisis in the 
mid-1960s. 
Utilitarian power of government results from its control of the 
economic possessions, technical and administrative capabilities, and 
its manipulation of these assets in a way that it can bring the subunits 
to comply with the norms it upholds for its members. 
Finally, the "identitive" power involves the symbolic identification 
of the citizens with their government. These identitive potentials are 
usually "values or symbols built up by educational and religious institu-
tions, national rituals, and other mechanisms" (Etzioni, 1965, p. 39). 
5. Functional Interests 
The hypothesis put forward here by Phillip and Toscano (1964) is 
that "integration is dependent on the extent to which the dominant 
functional interests are shared in each community and, thus, could be 
advanced by intercommunity agreement or association" (p. 29). It should 
be noted, however, that because people's devotion to particular interests 
may change with time and circumstances, converging functional interest 
"may not promise a firm and lasting basis for integration" (Ibid). 
6. Communal Character or Social Motive 
McClelland (1961) has identified three major sets of motivation 
that tend to differentiate societies. These are: 1. an affiliation 
motive, 2. an achievement motive, and 3. a power motive. Phillip and 
Toscano (1964) considers the affiliation motive as relevant to the issue 
of integration or cooperative behavior. Based on the McClelland's 
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typology, Phillip and Toscano hypothesized that "those societies 
characterized by a high proportion of affiliation motive, in contrast 
to achievement and power motives, would be both internally cohesive and 
strongly disposed to cooperate with other communities" hence national 
integration may be possible under such a condition (pp. 34-35). 
7. Structural Frame 
The argument here is that structures often result in certain 
ideological dispositions and that communities with a common or similar 
political structures have ideological affinities that make it possible 
for them to integrate more easily (Phillip and Toscano, 1964). 
The several ethnic groups in Nigeria did have different govern-
mental structures prior to colonialism. Consequently, each has its own 
ideological dispositions. The result is that today there is no clear-cut 
ideology in the country that can serve to unite or integrate the diverse 
linguistic and cultural groups. 
8. Previous Integrative Experience 
Finally, the studies of European integration by Haas (1968) suggests 
that integration may occur more easily if there have been previous 
integrative experiences. Tascano (1964) refers to similar experiences 
from the findings of his study of the Philadelphia suburban communities 
as "spill-over" effect. Furthermore, the pattern of political activity 
forced on a community by external forces such as colonialism, may 
generate the initial momentum for integration, but in most cases, such 
a common colonial experience may not be sufficient to sustain a firm 
integration among the different nationalities. Nigeria is an example 
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of this externally imposed amalgamation which has failed up to date to 
generate the much desired national integration. 
Theories of National Integration 
Just as the definition of integration varied, so do the proposed 
theories, strategies, and models for achieving political integration. 
Generally, most theories of national integration have been adopted from 
those theories of international political integration that have direct 
relevance for the analysis of the processes of national integration. 
It should be noted at this juncture, that most of the theoretical works 
on political integration have been developed within the field of inter-
national relations or relations among sovereign states. 
The theories of national integration fall into two broad cate-
gories. The first is the pluralist version which involves the creation 
of cross-cutting affiliations among the different cultural groups within 
a society. Osei-Kwame (1980) refers to this approach as the "cultural 
accommodation model" (p. xix). The second approach is called the assim-
ilationist version. Osei-Kwame refers to it as the "cultural dis-
placement model" because this version assumes that "primordial and civil 
ties are mutually exclusive and that integration takes the form of zero-
sum game culminating in the emergence of a homogeneous nation" (Zolberg, 
1967, p. 451). That means that intragroup cohesion and loyalties should 
disappear and be replaced by loyalty to social classes or to the society 
called the state before integration can occur. 
Whether pluralist or assimilationist, theories of political inte-
gration are important because they not only offer descriptions of 
various forms of integration and an explanation of the conditions which 
sustain them, but also provide an insight into the requisite 
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socioeconomic and political policies and structures for creating or meet-
ing these conditions and achieving national integration. 
The theories of national integration will be summarized under the 
following categories, which are fairly exhaustive. 
1. Theory of Charismatic Leadership 
Through an extensive review and analysis of the studies in integra-
tion, Ake (1969) grouped those approaches which emphasize charismatic 
leadership as an important factor in furthering political integration 
into a category called "charismatic legitimation." The theory concerns 
itself with how "the state comes to be the primary focus of the indi-
vidual's loyalties, when, to begin with, these loyalties were formerly 
focused on parochial institutions such as the chieftancy or the tribal 
council" (Ake, 1967, p. 51). The theory suggests that one mechanism 
by which such a transfer of loyalties may be achieved is through the 
charismatic leader whose appeal to a broad spectrum of the different 
cultural and linguistic groups enable it to manipulate the diverse 
groups to transfering their political loyalties from parochial to central 
levels--or institutions. 
According to Ake (1967), the underlying assumption of the theory 
is that the masses respect the charismatic leader in a way they do not 
respect the state. It is this love and respect for the magnetic person-
ality of the leader that he seizes upon to buttress the state until it 
(the state) wins its own legitimacy. Apter (1963) recognizes the vital 
integrative role the charismatic leader can play and does play in the 
process of nation-building in the emerging states when he wrote: 
as charisma has worked ••• as a newly accepted source of 
legitimacy, it has provided for the public extension of 
legitimacy and support to new types of social structures 
in keeping with the objectives of nationalism (nation-
building) meanwhile retaining subregional aspects of the 
traditional system and integrating these aspects in 
different relational and behavioral modes (p. 303). 
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Other proponents of charismatic leadership as an important transitional 
factor which can further political integration include Wallerstein 
(1961), Weber (1957), Runciman (1963), and Horowitz (1963). 
The theory of charismatic legitimation has come under criticisms 
by scholars of political integration. First, the concept, charisma, 
has been criticized on several grounds. For instance, Friedrich (1961) 
points out that charisma does not provide an adequate type of leadership 
but only of power. He also noted that "power is differentiated accord-
ing to its source, leadership according to its function" (p. 21). 
Leadership, he added, presupposes the existence of structured power, 
that is, institutionalized power "but, since charisma is the very 
antithesis of stuctuerd power, it is not clear what charismatic leader-
shipmeans" (Ake, 1967, p. 56). 
Enmet (1958) suggests that Weber "has conceptualized charisma too 
narrowly and assimilated it too hastily to a personal and irrational 
kind of authority" (p. 242). She suggests that charisma is more appli-
cable to inspirational leadership than to the "hypnotic" leadership which 
Weber describes. Similarly, Blau (1963) has pointed out that Weber's 
theory "encompasses only the historical processes that lead from charis-
matic movements to increasing rationalization and does not include an 
analysis of the historical conditions that give rise to charismatic 
eruptions in the social structure" (p. 309). Popper (1959) also argued 
that to the extent that charisma implies integrated following, the theory 
of charismatic legitimation offers a purely deductive explanation of 
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political integration. Deductive "because its explicans does not contain 
statements that go beyond the explicandum" (p. 59). 
Finally, because of the many thorny problems raised and the concep-
tual difficulties associated with the theory of charismatic legitimation, 
Ake (1967) has suggested two modifications in the theory. First, he 
urged that the concept of charisma should be dropped, for, while it is 
not essential to the theory, it is the major source of its weakness. 
Second, the personal authority for buttressing the state should not be 
sought from one charismatic leader but from a multiplicity of sources 
--traditional authorities and leaders of important sec~ndary associa-
tions. 
Ake's second point LS particularly relevant to a complex society 
such as Nigeria because it takes into congnizance the fact that the 
multi-ethnic composition, the cultural heterogeneity, and the socio-
political cleavages among the diverse groups in the new state can 
militate against the emergence of a leader with a nationwide personal 
appeal and authority. 
2. The Political Party Brokerage Theory 
This theory is closely related to that of charismatic legitimation. 
It is supported by Wallerstein (1961), Emerson (1966), Sklar (1967), 
LaPolombara and Weiner (1966), Stokes (1965, 1969), Coleman and Rosberg 
(1964), and Burnham (1967). 
Wallerstein (1961) argues that national integration can only be 
presumed to have occurred when the citizen accepts the state as "the 
legitimate holder of force and authority, the locus of legislation and 
social decision" (p. 88). The legitimation of the state involves con-
scentious effort to get the citizen to regard it as a genuine 
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representative of his interests and, therefore, deserving his loyalty. 
In other words, it is to a large degree a matter of making him think 
of the state as "we" rather than "they" (Ibid, p. 91). 
The principal instruments for legitimating the new state, for 
Wallerstein, are the dominant political party whose functions should 
include: communicating ideas between the government and the people; 
educating the citizenry and enlisting support for governmental policies; 
and strengthening social solidarity with its ideology. All these 
functions, according to Wallerstein, enables integration to be accom-
plished in a manner Which maximizes mass participation. It is the party, 
then, that serves as "the structure by which the unifying influence of 
the charismatic leader assumes a stable and tangible mold" (Ak.e, 1967, 
p. 53). 
Elaborating on the party brokage thesis, Osei-Kwame (1980) has 
identified two assumptions inherent in the theory. The first thesis 
is that in their attempt to broaden their support base in order to win 
elections, political parties, of necessity, formulate ideologies and 
policies which amalgamate both parochial and national interest groups. 
This, however, does not eliminate the necessity of parties appealing 
to their own ethnic groups. This is Why countries with various ethnic 
groups, such as Nigeria, are very likely to benefit from the integrative 
role of political parties. 
The second point Osei-Kwame made was that the political brokerage 
thesis assumes an environment in which multiparty democracy and free 
and fair elections are practiced. He argues that this approach "has 
no relevance in most African states today because the no-party military 
regimes, one-party regimes, and manipulated elections are so entrenched 
on the continent" (p. 34). Osei-Kwame's criticism not withstanding, 
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there is no doubt that political parties that are well-organized and 
institutionalized with memberships adequately representing a broad 
cross-section of the country do play a vital role in the integrative 
process in developing countries. One way they do this is by encouraging 
in the members a sense of loyalty and devotion and a feeling of security 
and confidence in the political system. 
3. The Elite-Mass Gap Theory 
This theory considers national integration as the systematic bridg-
ing of the -socioeconomic and cultural "gap" between the modernizing or 
ruling political elites and the masses. Coleman and Rosberg (1964), 
Binder (1964), and Shils (1958) are some of the authors who have examined 
the elite-mass gap in systematic and comprehensive fashion. 
Coleman and Rosberg (1964), for instance, defines political 
integration in terms of the elite-mass gap: "political integration ••• 
refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical 
plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and 
a participant political culture" (p. 7). They see national integration 
as including "the reduction of cultural and regional tensions and dis-
continuities on the horizontal plane" (Ibid). Thus, their strategy 
involves, first, the bridging of what they call an "elite-mass gap" and, 
secondly, the forging of what they term "territorial integration." 
According to Coleman and Rosberg (1964), the elite-mass gap is 
"generic to the Afro-Asian world ••• and it is the core of the issue of 
national integration in these states" (p. 686). Once this gap is 
bridged, the authors believe, the result will be "the development of 
an integrated political process and a participant political culture" 
(p. 9). 
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Shils (1958, 1960), like Coleman and Rosberg, sees national 
integration in the new states as dependent primarily on the closing of 
the elite-mass gap. In his 1958 article "The Concentration and Disper-
sion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped 
Countries", Shils argued that it is mistaken to assume that the gap 
between the highly political outlook of the ruling elite and the pre-
political outlook of the masses is caused by the detribalization of the 
former. He pointed out that the moderinization of the elite cannot be 
the relevant point because "in its political orientation, the educated 
elite displays a striking affinity with the traditional cultures from 
which it is supposed to be emancipated" ( p. 2.). 
In a later article published in 1960, Shils identifies parochialism 
as one of the factors causing the elite-mass gap. He observes that the 
importance of parochial loyalties in the political and administrative 
systems of the emergent states hinders the establishment of a tradition 
of bureaucratic impartiality. Parochialism causes mutual alientation 
of the masses and the rural elite. Parochialism itself, he noted, is 
intensified by the stratification system of the new state. The result 
of these features is the absence of a middle-class that will mediate 
between the powerful and wealthy on the one hand and the poor, under-
privileged masses on the other hand. Consequently, there is a great 
polarization between the ruling elite and the masses in the new state. 
His prescription for bridging the gap is political democracy which 
guarantees the dispersion of initiative. 
There is no doubt that the gap between the ruling class and the 
masses is an important obstacle to national integration in the new 
states. But, it is only one of the many cleavages that characterize 
the new states. Therefore, the panacea to malintegration in these states 
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does not lie only in bridging the elite-mass gap. This is why the 
theories of integration that focus on the bridging of the elite-mass 
gap are also limited in their usages. 
While Coleman and Rosberg's analysis can be considered as being 
broader than that of Shils', their framework is also limited. For 
instance, they said little about how territorial integration is to be 
achieved other than the implied suggestion that the closing of the 
elite-mass gap will cause the primordial ties to be transcended. 
Secondly, the authors hardly at any point attempted to define what they 
meant by the "elite". Thirdly, Dudley (1976) points out that when 
Coleman and Rosberg talk of a "modernizing elite" and the "traditional 
mass," they are in fact assuming that both are relatively homogeneous 
groups. To talk of these groups as modernizing elite could be mislead-
ing. Dudley (1976), therefore, suggested that the term "elite" (and 
traditional mass) "need to be preceded by a more appropriate or suitable 
adjectival prefixes that describe the existence of congeries of elites: 
economics, political, traditional, bureaucratic, respect, and so on" 
(p. 32). 
Ake (1967), in critizing the work of Shils, raised similar points 
made by Dudley with respect to the misleading usage of the term "elite." 
He states that, "it is unfortunate that emphasis on the elite-mass gap 
had tended to obscure the divisions and antagonisms on both sides of 
the gap" ( p. 75). He added: 
'Mass' and 'elite' are not necessarily homogeneous entities. 
For instance, those whom we lump together as the Nigerian 
masses may be Hausas, Ibos, Yorubas, (Ijaws, Urhobos, 
Itshekiris, Binis, Ishans), or TIV, Catholics, Protestants, 
Muslims, or Animists, peasants or urban laborers. Unless 
we breakdown 'elite' and 'mass' to their constituent elements 
we cannot fully appreciate the complexity of the problem of 
political integration (p. 75). 
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If we cannot assume that the "elite" constitute a homogeneous group 
in Africa, then, it can be argued that there is little left to be said 
of the prescriptions of Shils and Coleman and Rosberg. For as Huntington 
(1967) has observed, 
If the elite divides among itself, its factions appeal to 
the masses for support. This produces rapid mobilization 
of the masses into politics at the same time that it 
destroys whatever consensus previously existed among the 
politically active on the need for modernization (p. 427). 
In other words, if the elite is divided and its factions are able to 
mobilize support among the masses, the mass itself is also not a homo-
geneous--or traditional--group (Dudley, 1976). This point 1s partie-
ularly relevant to Nigeria where there has been and continues to be 
elite-fragmentation or elite dissensus. ~ach of the leaders of various 
"factions" has always fallen back on their respective ethnic groups. 
The result is that the "masses" are in themselves mobilized along ethno-
regional lines. This situation becomes worsened and threatens the unity 
of the country in times of political conflicts or crises. This increased 
mobilization of the masses is usually not accompanied by the institu-
tionalization of processes and structures. The result is "political 
decay" and "mal integration." 
Finally, Ake (1967) points out that the problem of political inte-
gration is not necessarily simplified by simply reducing it to one of 
increasing elite-consensus. He argues that "the amelioration of the 
malintegration of the new state demands not so much the bridging of the 
elite-mass gap as the progressive reduction of the tensions within the 
political elite" (p. 81). Thus, reducing tensions and increasing 
consensus within and among the political elites in a pluralistic and 
fragmented political culture such as Nigeria is a crucial factor in the 
process of building national integration. In short, the strategy that 
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there should be elite consensus and mass support for the elite provides 
a possible workable model to the question of national integration in 
Nigeria. 
4. The Free Market Model 
This approach to political integration has been attributed to Haas 
and Schmitter (1964). The authors have suggested that the primary 
requisite for political integration is that the political actors involved 
in the process behave rationally. Rational behavior they defined as 
that which seeks to maximize the pay-off's to individual participants. 
Although the Haas and Schmitter's theory was set in an international 
context (the integration of independent states), they saw themselves 
as putting forward a generalized theory of integration. To them, the 
theory can be more applicable to any specific level of analysis if dif-
ferent values are substituted for the variables in the theory. This 
implies that the theory can also be applied to a country like Nigeria 
which has more than 250 ethnic groups or communities. 
The theory assumes that provided actors behave rationally, the 
collective welfare, like that of the individual, will be maximized 
because the gains and losses will cancel each other out leaving the 
collectivity better off. But, a number of difficulties are inherent 
in the Haas and Schmitter proposed framework. 
It has been pointed out that there exists an inferential jump in 
the postulation that the pursuit of individual calculations, as defined, 
will automatically lead to the creation of an integrated community 
(Dudley, 1976). In fact, it can be shown, on game--theory grounds--
using, for example, theorems deriving from the "prisoners dilemma"--
that far from such a rational calculus leading to the "members" being 
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better off, both the members and collectivity would actually be worse 
off (Ruciman and Sen, 1965; Rapoport, 1969). 
If an integrated community is to be taken as a goal, therefore, 
"the least desired strategy for achieving it would be the one proposed 
by Haas and Schmitter" (Dudley, 1976, p. 31). As Dudley (1973) rightly 
pointed out, from the experience of Nigeria, it can be demonsrated that 
it was the elite's pursuit of strategies like those suggested by Haas 
and Schmitter that all but led to the disintegration of the First Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (and also the demise of the Second Republic which 
came to an end on December 31, 1983 with the military overthrow of the 
four years and three months old administration of Alhagi Shehu Shagari). 
5. The Structural-Functionalist Thesis 
According to Osei-Kwame (1980), this group of theories essentially 
suggest that exposure to the forces of modernization such as wage 
employment, industrialization, commercialization, urban residence, 
migration, mass media, formal education, and increased political parti-
cipation tends to reduce or eradicate traditional particularistic or 
ethnic tendencies, hence, they are capable of fostering political inte-
gration. Proponents of the structural-functional framework include 
Coleman (1955), Lerner (1958), Mitchell (1956), Almond and Verba (1963), 
Parsons (1964), Eisenstadt (1966), and Cohen (1974). 
Inherent in and consistent with this thesis is the idea that very 
low levels of economic and social development have very low levels of 
political integration. With increasing modernization, therefore, comes 
the realization of the need for increased sociopolitical interdependence 
which is a prerequisite for political or national unity. 
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The applicability or suitability of the structural-functionalist 
thesis to a country such as Nigeria and many other African states have 
been called to question on empirical grounds. Unchedu (1970) and Bates 
(1973), for instance, have observed that, at least in the African con-
text, modernization has demonstrated a rather strong tendency to coexist 
with or intensify traditionalistic tendencies such as tribalism. This 
observation invalidates the structural-functionalist proposition. 
6. Social Communications-Transactional Theory 
Deutsch (1957, 1964) developing his own previous work employing 
the theory of communication and control in the study of nationalism and 
social mobilization, later focused upon transactions and other forms 
of social communication in his analysis of the integration of political 
communities. The underlying hypothesis of this theory is that cohesive-
ness among individuals of a group and among communities can be measured 
by and promoted by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among 
them. In other words, the greater the transactional exchanges between 
members of a group the greater the cohesiveness of the group. 
Three types of major interactions are: communications which 
involves the interchange of messages (mail, telephone, radio, television, 
and so on); trade--the exchange of goods and services; and mobility--the 
movement of persons and the frequency of personal contacts (Jacob and 
Teune, 1964). 
Deutsch suggests in his theory that an extensive pattern of communi-
cation between national or communal units will result in a closer com-
munity which he refers to as a "security community." He also argues 
that if the rate of communications between groups within a community 
increases, an increase in elite responsiveness will result; and if elite 
39 
responsiveness increases, then a security community will arise. Deutsch 
(1957) defines a security community as one that attains a sense of unity 
"accompanied by formal and informal institutions and practices, suffi-
ciently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members" 
(pp. S-7). Hence, if an integrated community is desired, ways had to 
be sought to increase the flow of transactional exchanges between and 
among its members and communities. Thus, unity in diversity becomes 
the core of this kind of pluralistic but coherent political culture. 
The above conditions become essential elements in a society like 
Nigeria with a multiplicity of ethnic groups which have, to a large 
extent, been politicized along sectional or ethnoregional lines. But, 
there are a number of difficulties associated with the Deutsch model. 
Deutsch talks of transactions independent of the perceptions and 
motivations of transacting actors. Although he added a number of postu-
lates regarding such variables as trust, responsiveness, and complemen-
tarity, he left unexplained when and how trust and responsiveness among 
actors of a political community with fragmented political cultures are 
to occur (Dudley, 1976). This is why Haas (1971), in criticism of 
Detusch, states "it is as if theorists of the balance of power need only 
worry about the application of the principals of mechanics of inter-
national politics and need not worry about how foreign ministers perceive 
themselves in this supergame" (p. 23). 
Huntington (1967) points out that increased communication can 
increase ethnic consciousness and this, in turn, can stimulate political 
disintegration, tearing apart the body politic. As he puts it: 
increased communication may generate demands for more 
'modernity' than can be delivered (by the political system). 
It may also stimulate a reaction against modernity and 
activate traditional forces. Since the political arena is 
normally dominated by the more modern groups, it can bring 
into the arena new, anti-modern groups ••• it may also 
mobilize minority ethnic groups who had been indifferent to 
politics but who now acquire a self-consciousness and divide 
the political system along ethnic lines (thus stimulating 
political disintegration in the system's body politic)(p. 406). 
Finally, Jacob and Teune (1964) points out that exchanges or 
40 
transactions between people in various communities have costs attached 
to them. Costs of transactions, they noted, differentially benefit one 
community over another. Consequently, attempts to facilitate trans-
actions and, thus political integration, would probably be resisted by 
communities whose income depends heavily on intercommunity transactions, 
or where one community fears that such transactions will lead to the 
other community perpertually dominating them economically, adminis-
tratively, and politically. If costs of transactions are related to 
political integration, then, according to Jacob and Teune (1964), the 
greatest amount of national integration should occur between: 
communities where (1) distance and (2) political boundary 
factors are negligible, where (3) those who are affected by 
the changes in costs can participate in decisions relating 
to costs, and where (4) the benefits of the costs are rather 
evenly shared (p. 25.) 
It should be noted that "the transactional influences, if indeed they 
do represent an integrative factor, may need to be conditioned by other 
variables; or other variables may need to be present for the transactions 
to have their integrative impact" (Ibid, p. 26). 
7. The Cross-Pressure Theory 
Groups of theories under this category argue that overlapping 
memberships reduce the salience of the inevitable differences within 
a society and thus produce a basically homogeneous political culture 
(Lijphart, 1971). For instance, Truman (1951) points out that the 
stability of a heterogeneous or complex society, to a large extent, 
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depends on "multiple memberships." Lipset (1973) made the point even 
clearer when he stated that "the chances for a stable democracy are 
enchanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of 
cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations" (p. 37). Finally, 
Coser (1956) made the point more vividly when he argued that 
the multiple group affiliations of individuals make for 
a multiplicity of conflicts criss-crossing society. Such 
segmental participation, then, can result in a kind of 
balancing mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one 
axis (pp. 78-79). 
To the extent that the above is valid, it can also be argued that 
in a social structure where the major cleavages coincide and reinforce 
one another, there will more likely be a total and uncomplicated devotion 
to the position of the group and an intolerance of opposing groups. 
This is very true of Nigeria. As Diamond (1982) pointed out, it was 
"the progressive polarization of conflict between competing sectional 
parties that signficantly contibuted to the failure of the first Nigerian 
republic" (p. 30). 
8. The Equitable or Balanced Development Approach 
This approach, widely held by politicians of third world countries, 
claims that the problem of integration in the new states can be resolved 
by providing equal development for all ethnic regions. This thesis is 
widely held by most African leaders, politicians, and intellectuals, 
is best expressed by Busia (1967), a Ghanian sociologist and former Prime 
Minister of Ghana, when he stated that: 
if the regions of a state (within a country) are more evenly 
developed, and the people are able to share adequately in the 
government of their own areas, tribalism will cease to be a 
divisive force (and a threat to national unity)(p. 121). 
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Osei-Kwame (1980) has warned that while this approach may be tempt-
ing and probably justifiable on the basis of local knowledge, "the 
problems involved in the logistics and financing of 'equal development 
of all ethnic regions' means that the resolution of integration problem 
through equal development is unrealizeable in the immediate future" 
( p. 33) • 
9. Consociational Democratic Theory 
Among the foremost proponents of this theory are Apter (1961), 
Lehmbruch (1967), Bluhn (1970), Idem (1971, 1975), and Lijphart (1968, 
1969, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1979). Apter (1961) coined and used the term 
"consociational democracy" in the context of African political systems. 
He sees it as a type of democracy that works in a political system that 
~s willing "to accomodate a variety of groups of divergent ideas in order 
to achieve a goal of unity." He describes it as "essentially a system 
of compromise and accommodation" (pp. 24-25, 474-475, and 477-478). 
He added that, if suitably divised and genuinely implemented, consocia-
tional democracy can render conflict into effective government by 
distributing power among relevant political groups. 
Lijphart has developed the most systematic and comprehensive theory 
of consociational democracy. Like Apter, Lijphart's (1969) concept of 
consociational democracy calls for the formulation of nondivisive and 
accommodative solutions to most political issues facing plural societies, 
while recognizing the necessity of transcending cleavage lines on some 
critical occasions. Lijphart's approach is what Esman (1973) refers 
to as "balanced pluralism." Alternative terms are "proportionalism" 
used by Lehnbruch (1967) in a study of Austria and Switzerland, and 
"contractarianism," used by Bluhn (1970) in his study of Austria. 
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Lijphart (March, 1971) asserts that political stabiilty in cul-
turally fragmented systems depends "not so much on any particular 
institutional arrangement as on the overarching cooperation at the elite 
level" to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmenta-
tion. It is this pattern of mass culture and elite behavior that 
Lij phart attached the term "consociational ism." 
In his 1977 book Democracy in Plural Societies, Lijphart identi-
fied four major characteristics or principles of consociational demo-
cracy. They are: 
1. Government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of 
all significant segments of the plural society, 
2. The mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule, 
3. Proportionality as the principal standard of political repre-
sentation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, 
and 
4. A high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own 
internal affairs (segmental autonomy). 
Lijphart (1977) also attempted to identify those social structures 
and political cultures which are conducive to the development of con-
sociational politics. These favorable conditions include: 
1. A multiple balance of power among the subcultures, 
2. A moderate multiparty system, 
3. Distinct lines of cleavage between the subcultures or segments, 
4. Small or moderate size, 
5. Overarching loyalties which serve to provide cohesion for the 
society as a whole and thus moderate the intensities of all cleavages 
simultaneously, and 
6. Prior existence of a tradition of elite accommodation. 
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Kemeny and others (1966), elaborating on the grand coalition or 
elite consensus which Lijphart used as the central theme of this theory, 
pointed out that elite consensus is possible when authoritative alloca-
tions are made by maximal coalitions. To Kemeny and his coauthors: 
A coalition is maximal when it includes all possible winning 
coalition in the society, and there is no winning coalition 
that is not a member of the maximal coalition .••• If Sis the 
set of all possible winning coalitions, then the maximal 
coalition M is that coalition such that S is included in M 
(pp. 79-80). 
For maximal coalition to remain as such, Kemeny et al. point out 
that allocative decisions must be made in a way that no one member is 
left worse off. This, they believe, would be the case, when, as a 
minimum condition, allocations in a political system are made in direct 
proportion to the relative size of the different coalitions. 
Like the other theories of political integration, the approach 
provided us by Lijphart has its own limitations. Lijphart (1971) himself 
pointed to the major disadvantages of consociationalism when he stated 
that "the price to be paid for a system of participation by all 'elites', 
mutual veto, autonomy, and proportionality is inevitably a certain amount 
of inefficiency, slowness, and lack of decisiveness" (p. 14). He also 
accepted that consociationalism is an expensive type of government since 
subcultural autonomy will require the multiplication of the number of 
governmental and administrative units and other institutions and separate 
facilities. Furthermore, mutual veto has the disadvantage of may be 
used in blocking or delaying the adoption of socially, politically, and 
economically desirable policies. 
However, in spite of the disadvantages inherent in the consocia-
tional democratic approach to national integration, it has alot of merit 
and appeal and possible applicability to achieving political integration 
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in Nigeria and other African states if it can honestly be implemented. 
This 1s because the theory accepts the existence, 1n developing places 
such as found in Africa, the relative weakness of popular national senti-
ments. On the basis of this reality, it stipulates that it is necessary 
and sufficient that there be processes within the society capable of 
effecting elite accommodation and that elite accommodation be reflected 
in mass support through proportional representation and in the authori-
tative allocations of values. 
Furthermore, consociationalism has been supported by the factor 
analytic findings of Morrison and Stevenson (1972). These findings were 
that: 
(1) Turmoil, elite, and communal instability are related 
types of violence in political systems; (2) turmoil is a 
localized response to the failure to achieve a signficant 
redistribution of rewards in political systems which have 
experienced elite or communal instability; and (3) communal 
instability in Africa is a response on the part of the 
communal groupings in national populations (i.e., our 
'pluralistic security community') to elite stability which 
either fails to bring about a reapportionment of ethnic 
representation in government or which effects a too radical 
reapprotionment (p. 366). 
Finally, the consociational model can be considered as being com-
patible with a variety of structural sociopolitical forms--the single-
party state, the multiparty system, and with the no-party state. It 
is also compatible with the situation found in traditional societies, 
and even with a military regime where parties have been banned, with 
preferably some form of proportional representation (Dudley, 1976). 
The consociational approach, however, is not compatible with the hi-party 
system where the two parties stand in counter-position and where 
governing takes on the characteristic of a zero-sum game" (Dudley, 1976, 
p. 34). 
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Besides the theories we have examined above, Ake (1967) also has 
identified the work of a number of classical sociologists which, though 
do not offer us an articulated theory of social and political integra-
tion, no doubt provides us with insights into the processes and problems 
of national integration. These classical social theorists include: 
1. Karl Marx - whose works constitute a philosophy of history and 
from whom we learn how the economic structure of society determines its 
solidarity. 
2. Max Weber - His writings constitute a theory of social evolu-
tion. His description of bureaucratic and traditionalistic organizations 
"represent ~n effect different types of integration and his analysis 
of the consequences of these fo_rms of integration illuminate the phenom-
enon of political integration" (Ake, 1967, p. 39). Weber's analysis 
also indicates that the regularizing of expectations is an important 
prerequisite of integration. 
3. Henry Maine - developed a status and contract schema. He points 
out that the movement of progressive societies have been uniform in one 
basic respect: the tendency for contract to replace status as the basis 
of association. 
4. Ferdinand Toennies - like Maine, argued that there was a uni-
versal movement from social order based on consensus of wills and 
nourished by mores and religion to a social order based on convention 
and agreement. Toennies (1940) refers to all associations in which 
natural will predominants as "Gemeinschaft," and all those which are 
formed and "fundamentally conditioned by rational will, Gesellschaft" 
(p. 19). Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are ideal types and they signify 
"the model qualities of essence and the tendencies of being bound 
together" (Ibid, pp. 17-18). 
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5. Herbert Spencer - also developed a theory of social evolution. 
He distinguished between two types of societies, each of which is 
characterized by a different principle of integration. The first type 
is the "military" society where the principle of integration is "com-
pulsory cooperation." The second is the "industrial" society where the 
principle of integration is voluntary cooperation. 
6. Emile Durkheim- distinguishes two types of social solidarity: 
mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity is a feature of lower 
societies where the social behavior of members are determined by a 
"common conscience," which is "the totality of beliefs and sentiments 
common to the average citizen" (Durkheim, 1937, p. 79). In organic soli-
darity, the focus of interests shifts from the collective conscience 
to the individual. Durkheim argues that organic solidarity is morally 
superior and more lasting than mechanical solidarity. Lower societies, 
he believes, break down easily because they lack resistive force and 
totality of mutually complementary parts. Thus, Durkheim reminds us, 
as Ake points out, that "if a society is to be integrated and have resis-
tive force, its component parts must be functionally complementary" 
( p. 49). 
From the above analysis of the various definitions, conditions, 
and theories of political integration, a number of problems that tend 
to hinder national integration can be identified. These factors 
include: multiethnicity and cultural heterogeneity or fragmented 
political cultures; fears of domination; lack of interaction or trans-
actions between and among the different subunits of a political commu-
nity; and elite-fragmentation or elite instability. Other problems of 
integration are: uneven patterns of development; poor leadership and 
lack of truely national heroes; elite-mass gap; lack of previous 
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integrative experience and lack of institutionalized or broad-based 
organizations such as political parties. All these factors and the 
absence of generally agreed upon approach to achieving national integra-
tion indicate that political integration is a very complex phenomenon. 
CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND TO NIGERIA 
Introduction 
A full_ understanding of the problems of national integration and 
the analysis developed in this research requires some awareness, compre-
hension, and insight into the political history of Nigeria. This 
political history can be given a broad tripartite categorization: 
precolonialism, colonialism, and postcolonialism. Many readers who are 
unfamiliar with this background history will find it intriguing and 
equally interesting and helpful. Others who are familiar with this back-
ground may still find it useful to have it recalled as frequent reference 
will be noted to the salient events that are highlighted in course of 
analyzing the problems of national integration in the next chapter. 
Geography 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is in West Africa--one of the 
regions in the continent of Africa. It occupies a total land area of 
about 356,669 square miles (924,000 square kilometers). It lies within 
the tropics between latitudes 4° and 14° north of the Equator and longi-
tudes 3° and 15° east of the Greenwich Meridian. It is bounded in the 
west by the Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey), on the east by the 
Republic of Cameroun, on the north by the Republic of Niger, and in the 
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The most conspicuous physical feature of Nigeria LS the Niger River 
whose "Y" shape became the boundries by which Nigeria was divided into 
three political-administrative sectors--the Northern Region, Western 
Region, and Eastern Reg~on--up till May 1967 when more states were 
created out of the three regions. 
Ranging from south to north, four vegetational features are distin-
guishable. Along the coastline to the south is a dense belt of swamp 
and mangrove forests varying from 10 to 60 miles in width. This area 
is sparsely populated. To the north of the swamp lies the deciduous 
or tropical rainforest, from SO to 100 miles wide. Here are found ever-
green trees such as mahoganies and other valuable woods for furniture. 
Oil-palm bush is also found in this zone. This belt, in turn, yields 
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further north to a 300-mile-wide belt of open woodland and grass 
savannah. North of this zone, is a bare; sandy scrub which shades off 
until the southern Sahara is reached. 
The different layers of swamp, trees, and desert correspond to the 
different layers of climates. Thus, the climate accentuates the north-
south contrast. Generally, all Nigeria is hot but the south is very 
wet half of the year with very high humidity all the time. Rainfall 
in the south ranges from 100-140 inches a year. In contrast, the north 
has an average annual rainfall which ranges from 20-40 inches with very 
low humidity. The north has the typical characteristics of hot dry days 
and cool or cold nights as you approach places in the extreme north such 
as Sokoto and Maiduguri (see Map 2). It should be noted that the 
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Map 2. Vegetative and Rainfall Zones Ln Nigeria. 
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geographical differences between the north and the south help to explain 
the varying impacts of Islam, Christianity, Arabic, and western education 
upon them. 
The estimated population of Nigeria is 80 million, making it the 
most populous country in Africa. This population is multiethnic with 
nearly as many as 250 cultural linguistic groups, each with its own 
language, culture, traditions, customs, and so on. Thus, Nigeria can 
be considered as a conglomeration of nations or a "nation of nation-
alities." It is because of these numerous distinct linguistic groups 
that made Greenberg ( 1955) to refer to Nigeria as a principal "linguistic 
crossroads" of Africa. 
The three largest ethnic groups ~n Nigeria are the Hausa-Fulani, 
who are the dominant group ~n the north, the Ibo who are the principal 
group to the east, and the Yoruba who constitute the dominant ethnic 
group ~n the west. Other principal ethnic groups include the Kanuri, 
TIV, Edo, Ijaw, Efik, and Ibibios (see Map 3 and Table I). 
The two main religions in the country are Islam and Christianity. 
Islam has an overwhelming importance and influence in the north, while 
Christianity predominates in the south. Within the Christian south, 
the west is mainly Protestants and partly Moslems, while the east is 
mostly influenced by Catholicism. 
PreColonial History 
Introduction 
A common history can help hold a nation together, but the 
most significant general comment that can be made about 
precolonial history in Nigeria is that it is not Nigerian 
history but rather the history of different tribes, or, 
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Source: Population Census of Nigeria 1963, Vol. III, Federal Office 
Statistics. Lagos, pp. 10-11. 
The opening statement points to the fact that prior to colonization 
and the eventual artificial creation of the territorial political unit 
called Nigeria, there had existed a number of people inhabiting the area 
but with very limited links and important historical relationships. 
We do know, however, that the area which came to be called Nigeria had 
witnessed the rise and fall of a number of important empires and kingdoms 
prior to colonialism. 
In the northern part of Nigeria, which belongs to an area geograph-
ically and historically known as the Western Sudan, there had emerged 
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at different times: the Kanem-Bornu or Kanuri empires, the Rausa States, 
and the Usman Dan Fodio Jihad of 1804-1814. In the western region was 
a number of Yoruba kingdoms and states, the most notable being the Oyo 
Empire and the powerful Benin Kingdom. In the eastern region was a 
number of semi-autonomous Ibo states. The Niger Delta region also 
witnessed a number of small states. Each of these states and empires 
had their own traditional political culture. 
For the purpose of having a cross-cut perspective of the different 
political cultures, the peoples of Nigeria will be treated by region. 
Within each region only the governmental customs, culture, and political 
culture of the dominant groups or kingdoms/empires will be discussed 
fairly in detail. Some of the other principal ethnic groups within the 
regions will, however, in certain cases, be mentioned and briefly 
discussed (see Maps 3 and 4). 
The Peoples of Northern Nigeria 
The Rausa-Fulani are today the dominant group ~n northern Nigeria 
and their system of government was basically theocratic. The other 
principal group is the Kanuri (see Map 4). 
The Rausa people trace their origin back to one Bayajidda, a prince 
of Baghdad, who got married to a queen of Daura. Their descendents 
founded the seven "true" Rausa states called the Rausa Bakwai prior 
to colonalism. These states were Biram, Daura, Katsina, Kano, Zaria, 
Rano, and Gobir. Bayajidda's seven illegal sons also founded seven 
states in the northern region and were called the Banza Bakwai--the 
"Bastard" States. These included: Zamfara, Kebbi, Gwari, Yauri, Nupe, 
Yoruba, and Kwararafa. By the 15th century, these cities had developed 
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I~-- SIMPLIFIED BOUNDARIES 
OF HIST.ORICAL KINGDOMS 
OR EMPIRES 
l. Songhai Empire 9. Zazzau Empire 
2. Kebbi Empire 10. Yauri Empire 
3. Gobir Empire 11. Nupe Empire 
4. Katsina Empire 12. Jukun Empire 
5. Daura Empire 13. Iga1a Empire 
6. Bornu-Kanem Empire 14. Oyo and Ife Empire 
7. Kano Empire 15. Benin Empire 
8. Rano EfTlpire 
Map 4. Historical Empires that Arose in the 16th Century in the Area 
Which Carne to be Known as Nigeria in 1914. 
Source: Adapted and simplified from Michael Crowder. A Short History 
of Nigeria. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966, Map 2, 
P• 38. 
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into strong kingdoms. It was during this time that the Islamic religion 
began to penetrate Hausaland (Thatcher, 1974). 
By the late 15th century, the Fulanis, who had established them-
selves in Kano and began paying tributes to the Rausa leaders, soon 
absorbed the Rausa culture. They, however, eventually succeeded in 
converting some Rausa chiefs to the Islamic religion. Sooner, the 
Fulanis, under their local head, Usman Dan-Fodio, under the pretext of 
reviving the Islamic religious fervor and purifying the Islamic religion 
among the Rausa, declared a Jihad. He and his followers succeeded in 
overthrowing the Rausa chi~fs. In their places Fulani leaders were 
installed as local emirs. Ilorin, a Yoruba state, fell to the troops 
of Alimi, a Sokoto Fulani, in 1817. 
The new leaders and emirs were appointed by and owed their alle-
giance to Fodio and later to his son, Bello, who became the undisputable 
Sultan of Sokoto. Bello became the political and religious leader of 
all Islamic Fulani-Hausa Emirates. The Jihad resulted in the creation 
of the largest empire in northern Nigeria and in reversal of the rela-
tionship among the Hausas and Fulanis. 
The Fulani empire had its own distinguishing form of political 
organization. It was composed of 13 emirates in which the emir of each 
emirate personified both religious and political authority. The emirs 
were chosen from the royal families and the titled chiefs as well as 
the traditionl offices of the states were hierarchically organized. 
According to Sklar and Whitaker (1966), emirate rule was despotic in 
form because 
The personal security of the commoner depended wholly on the 
uncertain benevolence of his overlords •.• The concentration of 
'de jure' power and authority in the hands of the emir tended 
to inhibit any opposition to him, even from those within the 
ranks of the ruling status (p. 7). 
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Thus, the Hausa-Fulani Empire was a theocratic dynasty, for the 
emir claimed unquestioned religious sanctions derived through divine 
delegation. Here then is "a fusion of the sacred and the secular without 
constitutionality" (Olorunsola, 1972, p. 7). 
The Kanuri people who are found to the east and west of Lake Chad 
constitute the third largest group in northern Nigeria (see Map 5 and 
Table II). They built a number of empires known as the Kanem-Bornu 
Empires before the British colonization of northern Nigeria in 1902-
1904. The Kanuri-speaking people had been converted to Islam at the 
end of the 11th century, before the Hausa. According to Schwarz (1965), 
"their ties as part of the Kanem-Bornu Empire were with Egypt and north-
east coast of Africa, rather than, as the Rausa, with the kingdoms of 
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Mumuye 294, 202 
Alago 249,438 
Riggi 176,962 
Bur a 171,861 
Chamba 162,326 
Shau Arabashuwa 155,514 
Kaje 151, 992 
Jari 146,976 
Kambari 145,608 
Egg on 143,007 








the Western Sudan and Morocco" (p. 15). The Kanem-Bornu Empire reached 
its height in the 16th century under Mai (King) Idris Alooma, during 
which time the empire even had some control over some of the Rausa city 
states. 
The Kanuri developed a stable and efficient system of government. 
Islam provided unity and an efficient method of government. At the head 
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of the central government was the Mai, an hereditary monarch chosen 
from the Shehu's family. Theoretically, his power was supreme, but ~n 
practice he had to take into consideration the advise of his council 
of twelve nobles--who were responsible for the north, east, south, and 
west of the empire. Women of the royal family--the Magira (the Mai's 
mother), the Magara (the Mai's senior sister), and the Gumsu (the 
Mai's first wife)--had considerable influence and often exercised great 
power, especially when there was a weak Mai (Thatcher, 1974). While 
the great office-holders stayed in the capital under the eyes of the 
Mai, the day-to-day running of the local governments of the empire was 
delegated to officials called Chimagina. Their responsibilities included 
maintaining law and order and were expected to remit regularly to the 
King parts of the revenues they had collected from the Mai's subjects. 
The Nupe people is the fourth and smallest of the predominantly 
Moslem groups in the Northern Region. They are partially localized in 
the Niger River Valley. Before the Fulani Jihad, a Nuper Kingdom had 
existed since the 15th century. However, the kingdom was conquered 
during the Fulani Jihad and was divided among several Fulani states 
(Coleman, 1960). 
The fifth major ethnic group in the former Northern Region of 
Nigeria ~s the TIV--who are highly concentrated in south of the Benue 
River. The TIV are a distinct tribal group who resisted both the Fulani 
Jihad and the impact of Islam. They never had a central government but 
have a strong feeling of individuality because of "the conspicuous 
uniformity of their language and physique, their common customs, and 
their belief in a common origin" (Coleman, 1960, p. 23). The TIV people 
were never conquered by the Fulani and were one of the last groups to 
be pacified by the British in northern Nigeria. The lack of traditional 
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political institutions made Sklar ( 1961) refer to the TIVs as an "egali-
tarian if not anarchistic polity" (p. 10). 
The Peoples of Western Nigeria 
The Yoruba people are the largest cultural group inhabiting the 
land south and west of the lower Niger (see Table III and Map 6). They 
were not, at any time, either in political or commercial contact with 
the Kanuri who lived to the northeast, or with the Hausa-Fulani to the 
north, or at least, not until the early 19th century. 
TABLE III 
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF 
WESTERN REGION, 1963 
Yoruba 9,667,612 
Ibo 208,563 
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Source: Population Census of Nigeria 1963, Vol. III, 
Federal Office of Statistics. Lagos, 
p. 20-21. 
YORUBA (INCLUDING JEKRI) 
EDO (INCLUDING ETSAKOR AND 5080) 
~ IJAW MINORITY 
ITIII11 lBO MINORITY 
Map 6. Principal Ethnic Groups in Western Region. 
Source: James s. Coleman. Nigeria: Background to 
Nationalism. Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1960. p. 19. 
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The origins of the Yoruba people is shrouded in myth and mystery. 
However, it is believed that by about 900 A.D. or 1000 A.D., they had 
already settled in their present abode. Their early history, based on 
oral tradition, centers·on Oduduwa who is believed to have come down 
from heaven at Ile-Ife and there created earth. Today, Ife remains the 
spiritual and cultural center of the Yoruba. 
The area occupied by the Yoruba witnessed the rise of many Yoruba 
kingdoms 1n the 18th century. According to Coleman (1960), during most 
of the 18th century, the Yoruba people were united into one large kingdom 
ruled by Old Oyo. But, by 1780, they had been split into four states--
Oyo, Egba, Ketu, and Jehu--because of internal conflicts, and by 1850, 
as a result of the Fulani conquest of Ilorin (a Yoruba state), four new 
states emerged. These new states were "Ibadan, Ilesha, Ife, and the 
Ekiti Parapo" (p. 25). This additional fragmentation was a consequence 
of the devastating internal wars which came to be known as the 19th 
Century Yoruba Intercine Wars. 
Despite the large amount of internal discord and dissonance in the 
precolonial times, there is a comparatively strong Yoruba consciousness 
which has persisted because of the strong belief in a common origin. 
The Yoruba developed large-scale traditional political arrangements 
that were urban oriented before the British intrusion. Of all the 
different systems, the Old Oyo Kingdom which managed to unite all the 
Yoruba--except the important Ijebu subtribe--during most of the 19th 
century is the much studied example of a typical Yoruba kingdom. 
The Old Oyo Kingdom, like most other Yoruba kingdoms, developed 
a system of government with a complicated arrangement of checks and 
balances to prevent any one branch of the government acquiring excessive 
powers. At the head of the central government was the Alafin, who was 
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always from one of the royal families. Unlike the Fulani Emir, the 
powers of the Alafin was not absolute. Other institutions checked his 
authority. 
There was the Council of Ministers known as the Oyo Mesi. This 
council served as the kingmaker and the supreme council of state. They 
have the power of life and death over an Alafin that was becoming too 
despotic. The Alafin and this council actually ruled over the kingdom. 
Next to the Council of Ministers was the Ogboni Cult, a secret 
religious society whose responsibility it was to approve all decisions 
of the Oyo Mesi and to mediate between the Alafin and the Oyo Mesi when 
there was a conflict. 
Finally, there was the Esos--the warlords who were appointed by 
the Oyo Mesi and who were responsible for the raising of troops to defend 
and expand the frontiers of the empire. The head of the Esos and the 
military was the Are-Ona-Ka-Kanfo, the field marshal. Much of the admin-
istrative work of the empire was carried out by palace chiefs (Thatcher, 
1974). The system of government of the Yoruba states has been referred 
to as a constitutional monarchy. As Olorunsola (1972) rightly pointed 
out, "the (Yoruba) Obas were limited, hence, they could not afford to 
be despotic without recrimination" (p. 11). 
Another empire which emerged in the west was the Benin Empire 
founded by the Ebos. It was situated in the southwest of the Yoruba 
empire in the coastal region. Its center was the city of Benin. By 
as early as 1400, it was already a powerful state. The Edo people of 
Benin created a highly developed system of centralized government which 
survived almost unchallenged until the conquest of Benin by the British 
in 1897 (Thatcher, 1974). 
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The Benin Empire adopted a monarchial system of government, at the 
head of which was the Oba who was considered supreme in all things and 
was held as a semi-god by his subjects. Like the Alafin of Oyo, he has 
a council called the Uzama. But, unlike the Alafin, the Oba did not 
have his power limited by his council which was merely an advisory 
council. The Uzama could not create or destroy an Oba. The Obaship 
and the chieftancies in the Benin Empire are inherited by primogeniture. 
Thus, chiefs tended to serve less as a representatives of their lineages 
as among the Yoruba and more as privy counselors of the Oba. 
The Ijaw people on whom virtually no ethnographic work has been 
completed, constitute another major ethnic group. They occupy the Niger 
Delta of western and eastern Nigeria. The tribe is considered as one 
of the oldest in this area of West Africa. The language possesses little 
affinity with any other in Nigeria. Their traditional political arrange-
ment is not as structured as those of the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri, Yoruba, 
and Edo. 
The People of Eastern Nigeria 
The Ibos are the dominant tribe in eastern Nigeria (see Map 7 and 
Table IV). The Ibo people have no large-scale centralized political 
institutions. Their traditional political system was based on the 
principle of village democracy. This is why they have been referred 
to as a segmentary society. Coleman (1960) attributed the highly decen-
tralized political structure of the Ibo people to three major factors: 
1. The wide spread dense forest that covers a large part of the 
eastern region, 
2. The absence of invasions or mass migrations which would have 
induced or compelled them to form large states administered by a 
centralized authoritative leadership, and 
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Map. 7. Principal Ethnic Groups in Eastern Nigeria. 
Source: James S. Coleman. 
Los Angeles: 
p. 29. 
Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. 
University of California Press, 1960. 
Among the Ibo and Ibibio, there were two main institutions of 
government in each village; the Council of Elders and the village 
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assembly. The Council of Elders was usually composed of the heads of . 
each extended family. In the village assembly all had the right to speak 
and decisions had to be unanimous. The system of justice was equally 
democratic and age-set organizations were used to undertake public works 
(Thatcher, 1974). 
TABLE IV 














































Source: Population Census 1963, Vol. III. 
Stevenson (1968) has pointed out that "leadership and political 
office among the Ibo ••• in the precolonial period have been much more 
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largely based on achievement and wealth as opposed to lineage ascription" 
(p. 200). This emphasis on achievement as a basis of wielding power 
and authority made Olorunsola ( 1972) to state that "the Ibo value system 
heavily rewarded aggressiveness" (p. 11). Thus, an analysis of the 
traditional political culture of the Ibos, the largest ethnic group in 
eastern Nigeria, reveals neither a constitutional monarchy nor a 
68 
theocracy as was found to characterize the Yorubas and Hausa-Fulanis, 
respectively. For the Ibos, the value system was one of equalitarianism, 
individualism, and achievement. 
It should be noted that while the social structure of the Ibo and 
Ibibio are regarded as similar, they do not otherwise possess cultural 
or linguistic identities (Greenberg, 1955). Other peoples of the eastern 
region are the Efik, Ijaw, to mention but two. It is important to note 
that each of the regions discussed above consists of one major ethnic 
group and several minority ethnic groups (see Map 8). 
The foregoing sketch of the political history of Nigeria prior to 
colonialism, particularly of the major ethnic groups and their tradi-
tional political arrangements makes it apparent that Nigeria 1s an 
ethnically fragmented country. The ethnic groups are broadly distributed 
throughout the country. No significant relationships appear to have 
spanned the entire territory at any time during the period under discus-
sion. Indeed, the few relations that develop tended to be limited to 
geographically adjacent neighbors. Even those relations were character-
ized at best by a mixture of antagonism and small-scale trade. It is 
little wonder then, that Nigeria after twenty-five years of independence 
is still finding ways by which it can integrate these heterogeneous 
ethnic groups into a nation-state. 
It is this diversity of ethnic groups which characterize Nigeria 
that led Awolowo (1947) to state: 
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expres-
sion. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there 
are 'English', 'Welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' 
is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those 
who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who 
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69 
70 
From Colonialism to Independence 
Introduction 
Europeans in the persons of Portuguese had visited the Coast of 
Guinea by the 15th century. For instance, Coleman (1960) reports that 
"Portuguese traders and missionaries briefly visited Benin City in the 
1480s, and from the latter part of the 15th century until the beginning 
of the 19th century they exercised an appreciable influence in the 
Itsekiri Kingdom of Warri" in the Niger Delta (p. 40). 
From the 1500s on, most of the leading European nations participated 
Ln the lucrative slave trade, and trading posts of one sort or another 
sprang up along the West African coast. By 1712 the British had secured 
a virtual monopoly over slave trading on the west coast. However, the 
British declared slave trade illegal in 1807 and slave trade was finally 
ended in the 1840s. European traders were, as a result of the abolition, 
compelled to turn to legitimate trade in other commodities such as palm 
oil and ivory. By 1826, twelve British merchant ships were reported 
to have been in the Bonny River in the Eastern Region of Nigeria 
(Coleman, 1960). 
Although British contact with the coast of Nigeria dates back 
several centuries, British colonization did not formally commence until 
the annexation of Lagos in 1861, the year that Lagos was ceded to the 
Crown. And it was not until the beginning of this century (1914) that 
Nigeria, as a geographical entity, was established by administrative 
fiat. 
From 1861 Annexation of Lagos Up To Amalgamation 
in 1914 
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The British colonization process of the territory which later became 
known as Nigeria took two principal forms: 
1. Acquiring jurisdiction through unequal treaties with local 
rulers (especially in the south), and 
2. Outright military conquest of the northern Moslem emirates, 
using the West African Frontier Force in 1902-1904. 
During the same period of the annexation of Lagos, British mission-
ary activities expanded rapidly, especially in Yorubaland, notably 
Abeokuta, while British trading activities were concentrated in the Niger 
Delta area and along the Niger River. 
In 1879, Sir George Goldier united all the rival companies into 
the United Africa Company (U.A.C.). The Berlin Conference of 1885 
acknowledged British claims to the Niger Basin. In 1886, the United 
Africa Company acquired a royal charter from the British government which 
gave it the power "to administer, make treaties, levy customs, and trade 
in all territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluents" (Perham, 
1937, p. 3). The company became known as the Royal Niger Company. 
In 1897, the Benin Empire was brutally conquered and incorporated 
into the Niger Coast Protectorate, thus extending British influence in 
the middle Niger area. In 1900, the company lost its charter as the 
British government assumed direct control of the Royal Niger Company. 
In the same year, the Niger Coast Protectorate became the Protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria (Coleman, 1960). 
The Royal Niger Company, after the conquest of the Benin Empire, 
had prepared the way for the British advance against the Sokoto Empire 
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by signing treaties with the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu 
and by conquering Nupe and Ilorin in 1817 (Thatcher, 1974). The British 
government completed the conquest of the Sokoto Empire after which it 
established the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria with Sir Frederick 
Lugard as High Commissioner. Lugard, through a mixture of force and 
persuasion, was able to bring the whole empire under British control 
between 1901 and 1904. 
Faced with limited resources of men and money, and since the vast 
area already possessed a highly developed and efficient system of admini-
stration headed by emirs, Lugard decided to introduce the indirect rule 
system. Because of the existence of strong, respected traditional 
rulers, indirect rule worked in the north and enabled the British govern-
ment to rule the area cheaply and peacefully. 
In 1906, the Southern Protectorate was amalgamated with Lagos under 
the title of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, 
in 1914, goaded by economic factors, Lord Lugard amalgamated the two 
protectorates (Northern and Southern) to form the Colony and Protectorate 
of Nigeria. This amalgamation gave birth to the country which came to 
be called Nigeria with Lugard as its first Governor General. 
Political and Constitutional Developments from 
Amalgation (1914) - Independence (1960) 
Two years after the amalgamation, a legislative council dominated 
by whites was established by Lord Lugard. This council was regarded, 
more or less, as a debating society. 
From 1914 to 1919, Lugard also attempted to extend the indirect 
rule system to the south, but it was a partial success in the west and 
a total failure in the east where Lugard, finding no traditional chiefs, 
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created "warrant" chiefs who were very unpopular among the Ibo. Indirect 
rule was eventually abandoned in the east and replaced by a more demo-
cratic system modelled after the British local government. The abandon-
ment was due to the Aba Women's Riot of 1929 which followed an attempt 
by the created warrant chiefs to impose direct taxation on the people. 
The Legislative Council of the Colony, established by Lugard, was 
very unpopular among the people of the colony because of its extremely 
limited powers. In order to obtain the advise of responsible members 
of the community, it became necessary to devise some other means. The 
result was the abolition of the small council for the colony by order 
in council in 1922 and in its place was substituted the Clifford's 
Constitution (Burns, 1964). 
The 1922 Clifford's Constitution provided for and established a 
larger legislative council for the whole country. The council consisted 
of 26 official members, the Governor as Chairman, 16 unofficial members, 
and four members elected to represent the municipal areas of Lagos and 
Calabar. It was during this time that Nigeria witnessed the emergence 
of its first political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party 
(NNDP), founded by Herbert Macaulay. 
It is important to note, however, that the legislative council 
legislated only for the colony and the southern provinces and had no 
power to legislate or impose taxation in the northern provinces (Burns, 
1963). It is also vital to note that during this time, 
1. The north had its affairs put under the control of the governor, 
2. The council was a mere debating society and a mere appendage 
to the all powerful governor, and 
3. No money could be expended in the northern provinces from the 
public treasury without the approval of the council. 
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The national agitation which continued with the formation of the 
NNDP throughout the 1920s took a significant turn in the 1930s with the 
formation of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the entry of Nnamdi 
Nzikiwe with his two newspapers into the political arena in 1937. In 
1939, because of the vigorous criticism of the British administration, 
Governor Bourdillon split the country into three regions--North, West, 
and East--and suggested that the North must be reunited with the South 
as soon as practicable. 
In 1943, Governor Bourdillon was succeeded by Sir Richards. In 
1945, there was a country-wide strike organized by the nationalists. 
The crisis impressed on Richards the urgency for a new constitution to 
replace the 24 year old Clifford Constitution. Hence, in January 1947 
Sir Arthur Richards unilaterally formulated a constitution for the 
country. 
The objective of the constitution was to promote the unity of 
Nigeria and to provide adequ~tely within that unity for the diverse 
elements which make the country and to secure greater participation by 
Nigerians in the decision of their own affairs. To this effect, the 
consititution provided for a central legislative body to legislate for 
the entire country, including the northern provinces. Northerners were 
to be members of the legislative council for the first time. Thus, the 
idea which Governor Bourdillon expressed in 1939 was translated into 
action in 1947. For the first time, too, persons (known as "unoffi-
cials") other than colonial administrators were to be in a majority in 
the only national legislative body (Schwartz, 1965). 
The new central legislature consisted of 16 official members and 
28 unofficial members, three of whom were to be elected from Lagos and 
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one from Calabar. The constitution also provided for regional houses 
for the three regions. In addition, a House of Chiefs was established 
in the north. Thus, the Richards Constitution established for the first 
time a federal system of government for Nigeria consisting of three 
regions. It also gave birth to a new political party--the National 
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) with Herbert Macaulay as 
its first president. 
In spite of the remarkable progress that the Richards Consitution 
made, it was bitterly criticized for the lack of any consultation of 
the people and its arbitrary imposition by the colonial government. 
Secondly, the legislative body provided for by the constitution was a 
mere national debating forum. Thirdly, the very nature of the electoral 
system (that is, nominees of native authorities and chiefs) insured that 
the various assemblies were unrepresentative of the educated youths. 
Moreover, the Richards Constitution made no alteration in the 
executive branch of the central government; no Nigerians were added to 
the Governor's Executive Council which held actual powers. Because of 
these limitations, the nationalists intensified their activities on the 
colonial administration. For instance, an NCNC team led by Herbert 
Macaulay and Azikiwe set out on a national tour in 1946 to educate the 
people to reject the Richards Constitution. They even carried their 
case to the Secretary of State for the colonies in London. 
In 1948, Sir Arthur Richards was replaced by Governor MacPherson 
who decided to replace the Richards Constitution which was intended to 
work for nine years, with his own. Obviously, hoping to avoid the 
problems caused by the failure of Richards to consult Nigerian leaders 
in 1945 to 1947, MacPherson spent two years in a series of local, provin-
cial, and regional conferences devoted to an exhaustive discussion as 
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to the form the new constitution should take. The new constitution was 
presented to the nation in 1951. 
The constitution provided for 
1. A central house of legislature to be known as the House of 
Representatives, 
2. Two houses--the Houses of Assembly and Chiefs--in both the West 
and North; and a single house--the House of Assembly--for the East, and 
3. An executive council headed by the governor consisting of 
ministers selected from the regional houses. They were ministers with-
out ministries. 
In spite of the long period of consultation, the MacPherson 
Constitution was vehemently opposed and denounced by the nationalists 
for certain weaknesses, which included: 
1. The absence of the Prime Minister inspite of the provision for 
an executive council, 
2. The ministers at the center were without portfolios, and 
3. The ministers were representatives of regional houses--thus 
their outlook were regional rather than national. 
Party hostilities between the northern NPC and southern parties 
(the NCNC and AG) over the 1953 self-independence motion in the House 
of Representatives by Chief Enahovo of the AG led to the eventual break-
down of the MacPherson Constitution. MacPherson was recalled to London 
by the British government in 1953 and was succeeded by Lytelton who had 
proposed to put into practice all decisions of the conferences that had 
been held both in London and Lagos to settle the political parties. 
The result was the Lytelton Consitution of 1954, which went a little 
further to satisfy the aspirations of the nationalists. It increased 
the membership of the central house. Secondly, apart from retaining 
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the existing houses in the regions, it also established a House of Chiefs 
in the east. Thirdly, the police and the judiciary were regionalized. 
Fourthly, it set up an electoral commission to conduct elections in the 
country. Finally, it alloted ministries to the ministers. Once again, 
the Lytelton Constitution still left out the post of the Prime Minister. 
It was not long before the 1954 constitution was found to be unworkable 
and a series of constitutional conferences were held, both in Nigeria 
and in London. The May and June 1957 constitutional conferences, held 
in London and attended by representatives of all political parties in 
Nigeria, resulted in further constitutional advances for Nigeria (Burns, 
1964). 
On August 8, 1957, the Eastern and Western regions became self-
governing. In 1958, a conference was held in London where it was decided 
that Nigeria should become independent on October 1, 1960. In the same 
conference, it was further agreed that the Northern region should become 
self-governing in 1959, and the post of the Prime Minister was estab-
lished. 
On March 15, 1959, the Northern Region became self-governing and 
Ln December there were federal elections to an enlarged House of Repre-
sentatives and members of a new Senate were appointed. On October 1, 
1960, Nigeria became an independent federation consisting of Northern, 
Western, and Eastern Nigeria (Burns, 1964). 
Principal Political Parties at Independence 
At the time of independence in 1960, there were three principal 
political parties corresponding to the three dominant ethnic groups and 
their different regions. The parties were: 
1. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), 
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2. The Action Group (AG), and 
3. The Northern People's Congress (NPC). 
The NCNC was an Ibo dominated party and it controlled the Eastern 
House of Assembly. The AG was the Yoruba answer to the mainly Ibo NCNC 
and founded by Obafemi Awolowo in 1951 from the Egbe-Omo-Odu-Duwa (formed 
in 1948), a Yoruba cultural organization. The AG also had a large major-
ity in the Western Region House of Assembly. The NPC was formed from 
a number of cultural groups in 1951. It is mainly Hausa-Fulani party 
and it had an overwhelming majority in the Northern Region House of 
Assembly. 
The results of the election held in December 1959 into the Federal 
House of Representatives were: NPC 142, NCNC 89, AG 72, and Indepen-
dents 9. 
According to Burns (1964), following this elections, because no 
single party won the majority of seats to enable it form the government 
"a coalition government was formed of the NPC and the NCNC, with the 
Action Group as the opposition. It was this government which was in 
power when Nigeria attained independence" ( p. 260). Alhj i Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa became the first Prime Minister of the coalition govern-
ment, while Nnamdi Azikwe, who was the President of the NCNC--the junior 
partner of the coalition, became the President of the Senate. Azikwe 
later succeeded Sir James Robertson as the Governor-General of Nigeria 
on October 16, 1961 (Burns, 1964). 
The NPC-NCNC coalition was a strange one. It was referred to as 
a "marriage of convenience" or as a "marriage of incompatibles." To 
Schwartz (1965), the coalition brought together the most conservative 
(the NPC) and one of the then most radical parties (the NCNC) at the 
federal level. The coalition cannot be said to have been founded 
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primarily upon a program for the promotion of national unity as both 
parties had almost diametrically opposed ideologies and political goals. 
Most people of Nigeria had expected the AG and the NCNC, which had the 
educated elites with similar values and very similar political goals, 
to combine against the NPC. At this juncture, two questions might be 
in order. First, why was it that the NCNC and the AG were unsuccessful 
at forming a coalition against the NPC? Secondly, what factors brought 
the NPC and the NCNC together? 
The above questions are particularly worth addressing because 
immediately the results of the 1959 election were formally announced 
and it was evidenced that no party won a majority to form the federal 
government, Chief Awolowo was reported to have declared his party's 
desire to form a coalition government with NCNC. The leadership of such 
a coalition would have been conceded to Azikiwe, the leader of the NCNC. 
Awolowo strongly expressed the view that he would rather have a nation-
alist like Azikiwe lead the country than Balewa, who in 1947, had 
declared that "Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the coun-
try" and that "if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the 
Northern people could continue their interrupted conquest (1814 Jihad) 
to the sea." 1 Awolowo also alluded to Balewa's response to Azikiwa's 
motion of 1948 which called for a united Nigerian outlook. Balewa's 
response to the motion was that many Nigerians 
deceive themselves by thinking Nigeria is one. This is 
wrong. I am sorry. This presence of unity is artificial 
and it ends outside this chamber ••• The southern tribes 
who are now pouring into the North in ever increasing 
1Legislative Council Debates, March 20 to April 2, 1947. Lagos: Govern-
ment Printer, 1947, p. 212. 
numbers ••• do not mix with the northern people in social 
matters and we in the North look upon them as invaders.1 
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However, Awolowo's plans did not materialize. While the refusal 
of the NCNC to accept Awolowo's proposals has been attributed to the 
fact that he was suspected of duplicity (Nwankwo and Ifejika, 1969), 
the truth of the matter was that the answer to the first question above 
can be best explained by the early rivalry between the Yorubas and the 
Ibos. In other words, the answer lies in the intensity of the inter-
personal, interregional, interethnic, and interparty competition between 
the Ibos and the Yorubas for federal services and political leadership 
of the country. This rivalry is traceable to the 1940s. 
The people of Western Nigeria, especially the Yoruba's, were the 
first to embrace western religion and education because of their prox-
imity to the coast. The advantages of this early contact with Europeans 
were enormous as the Yorubas acquired western education and consequently 
were to hold an overwhelming majority of higher positions in the Nigerian 
Civil Service and in business firms. Similarly, until the emergence 
of the NCNC in the 1940s, the Yorubas had a near monopoly over modern 
political activities in Nigeria (Coleman, 1960). 
However, western influence later spread to the Eastern Region of 
Nigeria as churches, schools, and other institutions of learning were 
being built. The Ibos, the dominant ethnic group in the East, absorbed 
western education so rapidly that by the early 1930s, the disparity 
between the West (the Yorubas) and the East (the Ibos) had virtually 
disappeared. According to Schwarz (1965), by the late 1930s, "there 
were more Ibos than Yorubas at most of the important Nigerian schools" 
1 Legislative Council Debates, March 4, 1948, p. 227. 
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(p. 67). With the rapid acquisition of western education, the Ibos moved 
very fast as tough competitors for jobs which the Yorubas had held almost 
exclusively for the past three decades through their earlier access to 
education. The Yorubas, according to Coleman (1960), expressed fear 
of what they called Ibo domination--actually the Ibo challenge. The 
Yoruba intellectuals responded to the Ibo challenge with tribal national-
~sm. First, with the formation of the cultural association, Egbe-Omo-
Oduduwa and, second, by the emergence of the AG as a political party 
under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo as the champion of Yoruba 
nationalism. The AG became the first great rival of Azikiwa for national 
political power. 
The Yoruba fear of possible Ibo domination was expressed as early 
as 1940 by Chief Awolowo when he stated, "it seemed clear to me that 
(Azikiwe) policy was to corrode the self respect of the Yoruba people 
as a group; to build up the Ibo as a master race." 1 In 1948, Sir Adeyemo 
Alakiya, the President of the Egbe-Omo-Oduduwa, echoed the same fear 
expressed by Awolowo when he stated at the inauguration of the associa-
tion at Ile-Ife, "The Big Tomorrow ••. (for the Yoruba) is the future of 
our children .•.. How they will hold their own against other tribes of 
Nigeria. How the Yorubas will not be relegated to the background in 
the future." 2 
By late 1948, the tension between the Yorubas and Ibos in Lagos 
had reached a breaking point as the conflict nearly led to violence. 
According to Schwarz (1965), at this time, both groups prepared by pur-
1Quoted in Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, by John Hatch. Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1970. p. 242. 
2 Quoted by Coleman, 1960, p. 346. 
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chasing all avaliable machetes. It need be pointed out that the fear 
of the nonibos in Lagos, especially the Yorubas, can be justified by 
certain arrogant and tribalistic utterances of Nnamdi Azikiwe. For 
instance, in his presidental address at the first Ibo State Union (a 
quasi-political wing of the NCNC) Conference in 1949, Azikiwe made the 
following statement: 
It would appear that the God of Africa has specially 
created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from 
the bondage of the ages .•• The martial prowess of the Ibo 
nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not 
only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the 
role of preserver ••. The Ibo nation cannot shirk its responsi-
bilities from its manifest destiny. 1 
Thus the Ibos came into conflict with the Yorubas in two ways: 
1) the spread of Ibos all over Nigeria (following their rapid acquisition 
of western education) including Yoruba cities which challenged the job 
opportunities and other economic interests of the Yorubas, and 2) the 
Ibo challenge of the established political interests of the Yorubas 
(Schwarz, 1965). It was the rivalry a~d the intensity of the competition 
between the Yorubas and the Ibos which led to ethnic hostility and dis-
trust between the groups which made it very difficult for the NCNC (the 
party of the Ibos) to combine together with the AG (the party of the 
Yorubas) to form a coalition government at the central level. 
To the second question (what brought the NPC and the NCNC together) 
can be explained in terms of a "national consequence of the animosity 
that both the NPC and the NCNC felt toward the AG because of its efforts 
to create new states or regions and stir up minority fears in their home 
regions" (Schwarz, 1965, pp. 112-113). Finally, it has been argued that 
1Nnamdi Azikiwe, West African Pilot, July 6, 1949, quoted in Coleman 
( 1960) ' p.' 34 7. 
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Azikiwe agreed to enter into a coalition with the NPC to form the central 
government because if the NCNC and the AG had arrayed themselves in a 
coalition against the NPC, the latter would have seceeded. Thus, Nigeria 
would have ceased to exist as a country. 
The NPC-NCNC coalition was a shaky one throughout its duration. 
It was finally split apart in 1965 following rivalry and attempts by 
by each of the coalition partners to politically outmaneuver the other 
so as to win control of the federal government. But, the last straw 
that broke the camel's back was the controversy over the census figures 
of 1962-1964. The NCNC vehemently opposed the figures of the 1962 
elections and of the 1963-1964 recount. It was here the party came 
at direct confrontation with the NPC--the senior partner of the coali-
tion. We wish to point out that the Ibos (the NPP) were also in a 
coalition partnership with the NPN (an Hausa-Fulani party) in the Second 
Republic. As in the First Republic, the coalition was a complete 
failure. 
Political Trends in Nigeria From 
Independence to the Present 
The independence Nigeria won from the British on October 1, 1960 
was one surrounded by many unresolved malintegrative forces. These 
included: 
1. The fears of the people from the minority areas under the 
domination of the majority ethnic groups, 
2. The federal system composed of three regions, in which, one 
region, the North, was bigger and, therefore, commanded more seats in 
the Federal House, than the other regions combined, and 
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3. The tribalistic outlook of the politicians as well as their 
political parties. 
Act one of the drama was the 1962 crisis of the Western Region House 
of Assembly. In this year, the internal party upheaval between Awolowo, 
the leader of the AG who resigned his premiership in the West to become 
the opposition leader at the center, and his deputy and successor, Chief 
Akintola, reached a climax. The Executive Committee of the Action Group 
called upon Chief Akintola to resign as Premier of the West after "find-
ing him guilty of maladministration, antiparty activities, and indisci-
pline" (Schwarz, 1965, p. 135). Chief Akintola refused to resign and 
the Governor revoked his appointment as Premier and appointed in his 
stead Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro. 
On May 25, 1962, the supporters of Akintola disrupted the Regional 
House that was convened in order to approve the appointment of Alhaji 
Adegbenro. According to Schwarz (1965), as soon as the House was con-
vened, three words, "Mr. Speaker, Sir ••• " had hardly been spoken when, 
Suddenly an Akintola supporter jumped on his bench and 
leapt through the room, shouting 'fire, smoke, fire ••• 
fire on the mountain'. Fighting immediately broke out, 
punches were traded, and chairs, thrown; the speaker was 
nearly decapitated with the symbolic mace and order was 
not restored until the police entered and cleared the room 
with tear gas (p. 37). 
The Awolowo faction wanted to reconvene the House so as to complete 
the formalities of replacing Chief Akintola. Accordingly, they requested 
police protection from the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, but the latter 
refused. The second meeting convened was also disrupted by Akintola's 
supporters and had to be dispersed just like the first incident. 
Following the breakdown of the Action Group controlled government 
in the Western Region because of the crisis within the party, the Prime 
Minister declared a state of emergency on the region on May 29, 1962. 
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The affairs of the region were, for six months, placed under the manage-
ment of an administrator, Dr. A. M. A. Majekodumi. 
Later in 1962, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (the opposition party leader 
at the center), with whom members of his factions of the AG (and that 
of Akintola) had been put under restrictions, were rounded up and charged 
with conspiracy to commit treasonable felony. Akintola was released 
from restriction, left the AG, and formed a new party (the United 
People's Party--UPP) at the end of the year when the emergency ended. 
Akintola was later restored to office by the Federal Government as 
Premier of Western Region without election (Schwarz, 1965). 
Awolowo and his leading party members were tried for the felony 
charges and were found guilty of the offense and sentenced to jail for 
periods ranging from 15 to 20 years. Schwarz (1968) points out that 
"the trial was the central political event of the Balewa regime and 
Awolowo's conviction marked the end of effective constitutional opposi-
tion" (p. 128). 
The act in 1962 closed with a controversial national census which 
was rejected outright by the NCNC and the AG. This rejection led to 
a fresh count in 1963 which put the population of Nigeria at 55.6 
million; made up of 29.9 million from the North, 12.3 million from the 
East, 10.2 million from the West, 2.6 million from the MidWest (formerly 
a part of the Western Region), and 0.6 million from Lagos. These numbers 
were also rejected by the NCNC and AG parties on grounds that they were 
inflated but the Prime Minister, himself a northerner, quickly announced 
the figures as the officially accepted population for the country before 
opposition to them became intensified. 
On October 1, 1963, the country became a republic and Nnamdi Azikiwe 
became the first Nigerian President--a mere constitutional president. 
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In the same year, amidst bitter oppositions from the AG (the coaltion 
government, in order to destroy Awolowo politically) the Mid-West was 
created from the West as the fourth region, while the East and bigger 
North were left intact. Chief Dennis Osadebey became the administrator 
until January, 1964, when he was elected as the Premier of the Mid-
Western Region. 
In 1964, another act was opened with the general workers strike, 
the census controversy--"a bitter tribal arguement which wrecked the 
alliance of the Northern (NPC) and Eastern (NCNC) parties" (Schwarz, 
1968), and the federal general elections in which a new line-up, with 
both the popular parties of the South (the AG and NCNC) now ranged 
against the Northern establishment. There was the TIV riots in the 
middle belt whereby the military had to be called in to quell the 
spreading revolt. 
Before the 1964 elections, the major political parties had 
regrouped themselves into two. The NCNC and the AG formed themselves 
into the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), while the NPC and 
the newly formed Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) formed an 
alliance known as 'the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). It should be 
noted that the new NNDP was formed in March 1964 in the name of Yoruba 
and Western Region interests. According to Schwarz (1965), "it brought 
together in the Western House of Assembly Akintola's United People's 
Party and 14 NCNC members of the Assembly who resigned from the NCNC" 
( p. 142). 
Then came the elections. The results were rejected by the UPGA 
for alleged irregularities. The crisis that followed almost broke the 
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Federation apart, but an uneasy compromise reached by the two parties 
saved the Re pub 1 ic • 
There then opened the final act, the last straw that was to break 
the camel's back. This was the 1965 Western Region election, "the final, 
desperate attempt of the Southern alliance to win power by constitutional 
means" (Schwarz, 1968, p. 128). But, the elections were "super" rigged 
by the NNA which then formed the government. Its failure, and amidst 
the bitterness of a rigged election, the UPGA, under Alhaji Dauda 
Adegbenro, formed an alternative government in the same Western Region. 
This unusual event was followed by wide spread chaos in the West; burning 
of houses and looting, during which many hundreds of people lost their 
lives. The chaos continued for months and was spreading to Lagos, the 
capital. It was apparent that law and order had completely broken down 
in the West. In the face of this more serious threat compared to the 
1962 disorder in the Western Region Assembly, the Prime Minister refused 
to declare a state of emergency in the West because his political party 
alliance was in power in that region. 
It was during this very explosive situation 1n the country, partic-
ularly the spreading chaos in the West, that led directly to the coup 
d'etat of January 5, 1966. This coup claimed the lives of prominent 
Nigerian politicians and top military officers. Among those killed were: 
the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Premiers of both 
the North (the Saudana of Sokoto) and the West (ChiefS. L. Akintola); 
the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh; Bridagier Maimalari 
and Ademulegun; Lieutenant Colonels Pam, Largema, and Arthur Unegbu; and 
so on. 
The coup planners and executioners were mainly Ibo-speaking from 
the Eastern Region and all but one of those killed in the coup were 
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non!bo-speaking. This tended to confirm the sectionalist image of the 
coup. On the whole, 27 people were known to have been killed in the 
coup (Dudley, 1982, p. 80). 
Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, the man who foiled the coup, became 
the head of the new military government. Ironsi, himself, was an Ibo. 
As soon as he assumed power, Ironsi, on May 24, promulgated Decree No. 34 
making the country a unitary system in spite of strong opposition from 
Northerners who had expressed fears that the coup was organized to get 
rid of northern political leaders so that the Ibos could dominate the 
country. 
The reaction in the North to Decree No. 34 was swift and violent. 
By May 28, killings of Ibos which started in Kana had spread throughout 
northern Nigeria. Hundreds of Ibo people were killed by thugs in the 
Sabon gari--the "strangers quarter"-of the major cities in the north 
where the Ibos lived (Schwarz, 1968). At this point, Ironsi was showing 
signs of loosing control. In a desperate attempt to do something, Ironsi 
started a tour of the regions amidst expectations of a counter coup. 
He was never to return. 
On July 29, 1966, Northern military officers organized and executed 
a counter coup. Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, then touring parts of the 
Western Region, and his host, Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the 
military governor of the West, and many Ibo army officers were killed 
in this second coup. 
On August 1, 1966, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon--a Northerner 
and then the Chief of Staff (army)--assumed the control of the country 
and as the Supreme Commmander of the Nigerian Armed Forces. He promised 
to restore peace and harmony to the country. But the killing of Ibo 
people continued in the North up till September 1966. One of the first 
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actions of Gowan on assuming office was the abrogation of the contro-
versial Decree No. 34 establishing a unitary system. He then reverted 
to the federal system of government. He also released political 
prisoners, including Chief Obafemi Awolowo (on August 4) who then was 
serving a ten year jail term. Gowan later on set up a steering committee 
to recommend to him the type of constitutional government that would 
be most suitable for the country. The committee could not achieve any 
progress owing to the withdrawal of the eastern region delegation from 
the conference on the grounds that they were not safe in the country. 
The search for peace and harmony continued with the January 4, 1967 
meeting of all Nigerian leaders at Aburi, Ghana, but peace was still 
eluded the country. 
On May 27, 1967, Major General Gowan broke the country into 12 
states and later appointed military governors for 11 of the 12 states. 
Mr. Ukpabi Aska, a civilian, was appointed administrator for the East 
Central state, the 12th state. The decree divided the North into six 
separate states, something "southern politicans had been trying for 
decades to do--and what the Sardauna had so fiercely resisted. It ended 
an administration that had been unified since the Holy War of Usman Dan 
Fodio in 1817" (Schwarz, 1968, p. 233). 
On May 30, 1967, the former Eastern Region, formerly seceeded 
declaring itself an independent country under the name the "Republic 
of Biafra" with Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Ojukwu as the "Head of State". 
In order to thwart the Ibo efforts at disintegrating the country, 
Gowan, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Nigerian Armed 
Forces, on July 6, 1967 ordered the Nigerian Forces to enter the Eastern 
Region. This marked the beginning of what came to be known as the 
Nigerian Civil War, a war which lasted for thirty months. 
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On January 9, 1970, the rebel leader, Emeke Ojukwu, in a dramatic 
move, fled the country, leaving his dream republic (the "Republic of 
Biafra") under the control of his second in command--Lieutenant Colonel 
Phillip Effiong. The civil war ended on January 12, 1970, when Colonel 
Effiong handed over the so-called Biafra to General Yakubu Gowan with 
the following statement: 
I, Major-General Phillip Effiong, officer administrating the 
(ill-fated) government of the Republic of Biafra now wish to 
make the following declaration: 
(a) That we affirm we are loyal Nigerian citizens and 
accept the authority of the federal military 
government of Nigeria. 
(b) That we accept the existing administration and 
political structure of the federation of Nigeria. 
(c) That any future constitutional arrangement will 
be worked out by representatives of the people 
of Nigeria 
(d) That the Republic of Biafra hereby ceases to 
exist. (Dudley, 1976, pp. 81-82). 
The above "statements of surrender" formally brought the Republic of 
Biafra to an unceremonious end. 
Gowan received the declaration and replied with the greatest 
magnanimity, that in the war, there are "no victors no vanquished." 
He immediately initiated the policies of rehabilitating and reconciling 
the people, as well as reconstructing the damaged roads, bridges, 
installations, and institutions in the country. 
Later, in 1970, Gowan announced a "nine-point program" of transition 
to handing over power to a civilian government in 1976. But, on October 
1, 1976, he announced to the astonishment of the country that it would 
be "unrealistic" for the military to hand over power in 1976 as earlier 
promised. He did not promise an alternative date for possible handover 
of government to a civilian administration (Dudley, 1982). 
On the 29th of July, 1975, after about nine years of rule, General 
Gowan, himself, was overthrown in a "palace coup." He was succeeded 
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by Brigadier Murtala Muhammed, himself a northerner. Murtala promised 
to return the country to a civilian rule. To achieve this objective, 
he soon set up a constitution drafting committee. He also created more 
states, changing the 12 state structure to 19 states in the federation. 
Of the 19 states, 10 are in the former Northern Region (see Map 9). 
On February 15, 1976, Brigadier Murtala Muhammed was assassinated 
in an abortive coup led by Colonel Dimka. Muhammed was succeeded by 
his second in command, Lieutenant General Olesegun Obasanjo (a Yoruba) 
who became "the fourth military person to take over the Head of State 
and Commander-in-Chief in ten years after the coup which had first 
brought the military to power" (Dudley, 1982, pp. 83-84). 
The Obasanjo administration basically followed the policy outlines 
laid down during the Muhammed era. At the end of September 1978, the 
decree which imposed a state of emergency in May 1967 was abrogated. 
This permitted the formation of political parties to contest the 
forthcoming elections. Five parties: the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN); Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN); Nigerian People's Party (NPP); Great 
Nigerian People's Party (GNPP); and People's Redemption Party (PRP), 
were approved to contest the elections. In July/August 1979 elections 
were held into the newly created office of the Executive President; the 
state governors, and the National Assembly and State Assemblies. 
On October 1, 1979, General Obasanjo formally handed over power 
to the newly elected Executive President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and thus 
began what came to be referred to as the Second Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, after 13 years of military rule. 
However, on December 31, 1983, because of rigged elections (of 
August/September 1983) and killings during the elections, the worsening 
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econom1c situation, corruption and ineptitude of the Shagari administra-
tion, and increasing unemployment and the potential atmosphere of politi-
cal instability, the military staged another comeback. This brought 
to an end not only the Shagari's administration which was three months 
into its second term (after the first term of four years), but also the 
Second Republic of Nigeria. Major General Mohammadu Buhari (a North-
erner) became the head of the new Federal Military Government with effect 
from January 1, 1984. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MAJOR NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
Introduction 
Political parties are regarded as institutions characteris-
tic of modern demmocracy; they are also considered to be 
indispensible for its success and survival •.. They serve as 
instruments (of integration) to integrate interests, to 
provide leadership, and to facilitate a periodic choice of 
alternatives by the common man. 
Coleman 1955, p. 225 
On several counts the task of African parties in promoting 
national integration in particular is both more difficult 
and more necessary than it would be in any other part of 
the world. Achieving independence with a lower stable 
level of national integration within the existing political 
units ••• , all African countries south of the Sahara are in 
grave need of forces which can actively promote their 
unity. In a number of these countries political parties 
have played a central and invaluable role in speeding 
and consolidating the process of integration ••• In some 
instances parties have impeded rather than advanced 
integration, notably where their guiding star was tribal-
ism or regionalism rather than nationalism ..• 
Emerson 1966, p. 267 
The thesis of this study is that the major political parties in 
Nigeria during the first Republic were not broad-based national parties. 
In fact, they were ethnoregionally based. This particularistic nature 
of the parties made them to impede the process of national integration 
in Nigeria. In investigating this proposition, the discussion in this 
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chapter is structured in terms of the specific dimensions outlined Ln 
the analytical framework developed in Chapter I. 
Identifying The Major Political Parties 
In Nigeria Up To 1966, And In The 
1979 Elections 
The real decisive factor--the precipitant--in the formation of 
political parties in Nigeria has been attributed to increased nationalist 
movements in the country, particularly, immediately after World War II. 
As Hodgkin (1954) succinctly stated: 
In Nigeria, as elsewhere in emergent Africa under British 
or French rule, nationalist pressures quickened the pace 
of constitutional advance which in turn stimulated the 
development of political parties (p. 13). 
At the time of the first military coup that brought the First 
Republic of Nigeria to an end on January 15, 1966, 81 political parties 
were in existence (Peil, 1976). In May 1966, all 81 political parties 
were dissolved by the military governm~nt. Table V presents some of 
these political parties, their l'eaders and their main areas of opera-
tion. Of the 81 parties in the First Republic, three were often been 
considered as the major political parties by virtue of their leadership 
size, the size of their membership, and control over one of the three, 
and later four, regions in the country. 
The three major parties in the First Republic of Nigeria were: 
1. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons which later 
became known, as from 1961, as the National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC). 
2. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), and 


















MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE 
FIRST REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 
Name 
Action Group 
Bornu Youth Movement 
Dynamic Party 
Mid-West Democratic Front 
Mobolaje Grand Alliance 
National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens 
Niger Delta Congress 
Northern Elements Progressive 
Union 
Nigerian National Democratic 
Party 
Nigerian National Alliance 
Northern People's Congress 
Northern Progressive Front 
Otu Edo 
Socialist Workers and Farmers 
Party 
United Middle Belt Congress 
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In the Second Republic--October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983--the 
five parties that qualified for registration and which contested the 
elections held in July/August 1978 can be considered as major political 
parties. Out of about 150 political associations that were formed at 
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the end of 1978 in which 50 applied for registration as political 
parties, only 5 met the electoral decree provision of January 1978 that 
a political association must have headquarters in 13 of the 19 states 
to be registered as a political party by the Federal Electoral Commis-
sion (FEDECO). 
The five parties that were registered and which contested the July/ 






National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) , 
Nigerian People's Party (NPP) , 
Great Nigeria People's Party ( GNPP), and 
People's Redemption Party (PRP). 
The Scope, Nature, and Political Bases 
of the Major Political Parties 
In the First Republic 
In determining whether or not the major political parties in Nigeria 
were broad-based or national in scope, certain indicators will have to 
be examined. These variables are: 
a. The ethnic composition of the leadership of each of the major 
parties, 
b. The regional composition of the leadership group of each of 
the parties, 
c. The communal bases of political support of each of the major 
parties in situations of interparty competition, and 
d. The electoral returns for each of the major parties in regional 
and federal elections from 1951 to 1965 and in the 1979 elections. 
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If the ethnic and regional composition of the political parties 
are a representation of a broad cross-section of the plural society of 
Nigeria, if the communal bases of the parties' support and electoral 
returns show a crossethnic or regional lining, then the political 
parties can be regarded as broad based and national in scope. In such 
a situation the political parties should be able to play a vital inte-
grative function ~n Nigeria. 
On the other hand, if the variables examined point to the contrary--
particularistic tendencies--such as ethnoregional composition of the 
parties' leadership, ethnic and regional support of a particular party 
in cases of interparty competition and elections, then the political 
parties cannot be considered as national in scope. Under such condi-
tions, the parties are most likely to constitute an obstacle to efforts 
at national integration in Nigeria. 
Before examining the above variables to determine the scope, nature, 
and political basis of the major political parties in Nigeria, it should 
be recalled that the Richards Constitution of 1946 divided Nigeria into 
three "unequal" regions. These were the North, East, and Western 
Regions. Each region was dominated by a particular ethnic group. The 
Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yorubas in the West, and the Ibos in the 
East. Each of these regions were also comprised of several minority 
groups. 
The Richards Constitution marked and set in motion regional politics 
in Nigerian political life. The growth of political parties naturally 
followed regional/ethnic divisions. One of the major parties dominated 
each region and the party, in turn, was dominated by the predominant 
linguistic group in that region. It was the Action Group (AG) and the 
Yorubas in the Western Region, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
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(NCNC) and the Ibos in the Eastern Region, and the Northern People's 
Congress (NPC) and the Hausa-Fulanis to the Northern Region. This pre-
vailing situation can be summed up thus: 
NPC 
= AG 
= Hausa-Fulani Northern Region = 
Western Region 
Eastern Region = NCNC = 
= Yorubas 
Ibos 
The origin of the major political parties was discussed ~n the closing 
section of Chapter III and will not be discussed here. 
It should be remembered that the minorities in these regions 
responded to their dominance by the major ethnic group and their 
political parties by forming their own ethnic parties and demanded that 
states be created for them. This led to the emergence of 81 political 
parties in January 1966 when the military seized power and dissolved 
all political parties in the country. 
In examining, comparatively, the ethnic and regional distribution 
of the political leadership of the major political parties in 1960, 
Tables VI and VII reveal that the top leadership groups of all parties 
reflect their ethnic and regional foundations. The NPC, in accordance 
with its motto "One North One People," was made up only of northern 
tribes and the largest single group in the party leadership is the 
Fulani-Hausa who also constitute the dominant ethnic group ~n northern 
Nigeria. 
Similarily, the AG, in spite of its incursion into minority areas 
in the Eastern and Northern Regions, had as its ethnic and regional core 
of leadership, essentially the Yorubas of western Nigeria. This ethnic 
group constituted 68.2% of the party leadership. 
Furthermore, the NCNC party leadership was dominated by the Ibos 









ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR PARTY LEADERS, 
NIGERIA (IN PERCENTAGES) 
Other Other Cameroonians, 
Eastern Western Northern Non-Nigerians 
Groups Yo rub a Groups Groups and Unknown 
9.9 26.7 5.6 2.8 5.6 
15.2 68.2 7.6 3.0 1.5 
Other 
Habe Northern 
(Hausa) Nupe Kanuri Yoruba Groups Unknown 
18.9 9.4 6.8 6.8 16.2 9.4 







*The radical wing of the NPC broke away in 1950 to form the Northern Element Progressive Union 
(NEPU) under the leadership of Amino Kano. 
Source: James s. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg. Political Parties and National Integration in 









REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE 
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE 
MAJOR PARTIES, 1959 
Re~ions 
Northern Eastern Western Lagos Cameroons 
5 37 22 5 2 






Source: Richard L. Sklar. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in 
an Emergent Afican Nation. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963. pp. 323, 483-484. 
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Table VIII lists selected examples of the communal bases of the 
parties in situations of interparty competition. The table indicates 
that all parties were supported mostly by the major ethnic groups in 
the region where they had their bases. Each of the major parties then 
woos the cultural minorities within its domain and the minority groups 
in the other regions--the domain of the other rival parties. We see 
from the table, for example, that the AG was supported by most sections 
of the Yoruba speaking people, while in the Eastern and Northern Regions, 
it was supported, not by the dominant ethnic groups in those areas--the 
Ibos and Hausa-Fulanis, respectively, but by the people from the minority 
areas of those regions. 
Besides, Table IX which presents the results of Nigerian elections 
1951-1965 indicates that except for the federal election in the Western 
Region in 1954 where the NCNC won 23 seats, 5 seats more than the AG 









SELECTED COMMUNAL BASES OF PARTY SUPPORT IN 
SITUATIONS OF INTERPARTY COMPETITION 
Eastern Region 
Mostly people from minority 
sections - the Ibibio, Efik, 
and Aro people. 
All sections of the rho-
speaking people, and the 
Annang and Qua people in 
Ikot Ekpene and Calabo 
divisions, respectively. 




Most sections of the Yoruba-
speaking people, and the 
Itsekeri and Okpe-Urhobo 
people of the delta area. 
Edo, Ibo, and Urhobo (settlers 
of Warri) people of the mid-
west. Yoruba people from Illa, 
Ilesha and Modakeke (ward of 
Ife) districts Itausa and Ibo 
settlers in Lagos and Ibadan. 
Ibadan Yoruba, and a minority 
of the Yoruba Muslims. 
Northern Region 
Mostly peop~e from the 
minority areas: Bernu, TIV 
Chamba, Birom, Jarawa, and 
Sayawa, Igbolo, and Igbomina 
Yoruba people. 
Mostly minority peoples -
Ngizim and Karekare, Kilba, 
Gwari, and the Tijaniyya 
peoples. 
Peoples of the Hausa-Fulani 
state system and the Bornu 
Emirate. !gala and Idoma 
people of !gala and Idoma 
divisions, respectively. 
source: James s. Coleman.and Carl G. Rosberg. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical 






Eastern Regional Election 
Western Regional Election 
Northern Regional Election 
1953 
Eastern Regional Election 
1954 
Federal Election, Eastern Region 
Federal Election, Western Region 
Federal Election, Northern Region 
Federal Election, Lagos 
TABLE IX 
THE RESULTS OF NIGERIAN ELECTIONS, 
1951-1965 AND 1979 
Party 
NCNC 





National Independence Party 











































TABLE IX (Continued) 
Election Party 
1956 
Western Regional Election Action Group 
NCNC 
Northern Regional Election NPC 
Action Group 
1957 
Eastern Regional Election NCNC 
Action Group 
1959 
Federal Election, Eastern Region NCNC-NEPU Alliance 
Action Group 
Federal Election, Western Region Action Group 
NCNC-NEPU Alliance 
NPC 
Federal Election, Northern Region NPC 
Action Group 
NCNC-NEPU Alliance 
Federal Election, Lagos NCNC-NEPU Alliance 
Action Group 
NPC 






















































Western Regional Election 
1961 
Northern Regional Election 
Eastern Regional Election 
1964-1965 
Federal Election, Eastern Region 
Federal Election, Western Region 
Federal Election, Northern Region 
Federal Election, Midwestern Region 



































































Federal Election, Lagos 
Federal Election, Total 
















(one seat still 
to be contested) 
*The table has been adopted from the works of Sklar (1963, pp. 35-37}, Coleman and Rosberg (1964, pp. 652-
654), and Sklar and Whitaker (1966, pp. 53-56). 





were on ethnoregional bases. Consequently, we see the NPC consistently 
winning all or an overwhelming majority federal seats in the north and 
controlling the northern government and the state House of Assembly, 
while hardly winning a seat in the Eastern or Western regions. Simi-
larly, the AG won a majority of the federal seats in the Western Region 
within this period, except for the 1954 federal elections. However, 
it controlled the state government and the state House of Assembly. 
The few seats it ever won in the other two regions of the federation 
were from the minority areas of those regions. 
Finally, the NCNC won an overwhelming majority of the seats during 
all federal elections in the Eastern Region and controlled the state 
government and the state House of Assembly during this period under 
discussion. Besides the federal elections of 1954 when it won the 
majority of seats in the west over the AG, the few seats it ever won 
in both federal elections and regional elections in the Western and 
Northern Regions were from the minority areas. 
One conclusion that is evident from the foregoing analysis of the 
data presented in Tables V through IX is that the major political parties 
in Nigeria in the First Republic were ethnoregionally based. Thus, they 
cannot be considered as nationally based political parties. We found 
that the NCNC has its base in the Eastern Region and was dominated by 
the major ethnic group of that region, the Ibos. The AG has its base 
in the west and was dominated by the Yorubas, and the NPC which is a 
Northern Region party was exclusively Hausa-Fulani dominated. This 
cultural particularism that characterized the major political parties 
made them not only to espouse panregionalism but also to completely 
identify and equate their interests with the survival of their respective 
regions as a political entity. 
As Okoli (1980) rightly observed, under the above condition: 
the distinction between regional government and the party 
in power; between the party in power and the dominant ethnic 
groups within the various regions became blurred. This 
close identification of the region with the party, on the 
one hand, and the party with the dominant ethnic group 
within the region, on the other hand, tended to make the 
party in power intolerant of opposition within the region 
and at the same time incapable of responding effectively 
to cross-pressures from other regional parties ••• The lack 
of responsiveness has, in turn, severely stunted the growth 
of communication between the regions and reinforced section-
alism (p. 115). 
According to Lipset (1966, p. 77), "The greater the amount of 
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sectionalism, the greater the danger for a political system." So it 
was with Nigeria in the First Republic as we shall elucidate later ~n 
this chapter. The inability of the political parties to transcend their 
ethnoregional bases, and their failure to reflect national perspective 
and interests in their debates of issues with national consequences, 
adversely affected their ability to serve as instruments of national 
integration. 
The above discussion of the scope, nature, and political bases of 
the major parties in Nigeria up to 1966 can be clearly summed up in the 
statement by Mazrui and Tidy (1984). They stated that, 
The political history of Nigeria from 1945 to 1960 was 
less a struggle for independence than a struggle for 
supremacy within a federal state between the three most 
populous ethnic communities: the Hausa-Fulani of the 
North, the Yoruba of the West, and the Ibo of the East 
(p. 92). 
They added, 
Each of these three communities expressed its political 
subnationalism (regional nationalism as distinct from 
nation-wide nationalism) in a regionally based political 
party. The Hausa-Fulani overwhelmingly supported the 
Northern People's Congress (NPC), led by the Sardauna of 
Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and his Lieutenant Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa ••• The Yoruba rallied behind the Action Group 
(AG) led by Chief Obfemi Awolowo. The Ibo rallied to the 
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC)led by 
Nnamdi Azikiwe (p. 92). 
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The emergence of three regionally based political parties and the 
development of ethnic subnationalist politics in Nigeria constituted 
an obstacle to the evolution of a strong one-Nigerian national con-
sciousness, identity, and political integration. Rather, it paved the 
way to a series of conflicts which resulted in major crises and disunity 
among the various cultural groups in the country. 
The military regime which handed government over to a democratically 
elected civilian government on October 1, 1979 recognized the danger 
and the distability and disintegrative role played by the particularistic 
nature of the major political parties in the First Republic. It was 
in light of this realization that the military government proposed and 
incorporated certain criteria (to be met by all associations before they 
can be registered as political parties) in the Electoral Decree No. 73 
of 1977. These criteria were meant to make all political parties reflect 
the "federal character" of Nigeria. 
Some of the relevant criteria here are the provision that for an 
association to qualify for registration as a party by the Federal 
Electoral Commission (FEDECO), it required, among other things, to: 
1. Register the names and addresses of its national officers with 
the Commission, 
2. Make its membership open to every Nigerian irrespective of his 
place of origin, religion, ethnic group, or sex (the former Northern 
People's Congress had in its constitution prohibited Southerners by 
making the membership of the party open only to people of Northern 
Nigerian descent), 
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3. Register a copy of the association's "constitution" with the 
principal officer of FEDECO, 
4. Ensure that the name, emblem, or motto has no ethnic or reli-
gious connotation, and 
5. Have the headquarters of the association located in the federal 
capital, Lagos. 
6. The decree also required that the rules and constitution of 
a party provide for the periodic election "on a democratic basis" of 
the principal officers or members of the executive or governing body 
of the party, and 
7. The officers or members of the executive committee should 
reflect the "federal character of the society" (Dudley, 1982, pp. 182-
183). 
The five parties that were registered and which contested the 1979 
state and federal elections met the above criteria, hence they can be 
considered as not only major parties but also parties that have member-
ship from a broad cross-section of the Nigerian society. 
In spite of the electorial provisions, the party system (the five 
recognized political parties) under the Second Republic were more or 
less a reincarnation of the ethnoregionally based political parties of 
the First Republic. A political correspondence with the West Africa 
magazine based in London examined the new political parties and put it 
concisely when he pointed out: 
Broadly, the present parties correspond in terms of member-
ship and support to the pre-1966 ones. The NPN is the 
Northern People's Congress (NPC) by name; the NPP is the 
former NCNC; while the UPN is the Action Group (AG) reborn. 
The PRP is NEPU, while the GNPP groups together something 
of all the other (old parties). 1 
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This parallel in the social bases and leaderships of the new parties 
with those of the old was even more vividly stressed and illustrated 
by Ojigbo (1980). He stated that 
1. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) is a reconstruc-
tion of the old NPC--its base is in the north, and its 
guiding force remains the Fulani aristocracy. 
2. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) is the Action Group 
reborn based again in the Yoruba west, and led again by 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo. 
3. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP) reproduces the old 
NCNC, the party of the lbos and of Nnamdi Azikiwe. 
4. The People's Redemption Party (PRP) is the reincarna-
tion of the radical Rausa party, NEPU, and once again is 
dominated by Mallam Aminu Kano. 
5. Even the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), led by 
Waziri Ibrahim, is strongest in his home state, Borno, 
and so may be compared to the Borno Youth Movement (pp. 
223-225). 
Phillips (1980) also alluded to and lamented the nature of the new 
parties in spite of FEDECO's attempts to prohibit ethnic and local 
parties. As he bluntly puts it: 
Many rightly argued that Nigeria was now back to square 
one: despite all efforts at newness, at recombinations, at 
stringent standards, at controls, there had emerged from 
the process the same politicians who had figured prominently 
in and survived the First Republic. The feeling was wide-
spread that 13 years had changed nothing but the ages of 
the participants (p. 15). 
Ejindu (1979) also observed another nature of the 1979 political 
parties. He pointed out that instead of open, high debates on national 
unity and progress, freedom, the economy and welfare of the country, 
the "Nigerian debates during the 1978/1979 campaign were concerned with 
the benefits of one (major) ethnic group against those of another" (p. 
1303). Ejindu went on to quote another commentator that the new parties 
1West Africa, July 2, 1979, p. 1149. 
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"had degenerated into virtually replacing the banned tribal ones of the 
1960s, the difference being that the new tactics are more subtle and 
more sophisticated" (p. 1303). 
Some writers like Diamond (1980) have argued that despite the 
striking continuity in party social base and leadership, the five new 
parties that conducted the 1979 elections were nevertheless not sec-
tional. Often the same writers have pointed out that the National Party 
of Nigeria was the most widely based and has the broadest ethnic 
character. Officially, "its 34 national officers hail from 17 of the 
19 states, while its rivals, the 24 UPN national officers and 29 NPP 
officers are each drawn from 13 states" (Diamond, 1980; p. 633). 
Diamond and others are correct when they argue that the five parties 
1n 1979 were national in their leadership and membership composition. 
But, this author contests Diamond's assertion that the parties were not 
sectional. The fact is that while all the parties seem to have a broad 
base among the different ethnic groups, their roots and support were 
still mainly on dominant ethnic-"regional" basis. The politics of 
Nigeria in 1979, in fact, like politics of the 1950s and 1960s, was still 
a "politics of the major ethnic groups." An examination of the vote 
returns of the 1979 elections may help clarify this issue. 
Table X presents the parties' percentage share of the votes in the 
1979 presidential election. The table shows that the UPN had an over-
whelming support (over 80% of the votes) in four states--Lagos, Ogun, 
Ondo, and Oyo. It should be pointed out that all these four states are 
Yoruba speaking states. The UPN also won 53.23% of the votes in Bendel 
State, formerly a minority area in the Western Region, 39.9% in Kwara 
where a significant portion of the electorate are Yoruba speaking people, 
and 21.68% in Gongola, formerly a minority area in northern Nigeria. 
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In the other 12 states of the federation. The percent vote for Chief 
Awolowo and his party, the UPN, ranged from as low as 0.75 in Anambra 
to 15.14 in Cross-River. 
The NPP received an overwhelming support (over 82%) in Imo and 
Anambra States which are Ibo-speaking states and identified ethnically 
with the party's leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe. The party also received SO% 
of the votes in Plateau State, formerly a minority section in northern 
Nigeria. Besides these three states, the NPP did not receive as much 
as 15% of the votes in the other sixteen states of the federation. 
Of the five presidential candidates who contested the 1979 presi-
dential elections, three were from northern Nigeria which now comprises 
ten of the nineteen states of the Federation of Nigeria. 
The NPN polled over 65% of the votes in Sokoto, the home state of 
the party's presidential candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Sokoto is 
dominated by the Hausa-Fulanis who also identified with Shehu Shagari. 
The NPN also polled more than 50% of the votes in Bauchi (62.48%), Benue 
(79.39%), Kwara (53.62%), Niger (75.42%) all are minority areas in the 
former Northern Region. The NPN also polled more than 60% in Cross-River 
(64.41%) and Rivers (72.66%) minority areas formally in eastern Nigeria. 
The GNPP succeeded in polling over 50% (54.05%) of the votes in 
only one state, Borno, an essentially Kanuri state and the home state 
of the party presidential leader, Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri. 
Finally, the PRP polled over-70% (77.71%) in Kano, an Hausa-Fulani 
state and the home state of the party leader and presidential candidate, 
Mallam Aminu Kano. The percentage of the votes polled by the party in 
the other states ranged from 0.18% to 31.66%. 
From the above analysis, four features are identifiable: 
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1. The new parties in 1979, like those of pre-1966, were ethno-
regionally based, although they appear to be national in their origin 
and leadership composition. 
2. Each of the parties won overwhelmingly in the party leader's 
or presidential candidate's home state. 
3. Majority of the parties (the UPN, NPN, and NPP) polled over-
whelming votes in one or more of the "minority" states. 
4. Finally, the voting (as the data on the presidential election 
returns show) has been on ethnic and regional bases. 
Political Parties and Conflicts and 
Crises in Nigeria 
In 1960, shortly after independence, Cole (1960) reflected on the 
political development in Nigeria in the last fifteen years. His con-
elusion was that 
The trend ••• had been towards separation rather than 
unity; that there has been no real emergence of symbols 
which would attract loyalities or even the attention of 
the illiterate and impoverished masses ••• nor is there any 
social setting in which a national consciousness can be 
grounded; that political parties ••• fail to accept the 
common interests on which ties of unity can rest; and 
without the existence of such ties of unity, a central 
government in a Nigerian federal system must either remain 
weak or disappear entirely (p. 4). 
Nigeria has not disappeared but weak it has been and may continue 
to be as a political entity because of the absence of common interests 
on which ties of unity can be based. Nigerian political parties which 
could have been instrumental in creating a basis of national conscious-
ness had not only failed to do so but rather has weakened loyalty to 
a common central government and intensified loyalties to the regions. 
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In order to clarify how the major Nigerian parties have led to the 
weakening of citizens' loyalties to a common central government while 
strengthening loyalties to the regions, we will subject actual crisis 
to a thorough analysis. In such an examination, we will determine the 
role the major political parties played in generating the crises and 
how the crises in turn led to a dislike for a single political entity 
called Nigeria while intensifying the need for autonomous government 
for the regions. 
The crises that have been selected for detail analysis are: 
1. The 1953 motion for independence in 1956, 
2. The census conflict from 1933 to 1964, and 
3. The 1964-1965 election crises. 
The Self-Government Crises at the Center in 1953 
At the Action Group's annual convention in December 1952, the party 
adopted a policy of political independence for Nigeria in 1956 (Sklar, 
1963). 
In March 1953, the House of Representatives (comprising of SO% 
Northern representatives, 25% Western representatives, and 25% Eastern 
Region representatives) met for its annual budget session. During this 
session, on March 31, 1953, Chief Anthony Enahoro, an AG member of the 
House moved a motion requesting the House to "accept as a primary 
political objective the attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 
1956" (Schwarz, 1965; p. 77). This motion plunged Nigeria into crisis 
and nearly led to the sucession of the Northern Region. 
The Northern representatives, fearing Southern domination if self-
government were granted too early, were implacably opposed to the 
motion. To them, an acceptance of the motion at a time when the North 
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was far behind the South politically would be an "acceptance of the 
invitation to commit suicide." Consequently, Mall am Ahmadu Bello, the 
Sardauna of Sokoto, speaking for the North and his party, the NPC, 
offered an amendment replacing the specific date of 1956 with the phrase 
"as soon as practicable" (Sklar, 1963; p. 127). 
The AG and some members of the NCNC refused to accept this vague 
amendment. When it became clear that the NPC was going to use its 
numerical strength to "veto" the motion or postpone debate on the motion 
for self-independence, the AG and NCNC members walked out of the House 
of Representatives (Sklar and Whitaker, 1966). The Northern representa-
tives were later booed and jeered at by Lagos crowds for their stand 
over the independence motion. They were also called names such as 
"puppets" and "stooges" of the British colonialists. The Northern 
representatives returned home feeling humiliated. They were much upset 
by the events that occurred in Lagos. 
The Northern delegates had hardly returned home when the AG decided 
to go to the north to campaign in order to convince the people of the 
north to desert their leaders and join 1n the demand for self-government 
in 1956. But, the NPC political leaders were prepared to do battle with 
The AG members who were going to campaign in the North. This point was 
made more explicit by Mallam Inuwa Wada, a member of the NPC and the 
Information officer for the Kano Native Authority. He stated, 
Having abused us (the Northerners) in the South, these very 
Southerners have decided to come over to the North to abuse 
us, but we have determined to retaliate ••• We have therefore 
orgnized about 1,000 men ready in the city to meet force 
with force; those men will parade Kano tomorrow, singing and 
shouting that the delegates are not wanted in Kano and that 
no lecture or meeting will be delivered by them. 1 
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Upon the arrival of the AG campaign under the leadership of S.L. Akintola 
in Kano in May, rioting broke out. The four days of rioting resulted 
in 241 wounded and 26 deaths (Coleman, 1958). 
After the riots, the NPC government drew up and passed an "eight 
point program" which was jointly endorsed by the joint meeting of the 
Northern House of Assembly and the Northern House of Chiefs. According 
to Coleman (1958), if this program had been implemented, it "would have 
meant virtual secession of the Northern Region from ~igeria" (pp. 399-
400). 
As a result of the crisis provoked by the 1953 motion for self-
government in 1956, the Colonial Secretary called a conference of 
Nigerian political party leaders to meet in London in July, 1953. 
Another conference was also held in Lagos in 1954. The result of these 
constitutional conferences was the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution which 
established, for the first time, a genuinely federal system of government 
in Nigeria. Even after the constitutional conferences, the north was 
still bent on taking further steps to reducing the dominance of the 
southerners in certain sectors of both the public and business circles. 
In January 1954, the northern leaders, as represented by the NPC 
government, proclaimed their policy of Northernization. This policy, 
according to Cole (1962) was interpreted by the Public Service Commission 
of the Northern Region as follows: 
1Report of Kano Disturbance, 16th-19th May, 1953 (Lagos, 1953), Appendix 
B, p. 46. 
If a qualified Northerner is available, he is given priority 
in recruitment; if no Northerner is available, an expatriate 
may be recruited (before) or a (non-Nigerian who is a) non-
Northerner on contract terms (p. 108). 
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Professor Kalu Ezera, a Nigerian academician and parliametarian 
expressed the indignation that was widespread in the south with regard 
to the Northernization pol'icy when he stated, 
I would rather not be a citizen of a country where I am 
regarded as a second class citizen. We know it to be a 
fact that in some parts of this federation citizens of 
this country are not regarded as citizens but, rather as 
expatrirates; Pakistanis, Ceylonese, and other national-
ities are given preferential treatment. I am not saying 
that the Northerninzation policy, giving preference to 
Northerners, is a bad thing as such, but where Northeners 
are not available other Nigerians should be given prefer-
ence to expatriates, if we are sincere about our advocacy 
of Nigerian unity ••. If all these are not acceptable, 
then I would suggest that we agree to disagree and break 
up the federation. 1 
The policy of Northernization was so vigorously pursued in early 
1958 that by August 1958, the primier of the north, Sardauna of Sokoto, 
was able to report to the Northern House of Assembly that "a total of 
2,148 southerners had been dismissed from the Northern Public Service 
since January 1954 and that only 24 southerners remained in the senior 
echelon of the permanent establishment." 2 By 1959, of the 221 members 
of the Northern Regional Administrative Class, "161 were expatriate 
officers, 59 were Northern Nigerians, and one was a non-northern 
Nigerian" (Younger, 1960; p. 5). This statistics reveal the extent and 
alacrity with which the northernization policy was pursued in the attempt 
to exclude southern Nigerians from the northern bureaucracy. 
1 Nigerian House of Representative Debates, March 1954, p. 97. 
2Daily Service, August 5, 1958 
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This policy, thus, entailed the periodic dismissals of non-northern 
Nigerians from their jobs in the north. Today, this policy still con-
tinues in the northern states of Nigeria but in a more subtle, sophisti-
cated, and disguised fashion. However, it needs to be pointed out that 
in Nigeria, the preponderant majority of Nigerian members of every state 
bureaucracy consists of persons who are indigenous to the particular 
state. 
In addition to the 1954 Northernization Policy, in 1958, the govern-
ment of northern Nigeria controlled by the NPC (whose representatives 
were booed in Lagos in March 1953 and who engineered the May 1953 Kano 
political riots) haven been pressured by northern businessmen who had 
greatly supported the party financially for more business contracts, 
adopted regional laws and local regulations that discriminated against 
non-northern Nigerians. In that year, 1958, the government instructed 
All Provincial Tenders Boards to prepare new registrars of 
local contractors, excluding contractors of non-northern 
origin (southern Nigerians) from all but a few specialized 
tasks which are not at present within the scope of contrac-
f h . . l tors o nort ern or1g1n. 
Contractors who were of southern Nigerian origin were hurt by this 
discriminatory instruction emanating from the Northern Region govern-
ment. Some of the contractors had to leave for their region of origin. 
This policy by the Northern Government, is an illustration of the "bread 
and butter" politics in Nigeria. It shows the relationship between party 
membership and guarantee of government jobs and contracts once that party 
is in control of a regional or federal government. 
1 Notice by the Ministry of Finance,, Northern Region, "Provincial Tenders 
Boards", Nigerian Citizen, November 8, 1958. 
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As we can visualize from the above analysis, the crises and other 
events that followed the conflict over the 1953 motion for political 
sovereignty in 1956 did not urgur well for a country in search of nation-
hood since it was amalgamated in 1914. The humiliation of the Northern 
representatives in Lagos in 1953 and the consequent threat of secession 
by the north as indicated in their "eight point program" could not but 
direct the loyalties and unite the northern peoples behind their regional 
government, at the expense of national unity. 
Similarily, the death of southerners in the Kano political dis-
turbance and the northernization policies implemented by the Northern 
government and their impact on southerners could not but create rancor 
in the minds of the peoples of southern Nigeria. The peoples affected, 
particularly those of the dominant ethnic groups, became more tied to 
the dominant party and its leaders with base in their region as the only 
group capable of protecting their interests. To those parties, their 
leaders, and the regional governments they owed much allegiance. The 
state of affairs across the country is best demonstrated by the concerns 
expressed by the Ibos should something bad happen to their son and 
political hero and leader of the Ibo dominated NCNC, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
"If a hen were killed, the chicken would be exposed to danger." 1 
In such a situation where, both in the North and Southern Regions, 
ethnic and regional loyalties of the people come to supercede that to 
the state, we have a problem of national integration. 
The Northernization Policy and other discriminatory regulations 
implemented in the north had the effects of balkanizing political alle-
giance and effectively excluding all southerners from effective 
1West African Pilot, August 30, 1948. 
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participation in northern politics. As Okoli (1980, p. 25) observed, 
these policies also "had the baneful and highly disruptive effects of 
regionalizing citizenship rights, (loyalties), obligations, and duties. 
It made southern Nigerians aliens in their own country ••• " and thus 
hindered the process of political integration. 
Census Conflicts From 1933-1964 
If there LS any single issue that can be identified in Nigeria that 
has become so complicated, politicized, sensitively explosive and has 
continuously generated conflict each time it crops up, that thing is 
census enumeration. This state of affairs can be attributed to the fact 
that the authoritative allocation of most valued goods in the country 
is largely dependent on the recorded population of each region/state. 
When the people came to realize that parliamentary and state or local 
representation, distribution of social amenities to states, local govern-
ments, and towns are based on census figures, they became over-zealous 
about the importance of census in Nigeria. 
According to Aluko (1965), 
The more literate people became, the more over-zealous the 
value of a census and the more they were prepared to do 
anything, not only to enumerate all their people, but also, 
if possible, to engage in double or triple (even quadruple) 
counts. The political leaders also became even more 
enthusiastic than others about the census returns, because 
they regarded them as instruments of political power (p. 377). 
This attitude of the politicians made census enumeration to be seen as 
a political contest between the regions before and during the First 
Republic. 
Although estimates and enumerations have been carried out in dif-
ferent parts of Nigeria before the 1950s, census figures did not become 
so politicized, controversial, and contested by southern Nigerian 
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politicians until when in 1954, the 1950-1953 census figures "came to 
be used as an arguement for giving northern Nigeria SO% representation 
~n the federal legislature" (Aluko, 1965; p. 376). In 1953, of the 
recorded total of 30.42 million, 16.84 million were in northern Nigeria 
(see Table XI for population estimates for each region from 1901 to 
1963). 
In 1917, three years after the southern and northern protectorates 
had been amalgamated to form one country called Nigeria, the British 
passed a census ordinance requiring decennial census. Pursuant to this 
ordinance, the first systematic census was conducted throughout the 
country in 1921. The census returns put the population of Nigeria as 
18,631,442, but later revision rounded it out to 18.72 million (Aluko, 
1965). 
The next decennial census was held in 1931: The enumeration in 
the north was considered relatively satisfactory. The population of 
the north was given as 11,435,000. But, in the southern provinces, the 
elaborate arrangements made for the census were disrupted by the Women's 
Riots and disturbances of 1929-1930 in Aba, Owerri, Onitsha, and Calabar 
(Aluko, 1965). 
Okoli (1980) has identified two major causes of the 1929 Aba Women's 
Riots. These include 1) the counting of human beings was a serious 
breach of the Ibo custom, and 2) the rumor that the census was the first 
step in a European attempt to tax women and increase the taxes on men. 
As a result, the people of the southern provinces did not cooperate with 
1For complete history and inaccuracies of Nigerian census figures, see 
S.A. Aluko, "How Many Nigerians? Analysis of Nigeria's Census 
Problems, 1901-1963". The Journal of Modern African Studies. 
3(1965):371-392. 
TABLE XI 
GROWTH OF POPULATION IN NIGERIA, 1901-1963 
Northern Eastern Western Midwestern 
Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria Lagos Nigeria 
Census M. % % M. % % M. % % M. % % M. % % M. % % 
1901 1 
Population 7.16 2.22 1.58 0.042 11.00 
Percentage 65.0 20.3 14.3 0.4 100 
of Total 
19112 
Population 8.12 4.50 - 2.15 1.21 0.074 16.03 
Percentage 51.2 27.4 13.8 7.2 0.4 100 
of Total 
Annual Rate 1.3 7.4 --- --- 5.8 3.9 
of Growth 
1921 3 
Population 10.56 5.11 2.17 0.78 0.100 18.72 
Percentage 57 .o 26.5 11.6 4.4 0.5 100 
of Total 
Annual Rate 2.7 1.3 0.1 4.3 3.0 1.6 
of Growth 
19314 
Population 11.44 4.55 2.95 0.99 0.126 20.06 
Percentage 57 .o 22.7 14.7 4.9 0.7 100 
cf Total 




TABLE XI (Continued) 
Northern Eastern Western Midwestern 
Ni9eria Ni9eria Nigeria Nigeria Lagos Nigeria 
Census M. % % M. % % M. % % M. ll; % M. % % M. % % 
1950-1953 5 
Population 16.84 7.22 4.60 1.49 0.272 30.42 
Percentage 55.1 24.0 15.0 5.0 0.9 100 
of Total 
Annual Rate 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0 3.8 1.9 
of Growth 
1963 6 
---population 29.78 12.39 10.28 2.53 0.675 55.66 
Percentage 53.4 22.3 18.4 4.6 1.3 100 
of Total 
Annual Rate 5.1 5.3 7.5 5.0 9.5 5.7 
of Growth 
1calculated from Annual Report of Northern Nigeria, 1901-1911 and Annual Report and Blue Book of Southern 
Nigeria, 1904 and 1901-1909. Figures for Western Nigeria in 1901 include the area which is now Midwestern 
Nigeria. 
2calculated from the Census of 1911 (London, 1913), and Handbook of Southern Nigeria (Lagos, 1912), pp. 338 
and 348. In 1911 the population figures for Southern Nigeria were given for the Western, Central, and 
Eastern Provinces. Parts of the present Eastern and Northern Regions were included in the Central 
Provinces (now the Midwest), so the figures have been adjusted accordingly. 
3census of Nigeria, 1921 (London, 1923) and Nigeria Handbook, 1925 (London, 1926). 
4census of Nigeria, 1931 {London, 1933), vols. I, II, III, and IV. 
5census of Nigeria, 1952-53 (Lagos, 1956 edn.). 
6Preliminary figures only. 
Source: S.A. Aluko. "How Many Nigerians?" An Analysis of Nigeria's Census Problems, 1901-1963". The 





the census officers. The eastern section of the southern provinces was 
to pay heavily for this affront on the British colonial power. 
Compounding the above problems was the fact that in the western 
section of the southern province, intensive enumeration also did not 
take place except in the colony of Lagos, Ibadan and Owo divisions, 
and Egbaland of western Nigeria. The census figures for other areas 
of western Nigeria were based, for no justifiable reasons, on tax returns 
and records. 1 
From the above analysis it is apparent that the 1931 census must 
have been defective in its population estimates for the different sec-
tions of the country. Even the government statistician pointed to this 
fact when he commented that "there was good reason to suppose the census 
figures to be slightly defective in the northern provinces and much in 
defect in the southern provinces" (Aluko, 1965, p. 375). 
The extent to which the 1931 census must have grossly underestimated 
the population of the southern provinces has been widely illustrated 
by Okoli (1980) when he wrote: 
While the 1921 population for the eastern section of the 
southern provinces was estimated at 5,440,000, that of the 
1931 was estimated at 4,691,000. This represents a loss of 
749,000. The low estimate which was made of the population 
of the southeastern region had a serious effect on the 
total population of southern Nigeria. In 1921, it was 
8,371,000 as against 9,998,000 for the north. In 1931 it 
stood at 8,493,000 as against 11,435,000 for the north 
(p. SO). 
According to Aluko (1965) there is enough evidence to believe that 
the population figures for southern Nigeria between 1900 and 1931 were 
largely inaccurate and may have been consistently underestimated. 
1Census of Nigeria, 1931, Vol. I, pp. 6 and 60 and Vol. III, pp. 1-2. 
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Similarly, Okoli (1980) has pointed out that there were allegations that 
"the British had consistently undercounted the southern population" 
(p. 51). He added, 
All along the southern politicians had felt the population 
of the south was greater than that of the north but the 
British had manipulated the figures in favor of the north 
(p. 57). 
The reason why the British would want to inflate the population figures 
of the north has been given by Aluko (1965). It was "to ensure that 
political power in the country remained with conservative northern 
politicians, who were regarded as more favorably disposed towards them 
--the British interest" ( p. 376). 
The decennial census was not held in 1941 because of the second 
world war. The next census was that of 1950-1953. However, between 
1941 and 1953 an updated version of the 1931 census figures was used 
and in 1950, the official estimate of the population for the different 
regions of Nigeria was: North--13,514,000; West (excluding Lagos)--
3,977,999; and East was estimated at 5,243,000. This figure indicated 
that the Northern Region population was almost twice that of the Eastern 
and Western Regions combined (Okoli, 1980, p. 50). 
The protested 1950-1953 census enumeration was conducted at dif-
ferent times throughout the federation. Again, like previous elections, 
the results attracted a lot of controversy. The conduct of the 
enumeration was problematic, particularly in the Southern Region, as 
it was in 1931. According to Aluko (1965), 
There was still a lot of suspicion about the motives for the 
census, as many Nigerians were reluctant to have their wives 
and children counted. Many regarded the census as a plot to 
enable the tax-gatherers to collect heavier taxes because 
in some parts of Nigeria, in the past, the more wives and 
children a man had, the more wealthy he was deemed to be and 
the heavier the tax he paid! Others, more superstitious, 
believed that the census brought ill-luck, famine, (death), 
or other misfortune. Yet others regarded it as a means of 
spying on their property and mode of life, or of providing 
names for military service (p. 376). 
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In the 1950-1953 census there was clear evidence of undercounting 
in certain parts of the country. This was revealed by the Western Region 
Free Primary Education in 1955. According to Aluko (1965), based on 
the 1952-1953 Census of Western Nigeria, it was projected that 170,000 
children would attain the ages of six and seven in 1955 and be enrolled 
for the Free Primary Education which was introduced in that January. 
Preparations were made accordingly. However, "when actual registration 
was completed in December 1954, it was discovered that there were 392,000 
such children. This represents 230% more than the estimated number 
deduced from the 1950-1953 census. Such a gross understatement consider-
ably embarrassed the government" (Aluko, 1965, p. 378). 
At this juncture it should be pointed out that by late 1952 the 
people of the south had come to realize the important role of census 
figures in the distribution of valued social goods in the country. As 
Aluko (1963) pointed out, "parliamentary and local council represen-
tation, government amenities, and the relative importance attached to 
towns, districts, provinces, or regions were largely dependent on the 
census figures of each" (pp. 376-377). The result is that the unwilling-
ness to allow census taking because of superstitions began to gradually 
fade away. It is in the light of this newly aroused enthusiasm (for 
census) that the 1962 enumeration, just two years after independence, 
was conducted. Thus, according to Pius (1971), "the real battle between 
the north and the south was postponed until the 1962 census" (p. 133). 
Once census enumeration was politicized it became very difficult to de-
politicize. 
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In 1962, every Nigerian knew the implications of a low census count 
for his or her area or region. The country-wide census for that year 
was conducted simultaneously. The exercise lasted for 17 days between 
May 5 and May 21, 1962, but unfortunately, the census figures were not 
released after six months. This long delay led to rumors and specula-
tions about the likelihood of political interference and inflation of 
the census figures in some provinces. There were charges and counter-
charges between the northern and southern political leaders (particularly 
between the federal coalition partners, the NPC, and the NCNC), who 
accused each other of trying to inflate the figures in order to have 
control of the central legislature. As Aluko observed, the flood of 
attacks that were being unleashed by the Eastern Nigerian NCNC politi-
cians against the NPC looked "as if the census controversy would split 
the nation asunder" (p. 383). The chief protagonists over this census 
issue were thus, the Eastern Region and the Northern Region. 
Six months after the census count, that is as late as November 1962, 
it was alleged that census counts (which were supposed to end on May 
21, 1962) were still going on in many parts of Northern Nigeria! This 
allegation became substantiated when an official of the NPC replied to 
the above charges on November 27, 1962, 
That 20,000 Ibos living in the Gboko Divisions of Northern 
Nigeria had been recounted because during the census they 
had travelled home to Eastern Nigeria to be counted, so as 
to swell the population there to the disadvantage of 
Northern Nigeria. This was a clear admission of the double 
counting of 20,000 people in one division alone. Similar 
practices were alleged in many parts of the country (Aluko, 
1965, p. 382). 
1 Eastern House of Assembly Debates (Enugu), November 16, 1962. 
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Mackintosh (1966) also noted the case of one junior official from 
the north "who allowed himself to be counted six times" (pp. 551-552). 
As Okoli (1980) rightly pointed out, to this junior northern officer, 
"it was a show of loyalty to the region in its competition against other 
regions" (p. 63). 
The controversy over the 1962 census led to a great deterioration 
~n North-South relations, particularly between the NCNC and the NPC which 
formed the coalition government at the center. The 1962 census figure 
were never published officially. In the end, in February 1963, ten 
months after the original count, the Prime Minister (NPC) nullified the 
1962 census results and a costly recount of the population was made later 
that year. 
With this atmosphere of North-South bitterness, distrust, and 
antagonism, elaborate safe-guards were made to ensure a fair and reliable 
census in 1963. According to Aluko, "the period of enumeration was 
shortened from 17 to 14 days--November 5-8, 1963, so as to reduce the 
chances of multiple counting" (p. 384). 
On February 24, 1964, the federal government released preliminary 
statistics of the enumeration to be 55.4 million, distributed thus: 
Northern Nigeria, 29.7 million; Eastern Nigeria, 12.3 million; Western 
Nigeria, 29.7 million; Midwestern Nigeria, 2.5 million; and the Federal 
Territory of Lagos, 675,000 (Carter, 1966). 
Like the 1962 census, these figures evoked a great deal of inter-
party and interregional conflicts and controversy. The NCNC-controlled 
governments of the Eastern and Midwestern Regions immediately rejected 
the figures declaring that the North's were inflated to enable that 
region and the NPC preserve its numerical supremacy in the House of 
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Representatives and to dominate Nigeria! The Northern region and 
Akintola's Western regional governments accepted them. 
Shortly before the November 5-8, 1963 elections, Mr. R.B.K. Okafor 
(NCNC), Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Justice, had 
warned that all the three southern regions (West, Midwest, and East) 
would secede and form a new country if the November 5-8, 1963 census 
recount collapsed as a result of "intrigue" by northerners~ 
In May 1964, the National Economic Council finally accepted the 
figures. The eastern government challenged the federal government's 
acceptance of the figures in the Federal Supreme Court, but lost on the 
technical grounds that the court had no authority to entertain the suit 
(Aluko, 1965). 
According to Schwarz (1965), in using the accepted figures for 
delimiting constituencies for the 1964 federal election, the North was 
allotted 167 parliamentary seats out of 312 (a reduction of 7); the East 
got 70 (a loss of 3); the West received 57 (a gain of, 10, this is the 
reason Why the Akintola government in the West accepted the 1963 census 
figures); the Midwest 14 (a reduction of 1); and Lagos 4 (a gain of 1). 
Although the North lost 7 seats with the new figures, it still held 27 
seats more than the East, West, Midwest, and Lagos combined. It seemed 
the North was assured a substantial overall majority in the upcoming 
1964 federal general election. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that the 1962 and 1963 censuses 
developed into North-South overtones. But, that the 1963 recount and 
1West Africa, March 7, 1964, p. 271. 
2West Africa, November 2, 1963, p. 1231. 
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the crisis that followed the federal government acceptance of the dis-
puted figures in 1964 developed pronounced Ibo-Hausa overtones, despite 
the fact that both dominant tribes constituted the coalition partners 
at the federal level. 
The aftermath of the 1963-1964 census controversy on the national 
integration in Nigeria can be identififed in the work of Okoli (1980). 
Because of the conflict over the census between the NCNC and the NPC, 
some members in the Northern House of Assembly demanded punitive action 
against the Ibos for their challenge of the northern census figures. 
According to Okoli, by the following day, "more than 2, 000 Ibos in Kana 
alone had been expelled from their market stalls. There was spontaneous, 
seemingly uncoordinated evictions of Ibos from Gusau, Funtua, and 
Katisna. Rumors spread that this was only the beginning of the complete 
elimination of Ibos from the north" (p. 65). 
Furthermore, some Ibos who owned businesses were forced out of them 
and specifically asked by the Northern regional government to surrender 
their businesses. Most Ibos in the regional public service--most of 
whom were on contracts--were dismissed without delay. Thus, the census 
controversy brought conflict between the East and the North one step 
closer to the eventual confrontation which came with the military coup 
d'etat of 1966 and the civil war that followed in 1967. 
As Okoli (1980) rightly pointed out with regard to the crises over 
the census figures, "once the forces of hate and recrimination are let 
loose, it is hard to call the enraged to sanity and calm" (p. 65). The 
census crisis had brought into prominence regional power and loyalty 
while the center was completely immobilized. The interregional, inter-
ethnic and interparty rivalry and struggles over census figures had not 
only prevented Nigerians from knowing how many they were, but also 
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hindered any effort at the political integration of the diverse cultural 
groups in the country. 
The Election Crisis of 1964-19£5 
The preceeding section revealed that the contoversy over the 1962 
census and the conflicts over the recount in 1963 severely strained the 
five-year-old federal coalition between the NPC and the NCNC, and that 
the coalition was going to be discarded. We noted that the NCNC (the 
junior partner in the federal coalition and identified with_ the Ibos 
in the East) were furious over the census figures and did not hide its 
bitterness. Because of this, the NPC leaders (the senior partner of 
the federal coalition and identified with the Hausa-Fulani in the North) 
accused their southern partners (the NCNC) of fickleness and unreli-
ability. 
According to Schwarz (1968), at the end of July 1964, about five 
months after the controversial census figures had been officially 
accepted by the NPC federal government, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the party 
leader of the NPC, stated categorically that, 
Even if my party fails to get the required majority in the 
next federal elections, it will definitely not enter into 
any agreement or coalition with the NCNC •.. The Ibos have 
never been true friends of the North and never will be 
(p. 164). 
Thus, by August 1964, the tension that had been building up between 
the federal coalition partners because of the controversies over the 
results of the decennial census had reached a breaking point. 
Having discarded the NCNC and the Ibos, the NPC sought an alliance 
with the Yorubas of the West. This it found in the anti-Awolowo faction 
of the Yoruba AG. This was the Akintola's faction which the NPC federal 
government had helped to impose on the people of the West six months 
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after it declared a state emergency in that region in 1962. Accordingly, 
in August 1964, the NPC and Akintola's NNDP formed the Nigerian National 
Alliance (NNA) to fight the upcoming 1964 federal elections. The NNA 
immediately attracted small opposition parties in the Eastern Region--the 
Niger Delta Congress (NDC), the Dynamic Party (DP) led by Chike Obi, 
an Ibo, and the Mid-West Democratic Front (MDF). 
On the other side, the two major parties in the South--the NCNC 
and the AG--joined together to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance 
(UPGA). This coalition was joi~ed by the Northern opposition parties, 
the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) formed as a result of the merger 
of Joseph Tarka's United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and Aminu Kana's 
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). With the formation of UPGA, 
there then emerged two nationwide alliances (parties) competing to gain 
control of power at the federal level through the electoral process in 
December 1964. 
According to Carter (1966), before the election, UPGA leaders calcu-
lated that it would have to win some 20-30 seats out of the 167 in the 
Northern Region to win an overall majority of the 312 parliamentary seats 
at stake. It was also optimistic that it could win virtually all the 
87 seats in Midwest, Lagos, and East, and all but half a dozen of the 
Western seats since there was apparently no support for the Akintola 
regime. The alliance's optimism was based on the 1959 performance of 
the AG, the NCNC, and their northern allies--in which they won over 30% 
of the northern votes cast and 33 northern seats. In that same election, 
it was the parties that now constitute the UPGA which won all the seats 
in Lagos, West, and in the Eastern Region. 
The campaign that preceeded the December 1964 federal election was 
a bitter one. As the elections approached, the NPC government of the 
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North increasingly frustrated UPGA candidates in the North so that many 
of them could not file their nomination papers (Ademoyaga, 1980; Carter, 
1966; Schwarz, 1968; Okoh, 1980). The hopes of the UPGA dimmed with the 
increasingly frequent complaints of harrassment, including mass arrest 
and malicious persecution of its members in the North (Carter, 1966). 
As a result of the numerous complaints by the opposition, the mem-
bers of the electoral commission flew to Kano. According to Okoli (1980) 
There, they found that the opposition candidates were 
virtually prevented from submitting their nomination papers 
or even entering their constituencies to campaign. All of 
the 24 opposition candidates in Sokoto province, 12 of the 
14 opposition candidates in Katsina, and 1 candidate from 
the province of Biu sought refuge in the opposition head-
quarters in Kano because it was unsafe for them to enter 
their constituencies, much less to campaign there. Those 
who dared to file their papers were sent to prison. Accord-
ing to Aminu Kano, the President of the opposition Nigerian 
People's Front (NPF), as of November 20, 1964, the number of 
opposition candidates jailed was 26. Even J.S. Tarka, the 
General President of the United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC), 
one of the parties that formed the NPF coalition, had been 
arrested and jailed (p. 103). 
Furthermore, it was found that Mr. G.M. Abengowe, an Ibo and one 
of the lawyers appointed by the UPGA to protect the interests of the 
coalition, was charged with unlawful assembly1 by an Alkali Court~ tried, 
and sentenced to nine months imprisonment with hard labor. 
The optimism of UPGA had been shattered. The whole crisis atmo-
sphere surrounding the elections deepened, when, ten days before the 
election it was announced that 68 NPC candidates had been declared 
"elected" unopposed. In the East, 15 NCNC candidates were returned 
unopposed and in the West, two NNDP members were returned unopposed 
1 The West African Pilot, October 21, 1964. 
2 The Aalkoli courts is a special arm of the Northern Native Authority 
System. The law which operates within it is the Koranic law, and 
the accused is not allowed any representation. 
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(Schwarz, 1968; Carter, 1966). The UPGA leadership rejected the "unop-
posed" returns in the North and demanded an immediate postponement of 
the election for six months pending the clarification of the disputed 
"unopposed" returns. The Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, refused and 
insisted that the elections must be held as scheduled on December 20, 
1964. A meeting between the President and the Prime Minister on December 
27 yielded no positive results. 
Consequently, on December 24, 1964, the UPGA, led by Dr. Okpara 
the Premier of the Eastern Region, called for a mass boycott of the 
election by its supporters. Dr. Okpara, in a press conference, argued 
that the election had become "a colossal farce--a daylight fraud" 
(Schwarz , 1968, p. 1969). 
The UPGA boycott was completely effective in the Eastern Region, 
where the NCNC government used its powers to ensure that no election 
was held. In the Western Region the boycott was partly successful, but 
very detrimental to UPGA, particularly the AG. According to Schwarz 
(1965), in the West there was a low turnout voting in all constituencies 
and the practical effect of the boycott was to increase the number of 
seats won by the NNDP (36 of 57) and reduce those won by the Action Group 
(15) and NCNC (3). In the Midwestern Region, leaders of the NCNC were 
not in agreement and so the party leader, Dennis Osadebey, decided not 
to have his followers boycott the election. The voting turnout was light 
but the NCNC won for its party all 14 seats. In the North, the NPC 
solidified its position winning 162 of the 167 seats. In the end, the 
NPC and its ally, the NNDP, had a clear majority--a comfortable figure 
of 198 seats out of the 312 parliamentary seats at stake. 
Although the election results lacked credit and while the UPGA 
leaders rejected them, the NPC and its allies of the NNA, which 
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single-handedly carried out the elections, generally accepted them 
(Ademoyega, 1981). Again, like the controversy over the 1962 and 1963 
census, the election results reflected a major confrontation between 
the NPC (the Northern Region) and the NCNC (the Eastern Region). The 
dispute between the UPGA and the NNA over the acceptability of the 
election results led to a national political stalemate. Four days after 
the elections, President Azikiwe (himself an Ibo and NCNC) failed to 
call upon the Prime Minister to form a government based upon the results 
of the election. 
According to Sklar and Whitaker (1966), for s~x days after the 
election, the peace and unity of the nation appeared to hang in the 
balance, waiting to explode, while intensive negotiations were conducted 
involving the President, the Prime Minister, leaders of the regional 
governments, and other influential persons. At last, a "six point plan 
was accepted by both the President and the Prime Minister as the only 
way to save the constitution, avoid deadlock, and prevent bloodshed and 
disintegration" (Okoli, 1980, p. 121). Among the six points was the 
agreement that the President should ask the Prime Minister to form "a 
broad-based national government," and that election would be conducted 
in those constituencies which had been successfully boycotted. 
In March 1964 elections were held in the previously boycotted con-
stituencies in the East and Lagos. The UPGA won the Lagos seats and 
all but 2 of the 45 Eastern seats, giving the final 1964-1965 federal 
election result of NNA-~197 seats; UPGA--108 seats; and Independents--7 
(Mackintosh, 1966, pp. 602-603). Pursuant to the Prime Minister's 
promise to make his government broadly based after the elections (in 
March 1965) he enlarged his ministrial appointments to 54, doubling the 
number in the previous government. The NPC took 22 of the ministries, 
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15 of those with cabinet rank. The NCNC and NNDP were assigned, respec-
tively, 16 and 14 ministries. The Action Group was not represented in 
the cabinet. Therefore, the government could not be considered a broad-
based national government. Here again, we find the NCNC, under the 
leadership of Azikiwe, like in the 1959 election entering into coalition 
with the NPC at the federal level and once more leaving the AG in the 
rain. That interpersonal conflict between Azikiwe and Awolowo, the 
interparty, interregional, and interethnic conflict and distrust between 
the Ibos and Yorubas we noted in the late 1940s was still vivid in the 
minds of the political leaders. Schwarz (1965) himself, has noted that 
during the 1964 election crisis, the NCNC which was the senior partner 
in the UPGA coalition showed that it was willing to "sacrifice the UPGA 
coal it ion for the interests of the NCNC, the East, and the Ibo people" 
(p. 147). However, this coalition at the federal level was not to last 
long as the army took over power in January 15, 1966. 
It should be noted that the new government emerged as a result of 
concessions and compromises over certain issues. The basic problem of 
the nation had not been solved, but swept under the carpet. The polit-
ical parties were still identified with the major ethnic groups in the 
regions. The loyalty of the people was to their party or region rather 
than to the central government. The North-South showdown still loomed 
on and had only once again been postponed. 
The Western Region Election Crisis, November 1965 
The year 1965 climaxed with the deteriorating political situation 
in Nigeria. According to Schwartz (1968), not long after the conflicts 
of the 1964 federal elections and the consequent formation of a "broad-
based" federal goverment, another "election fever, with its complaints 
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and counter-complaints, its threats and counter threats, its thugs and 
counter-thugs was not long in returning to Nigeria" (p. 1978). This 
was the October 1965 elections for the Western House of Assembly. 
In Chapter III we noted the intraparty conflict and the split 
within the Action Group between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the party leader, 
and Akintola, the Vice-President of the party and the Premier of the 
AG controlled Western Region government. The basic causes of the split 
within the AG were threefold: 
1. The struggle for power between chief Akintola and Chief Awolowo, 
2. The differences between the two over the party's program of 
"democratic socialism" and nationalization. Chief Akintola was against 
nationalization of basic industries, and 
3. The differences between Akintola 1 s and Awolowo 1 s wings of the 
party over support for minority movements in the North and East and the 
need to strike a deal to join with the coalition in a national govern-
ment. Akintola's wing desired to cease support of the minority movement 
in other regions, abandonment of all campaigning out of the Western 
Region, and join in a federal coalition government. This was contrary 
to Awolowo's stand on these issues. 
This internal rivalry for control of the party leadership had 
important consequences for the Yorubas. The Yorubas also became split 
and we began to wittness a process of clan or ethnic rivalries between 
the Yorubas in spite of their homogeneity. For instance, there was 
rivalry between the Ijebus and the Ogbomoshos. Awolowo was an Ijebu 
and Akintola was an Ogbomosho. In spite of the many army changes and 
long Nigerian civil war, no changes had occurred in the pattern of clan 
or ethnic rivalry among the Yorubas. This rivalry among clans in the 
Yoruba land was again particularly noticeable in the August/September 
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campaigns and elections into state and federal assemblies, state guber-
natorial, and presidential elections in 1983. 
The result of this conflict within the AG was that Akintola's 
faction broke away to form the NNDP. Because of his stand on regional-
ization, Akintola easily found support with the NPC, the senior partner 
in the federal coalition government. It was in light of this support 
that, following the uproar in the Western Region State House of Assembly 
and the consequent declaration of the state of emergency in that region, 
the NPC finally aided and abetted the Akintola faction of the AG, impos-
ing Akintola as premier on the people of the West in 1962. This is why 
the tensely awaited October 1965 election was significant. The Akintola 
party, the NNDP, that was in power in the West was, thus, yet to w~n 
a fully contested election. The October election, therefore, was to test 
and decide once and for all whether the people of the Western Region 
endorsed all that the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belawa, had 
done for them since 1962 and whether they accepted the rulership of 
Akintola. 
The opposition parties--AG and NCNC--campaigned under the banner 
of their alliance--the UPGA. They considered the October 1965 election 
as an opportunity to eliminate their rival--the NNA which includes the 
NNDP--from serious contention in southern Nigeria (Sklar and Whitaker, 
1966). The UPGA called the campaign "operation do or die." The party 
took precautionary measures to try to thwart techniques that the NNDP, 
in collaboration with its ally the NPC, might take to rig the election. 
For example, Schwarz (1968) reported that the UPGA knowing that the 
Akintola government would declare a number of the seats elected 
"unopposed," took the precaution of publishing in advance the names of 
its candidates for all 94 constituencies as soon as the Western House 
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of Assembly was dissolved. Once again, the election was misconducted 
as the Akintola government publicly interfered with the election process 
and the results of the election. 
First, at the end of the nominations, with 94 seats at stake, it 
was announced that 16 government (NNDP) candidates, including Premier 
Akintola himself, were duly "returned unopposed." The opposition, UPGA, 
protested vehemently that its candidates had been fraudently excluded. 
Secondly, on election day, large numbers of ballot papers mysteriously 
disappeared from police custody only to find their way into government 
party boxes. Police also found thousands of ballot papers in the illegal 
possession of electoral officials who were appointed by the regional 
government. Thirdly, after the polling, at the counting stations, local 
police were used to keep the opposition's polling agents and candidates 
away from the count. Finally, in a number of cases, AG candidates who 
had been declared elected by the returning officer and even given certif-
icates to that effect were not recognized by the government. Instead, 
their defeated opponents were declared elected through governmental news 
media (Ademoyega, 1981; Schwarz, 1968; Sklar and Whitaker, 1966). The 
official result was: NNDP--71, AG--15, and NCNC--2. 
The UPGA leaders refused to accept the results of the openly rigged 
elections by the NNDP. However, the NNDP went ahead to form the govern-
ment. Alternatively, the UPGA, under Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro, gave a 
press conference (the evening of the same day Akintola formed his govern-
ment) in which he declared he had formed his own government. This was 
an unusual event. The following day, according to Schwarz (1968), 
Adebgenro and some of his "cabinet" were arrested and charged with 
unlawfully forming 11 an interim executive council." The Chief Justice 
of the region, Mr. Justice Morgan, refused to grant them bail until they 
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agreed to a retraction of the published formation of a substitute govern-
ment. 
A jumble of confusion followed the election crisis ~n the west. 
By November 1965, many violent and rebellious acts, arson, and political 
murders began to sweep across the region. The people had risen in arms 
to fight the unpopular Akintola government. What actually took place 
following the elections can be best summarized in the words of Ademoyega 
(1981), himself a Yoruba from the West and the only survivor of the trio 
who planned and executed the first Nigerian coup d'etat of January 15, 
1966. He wrote: 
the people of Western Region did not appeal to the deaf gods 
typified by the law courts. They simply recalled the days 
of their ancestors when unpopular rulers were removed by 
the concerted efforts of the people ••• By November 15, 1965, 
the people had started to fight the unacceptable Akintola 
government. They sang war songs and fought on the streets. 
They invented the 'WETIE' (meaning 'soak him up'), a practice 
in which a political opponent and his house or property were 
sprayed with petrol and set ablaze ••• By December 1965, there 
had been a total breakdown of law and order in Western 
Nigeria. The lawlessness had gone beyond the control of the 
mobile (antiriot) police and the Akintola government was 
generally seen tottering to its collapse (p. 22). 
Estimates made later suggest that over 2,000 people were killed in the 
region between August 1965 and January 1966 as a result of political 
disturbances during the period after the Western Region election. 
In spite of the total breakdown of law and order in the Western 
Region, the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belawa, 
refused to invoke his emergency powers and declare a state of emergency. 
His critics pointed out that in 1962, "when disorders were restricted 
to a scuffle in the House of Assembly, he had declared a state of 
emergency. Why not again, now that law and order had effectively broken 
down throughout the region?" (Schwarz, 1968, p. 189). The Prime 
Minister's only response was that he had simply "no power" to impose 
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a solution on the West." He even stated that the situation in the West 
was normal and that everything was effectively under control. While 
the violence was spreading to Lagos, the Prime Minister was deceiving 
the world. He was receiving, in January 1966, delegates at Lagos airport 
to the Commonwealth Conference. 
However, it was clear to most Nigerians that the Belawa government 
was more interested in preserving Akintola and his party, the NNDP (ally 
to the NPC), as the premier and party of the region. He did not forsee 
the general calamity that was going to befall his whole regime by his 
inaction. It was a situation in which Blondel's (1969) prediction was 
to come true. He had rightly stated that "unless some arrangement exists 
by which governments can be created and ended in a peaceful fashion, 
the overthrow of these governments will be attempted" (p. 336). 
In Nigeria, these arrangements for the peaceful transfer of power 
have been seriously handicapped and weakened by the political parties. 
Consequently, they became effectively unworkable. The result was that, 
following the explosive situations in western Nigeria on January 15, 
1966, the army overthrew the Nigerian government bringing to an end the 
First Republic of Nigeria. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
No one can dispute that the role of political parties in 
national integration is, and presumably will remain, very 
great in emergent states. 
Emerson, 1966, p. 300 
Chapter IV examined the nature and scope of the major political 
parties in Nigeria before and during the First Republic and the nature 
of the major parties during the Second Republic. The chapter also 
analyzed the role of the major political parties in the problems of 
national integration in Nigeria by examining and concentrating on three 
major political events or crises before the demise of the First Nigerian 
Republic. In short, the chapter was devoted to testing the basic premise 
of this research. That proposition was that the lack of broad-based 
national parties in Nigeria made the major political parties into hin-
derances of political integration in the country. 
The present chapter will present a summary of the study, the find-
ings of the study, conclusions based on the findings, and a number of 
recommendations as to what particular party system should be adopted 
in Nigeria in order to avoid the deplorable conditions that have been 




We noted that Nigeria is a new country. It was created out of a 
number of entities by Britain as a colonial power in October 1, 1960. 
Today, over 80 million people are distributed throughout the country. 
Prior to the creation of more states in 1967, the peoples of Nigeria 
were distributed throughout three regions (later four regions with the 
creation of the Midwest from the West in 1964). Each region was domi-
nated.by one of the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the 
North, the Yorubas in the West, and the Ibos in the East. In addition, 
there are a number of many smaller tribes in each of the regions. 
Nigeria is a heterogeneous state. This heterogeneity and cultural 
fragmentation is evidenced by the over 250 different cultural and 
linguistic groups found within the country. This extraordinary diversity 
no doubt poses a lot of real problems in questions of national inte-
gration. As Bascom (1956) rightly recognized "it would be a mistake 
for Nigeria's political leaders to underestimate the stength of these 
cultural and linguistic loyalties" in the process of nation-building 
(p. 368). 
We also noted that for about a decade, from 1954 to 1962, government 
in Nigeria rested upon a tripartite balance of power--the NPC to the 
north, the AG to the west, and the NCNC to the east. The torpedo of 
the AG rule in the Western Region by the coalition federal government 
of the NPC and NCNC was to mark the beginning of greater crises that 
were to come and which were, in turn, to affect the stability of the 
First Republic of Nigeria. The last straw that broke the camel's back 
was the Western Region Election Crises of 1965 which led to the first 
military coup d'etat of January 15, 1966. Since that first coup, Nigeria 
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has witnessed several other coups and counter-coups, threats of seces-
sion, and a civil war which lasted for thirty months. 
Although the military returned power to a democratically elected 
civilian government on October 1, 1979, as a result of ineptitude and 
mass corruption of the political leaders coupled with the economic woes 
that were beginning to plague the country and the mass rigging and 
violence that characterized the August/September 1983 elections, the 
military again staged a comeback on December 31, 1983. This military 
coup brought to an end the Second Republic of Nigeria. At the time of 
this study, the military has not yet laid out a program for a return 
to civilian rule. Consequently, we do not know what date in the future 
a civilian government will be succeeding the present military admini-
stration in Nigeria. 
Findings 
In analyzing the data relating to the several dimensions associated 
with the thesis of this study, the following major findings are presented 
below: 
1. There were three major political parties at the time of demise 
of the First Republic, and five major parties during the Second Republic. 
Thus, Nigeria's party system during these periods can be best described 
as multiparty systems. 
2. Prior to 1964 when the Midwest Region was created from the 
Western Region, in all the regions, the major political parties relied 
for mass support upon the communal participation of the dominant ethnic 
group in the areas of traditional base. Consequently, we find that in 
Eastern Nigeria, the NCNC benefitted from the tendencies of the Ibos 
to identify the party with their collective interests. In the West the 
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Yorubas identified with the AG and, in the north, the NPC benefitted 
from the support it enjoyed of the Hausa-Fulanis. 
3. Each of the major parties formed the ruling government from 
1952 up to 1965 in their respective regions of habitation, except after 
1962 when, with the declaration of the state of emergency in the West, 
the Akintola faction of the AG assumed the rulership of the Western 
government until the coup of January 15, 1966. 
4. The major parties were engaged in unmitigated conflicts over 
national issues such as the 1953 motion fqr independence in 1956, census 
figures from 1953 up to 1964, and the federal election results of 1963 
and 1964. The controversies surrounding each of these issues resulting 
principally from the interparty conflicts threatened the political 
stability of the country. 
5. The prevailing political crises resulting from the controversies 
surrounding the three major events discussed (the 1953 motion for inde-
pendence, census enumerations, and federal election results) weakened 
the spirit of the citizens' loyalty to one central government while 
strengthening subnationalism, loyalty to the ethnic group, the party, 
the region, and its institutions. 
Conclusions 
Based upon the findings, the following conclusions are drawn. 
1. That the major political parties in Nigeria before and during 
the First Republic were parochial in outlook and character. They were 
ethnoregionally based, drawing most of their support mainly from a 
constituency limited principally by tribe and region. 
2. Nigeria operated a multiparty system in both the First and 
Second Republics. 
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3. The major political parties had a negative net impact on 
national integration in Nigeria. By their actions and ultimate claims, 
they not only fostered tribal and regional loyalty and identity among 
their supporters to the detriment of loyalty to the federal government, 
but also constituted a unique threat to the existence of the state and 
impeded the processes of national integration. In other words, the 
political parties in Nigeria operated with antinational loyalties. 
Thus, the findings of this study support the basic premise of this 
research, and that is, the lack of broad-base national parties in Nigeria 
made the major parties to constitute obstacles to national integration 
J.n Nigeria. 
In light of Nigeria's condition of ethnoregional divisions, can 
anything be done to promote national integration and restore an effective 
democratic system? 
While the correspondence of party divisions and ethnoregional divi-
sions does not indicate that the former necessarily caused the latter, 
this study presented some evidence that multiparty divisions reinforced 
ethnic consciousness. An effective constitution for a "Third Republic" 
in Nigeria might, therefore, incorporate measures to reduce or inhibit 
this correspondence between regional and ethnic divisions and party base 
and alignment. 
To some extent this was attempted in the constitution of the Second 
Republic by requiring parties to show a measure of interregional support 
in order to be recognized in state and national elections and by prohib-
iting symbols and slogans having an ethnic appeal. These provisions, 
while moving in the proper direction, proved to be inadequate to counter-
act the pre-existing patterns of alignment and centrifugal forces. It 
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is submitted that more drastic measures may be in order to encourage 
development of a two-party system in Nigeria. 
The measures envisioned here would include: 
a. Extensions of the Second Republic electoral restrictions to 
include more stringent requirements of an interregional showing as a 
precondition for recognition of a party in national or state elections, 
b. Retention of the Second Republic's prohibitions against ethnic 
or regional appeals in party politics, and 
c. Legal restrictions, patterned after the model of Senegal, but 
instead of allowing one of three parties to represent each of three 
designated set of ideological positions as in Senegal, there should 
be, in the case of Nigeria, two parties allowing only one to represent 
each of two designated sets of ideological positions. 
This plan is advanced with the recognition that it will not be a 
panacea for Nigeria's problems with political integration and that the 
assumptions upon which it rests are open to challenge. 
A number of objections might be raised with regard to the plan. 
First, it may be argued that even if it can be shown that two-party 
systems are more integrative than one-party or multiparty systems (and 
even here there are exceptions), it is difficult to demonstrate that 
a two-party system can be effectively imposed or adopted deliberately. 
Known two-party systems developed naturally, in response to historical, 
cultural, social, electoral, and other factors. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that an effective two-party system 
is a reflection of integration rather than a means for achieving inte-
gration. Two-party systems work in countries like the United States 
and the United Kingdom because of a high degree of the existing political 
and socioeconomic consensus. 
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Similarly, some might argue that Nigeria did have one brief and 
unfortunate experience with a two-party system in 1964; the United 
Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) versus the National Nigerian Alliance 
(NNA). This two, however, cannot be considered as a two-party system. 
They were parties of "parties." In other words, each alliance was a 
coalition of a number of parties arranged simply for the explicit purpose 
of contesting the 1964 federal election and the 1965 regional elections 
~n the Western Region. The alliances were not formed in the interest 
of Nigerian unity. The NNA was brought together by a belief in regional-
ization, while the UPGA was formed largely because of southern antipathy 
toward the north. Furthermore, each coalition was identified with the 
region which provided the leadership. As Okoli (1980) pointed out, the 
NNA was identified with the NPC which had its base in the Northern 
Region. The UPGA was identified with the NCNC which had its base in 
the East. It is little surprising then when, in spite of the two-party 
alliances, Chinwuba (1980) stated that "Nigerian politics in 1965 were 
more regionalized and ethnic based than in 1960 ••• " (p. 99). 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that a two-party system 
has advantages from the standpoint of national integration, and that 
an electoral system can be designed to promote the development of such 
a system along lines which discourage ethnoregional polarization. The 
literature on political parties, as we shall discuss shortly, indicates 
that a two-party system may have a number of advantages. 
Recommendation 
We have been able to establish from the analysis of available data 
for this study that the particularistic nature of the major parties in 
Nigeria made them to constitute an impediment to political integration 
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in Nigeria. At this juncture the question might be asked, how can we 
organize parties in Nigeria so that they can become more broad-based 
national parties (or broadly inclusive combinations of the different 
ethnic and interest groups), so that the parties can best pursue their 
integrative functions? In other words, what type of party system can 
best help achieve the much desired broad-base national parties? What 
party system can best lead to a stable and effective integrative govern-
ment in Nigeria? We suggest the two-party system as the most desirable 
and most capable of resolving the questions raised above. Before making 
case for the two-party system, we will examine critically the merits 
and demerits of the other types of party systems as instruments of 
national integration. In other words, we will analyze the net balance 
of the integrative and malintegrative consequences of particular party 
systems as a whole. 
In spite of the fact that political parties do function as brokers 
or intermediaries between the people and the government and as potential 
mechanisms for integrating diverse groups within a state, they are not 
found in all political systems. Some governments are under military 
rule and some others are under royal regimes. In most of these cases, 
there exists no political parties. 
In countries where political parties exist as institutions, they 
vary both in type, ideology, and in numbers. However, party systems 
are most commonly classified by political scientists according to the 
number of political parties that compete effectively for the control 
of government and regularly secure substantial portions of popular votes 
in elections. Based upon this criterion, a tripartite categorization 
of party systems has emerged. These are the one-party, the two-party, 
and the multiparty (three ore more) systems. 
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In some countries, only a single-party is allowed. All parties 
are prohibited except the single official state party. This is most 
commonly found in Communist totalitarian states. The Soviet Union is 
the oldest and perhaps the best example of this category of one-party 
states. This party system cannot be considered compatible with demo-
cratic government. 
The second category includes one-party states in the developing 
countries, particularly in Asia and Africa (such as Iraq, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Guinea, and Ivory Coast) which are not totalitarian. In such 
cases, the official party is not ideological and tends to be less 
extreme. Most one-party state leaders in Africa, such as Nyerere of 
Tanzania, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, 
believe that only a single party with the participation of the mass of 
the people can discourage ethnicism and build a spirit of national unity 
among diverse ethnic groups. 
While the one-party system can provide for political stability as 
in Tanzania, it is not a guarantee that it can necessarily foster 
national integration as in Ivory Coast, for example. Under Houphouet-
Boigny, political stability has been maintained mainly by operating a 
ruthless one-party police state. The result has been'regional discon-
tents and a trend towards multipartyism (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984). 
Thus, there are some serious shortcomings of one-party systems as 
an integrating force. One danger of the single national party is that 
its democratic forms can actually conceal authoritarian government. 
As Hitcher and Harbold (1980) rightly observed, 
The absence of an opposition (in a one-party system) con-
fronts the dominant leaders with neither rival nor checks; 
all too easily they suffer the delusions of indispensabil-
ity and omniscience and drift into unqualified dictatorship 
(p. 180). 
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Furthermore, in one-party systems the government and the party tend 
to become indistinguishable. That is, the ·party becomes "governmental-
ized." According to Weiner and LaPalombara (1966), where the party and 
government are indistinguishable, "there tends to be no buffer between 
the formulation of public policy and its application. The mediating 
influence of the party is lost and in the process, the party loses much 
of its ability to interpret government to the people and people to power 
holders" (p. 415). They added, in such a case, 
Loyalty to the nation is equated with loyalty to the party 
and disaffection from the party may mean disaffection both 
from the national state and from the political process 
itself. The difficulties of achieving any kind of integra-
tion beyond the tribal territory is enormously complicated 
by such a pattern (p. 415). 
Finally, the disadvantages and the malintegrative consequences of 
the one-party system can be best illustrated and summarized in the state-
ment by Grodzins (1966). He argues that 
Rather than existing to put alternatives before the citizen, 
the single party attempts to repress all competition. 
Rather than being separate from and less than the govern-
ment itself, where only the single party exists, state and 
party tend to become merged, one with the other, so that 
distinguishing their functions becomes difficult. Rather 
than relying on persuation, the single party ultimately 
depends upon threats of violence and violence itself. Fear 
replaces persuation for dissident groups. In such a situa-
tion integration becomes unattainable (p. 327). 
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the malintegrative 
consequences of the one-party system can outweigh the integrative func-
tions it can perform, particularly in a federal, heterogeneous society 
with deep cleavages between cultural groups such as found in Nigeria. 
Similarly, we want to point out that many one-party systems arise out 
of a social milieu with severe and prolonged internal war such as after 
a revolution as witnessed in the People's Republic of China, the Soviet 
Union, the Demmocratic Republic of Vietnam, and Mexico (now a one-party 
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dominant state). The absence of such a social milieu as described above 
in contemporary Nigeria helps to militate against any attempt to impose 
a one-party system in the country. 
Where there are three or more major political parties contesting 
effectively to win control of governmental power, the country is con-
sidered to have a multiparty system. Nigeria operated a multiparty 
system during her First and Second Republics. The great appeal of the 
multiparty system is its reflection of all shades of political views 
in a society. To some, this is the essence of democracy. But, multi-
partyism has serious limitations as an instrument of national integra-
tion, particularly in a society characterized by plurality of ethnic 
and linguistic groups, diverse social values, and differences in history, 
religion, and political culture. 
First, governments in multiparty systems are often composed of 
coalitions of parties, thus making it difficult to distinguish the 
government and the opposition. In such cases, as Ebenstein (1980) 
noted, there is no clear alternative party to which the voters may turn 
if they become displeased with those in power. Similarly, where govern-
ments are formed by coalition of several parties, they are often weakened 
by the withdrawal of certain members of the coalition. In other cases, 
such a friction often leads to a dissolution of the cabinet. This situa-
tion creates political instability and insecurity among the diverse 
groups in the country. In developing countries, such as Nigeria, such 
an environment is an occasion for the major ethnic groups to rally their 
support behind a party whose base lay in their region. This is because 
a member of the ethnic group is most likely to prote~t the interests 
of the group. The result is increased subnationalism rather than 
loyalty to a common central government. 
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Furthermore, the multitude of partisan views which arLse from a 
multiparty system, in most cases, may well overcomplicate public opinion 
on important national political questions. Besides, some parties may 
organize only in certain sections of the country; some parties may not 
even offer national programs, including performing integrative functions. 
The dispersal of partisan support and organization in a multiparty 
system may have several other negative consequences with regard to 
national integration. For instance, Ferguson and McHenry (1967) pointed 
out that 
The disadvantages of having many parties is great .•. The 
multiparty system produces instability, confuses the 
electorate with a multitude of alternatives, represents 
local groups and factions, and diffuses responsibility for 
action and inaction. It would make continued functioning 
of the electoral system (and integration of diverse ethnic 
and socioeconomic groups) virtually impossible (p. 218). 
Moreover, there is the genuine fear that any multiplication of 
parties would in fact be a multiplication of separatist tribal groups. 
This has been one of the grounds, according to Emerson (1966), on which 
the advocates of the one-party system and bipartism could defend their 
positions. As Weiner and LaPalombara (1966) observed, frequently in 
heterogeneous societies operating multiparty systems the political 
parties are often associated with the various fragmented cultures. In 
such a case, the parties have no intention of facilitating integration 
but aim instead at reinforcing loyalties to the subcultures with which 
they are identified. 
Finally, Sartori (1966) points out that the multiparty system is 
the most insecure and less viable solution to national integration in 
heterogeneous society. He also points out that not only that the 
multiparty system cannot profit from the stimulation of a responsible 
opposition, but also that it is often paralyzed by cabinet instability 
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and by the presence of antisystem parties which replace competitive 
politics with irresponsible outbidding. Under these conditions, accord-
ing to Sartori, the multiparty system 
is more an agent of disintegration than an instrument of 
aggregation and integration, and the outcome is sheer 
immobility, malintegration, or disorderly change, that is, 
an ideologically motivated, unrealistic sequence of abrupt 
changes that are likely to be unsuccessful (p. 175). 
This lack of stability and continuity of government in multiparty 
states, as noted by Sartori, is examplified in what has happened in 
France and Italy. According to Ebenstein and others (1980), France, 
under the Third and Fourth Republics, and in Italy, electoral support 
has been so fragmented and unstable that governments have found it dif-
ficult to handle critical social, political, and economic problems 
without being voted out of office. The authors point out that in France, 
for example, "from 1951 to 1956, under the Fourth Republic, cabinets 
lasted an average of only seven months, and in Italy from 1945 to 1979 
there were 39 cabinets" (p. 182). However, some multiparty countries 
such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries 
have had relatively stable governments for many decades. 
A developing pluralistic society in search of national integration 
cannot afford to experience abrupt political changes and instability, 
nor can it afford increased polarization of the great number of cleavages 
that already exist in the society. This is Why the multiparty system 
has failed repeatedly in Nigeria as a mechanism for fostering political 
stability and national integration. It is a party system that should 
not be experimented with anymore in Nigeria. 
We have analyzed the one-party and multiparty systems and found 
them to be grossly inadequate and unworkable as instruments of integra-
tion, effective, and stable government in a pluralistic society such 
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as Nigeria. This brings us to an examination of the biparty system. 
A two-party system, according to Thomas and Stoerker (1980), is 
a form of democratic politics in which power is exercised almost 
exclusively by two major parties, each of which has a realistic chance 
of winning control of the government, although one or more parties may 
also nominate candidates. 
Like the other party systems, bipartyism has its own limitations. 
Unlike multiparty system, for example, it may not reflect accurately 
differing political views in the country. Secondly, the two-party system 
has been criticized for limiting voters to candidates of two parties. 
These choices, it has been argued, are relatively meaningless if both 
parties have similar programs. Furthermore, the two-party system has 
been accused of encouraging policy ambiguity or less coherent policies 
because "ambiguity" may be a "safe" strategy (Ebenstein and others, 
1980). 
In spite of the above limitations, the two-party system has numerous 
advantages and integrative power. First, it is interesting to note that 
none of the limitations or criticisms considers bipartyism as an instru-
ment of malintegration or as a mechanism in which its malintegrative 
properties outweighs its integrative potentials. Secondly, some of the 
criticisms of the two-party system have not been argued in a balanced 
fashion. For instance, while it is true that in a two-party system 
voters are limited to candidates of two parties and that voters may not 
be getting a real choice, particularly where both parties have similar 
programs, it can also be equally argued that in such a case what has 
happened is that "the parties have succeeded in performing one of their 
main crucial functions: compromising different and conflicting points 
of view before the election" (Olson and Meyer, 1975, p. 127). This 
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success contributes to stability of the political system, an indispen-
sible requirement in the process of nation-building. 
Furthermore, in a two-party system majorities in the legislature 
are produced automatically by elections. This eliminates any need for 
constructing coalitions of parties to constitute a legislative majority, 
coalitions that often prove to be shaky and threatening to the stability 
of a government. Similarly, political activity is less fragmented and 
complicated. Since a two-party system frames many political questions 
in terms of either/or, according to Thomas and Stoerker (1980), choices 
for the voter are made less complex. 
Another integrative feature of a two-party system is that both 
parties tend to be moderate--moderating political conflict and rejecting 
attitudes of extremism. According to Ebenstein and others (1975), 
because "the parties adopt moderate policies, they unify rather than 
divide the people. In such a situation, the parties help to integrate 
the country" as seen in the United States (p. 180). Morlan (1979) made 
a similar point when he argued that not only do the parties in a biparty 
system sufficiently define issues for voters, but when necessary "they 
can temporarily blur certain issues that are too sharply divisive for 
the society to bear" (p. 123). Such issues, he noted, cannot safely 
be ignored or neglected, but given time they can usually be worked out, 
whereas an immediate confrontation as might occur in multi-party systems 
might be totally destructive. The parties, he added, can "then serve 
as brokers for the compromise necessary for solution and for promoting 
political unity and national integration" (p. 123). 
The biparty system also has the effect of offering the voter a 
clear-cut choice between alternative governments, something which is 
difficult in a multiparty state. Moreover, according to Wasserman and 
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others (1980), bipartyism prevents a country from being polarized or 
severely divided by keeping factions with unconventional or radical views 
from winning much power. 
To Thomas and Stoerker (1980), the two-party system is an important 
institution because it normally affords a high degree of stability. 
According to Monsona (1973), the chief significance of the two-party 
system lies in its encouragement of broadly based national parties. 
As Emerson (1966) rightly observed, only nation-based competitive politi-
cal parties can be counted upon to undertake the positive promotion of 
a sense of national identity and the fostering of the processes of 
nation-building and national integration. This advantage of the two-
party system makes it the more appealing to the Nigerian situation. 
For the absence of broad-based national parties made the party system 
in Nigeria to constitute an impediment to political integration in the 
country. 
Chambers (1966), after an extensive analysis of the American exper-
ience with the two-party system, suggests, as a general hypothesis, that 
a democratic two-party system can produce a net balance of integrative 
impacts on political development. In his 1966 work, Parties and Nation 
Building in America, he concluded that a two-party system has the capac-
ity and advantage of 
turning group conflict from unlimited pluralistic into manage-
able dualistic channels before it reached the decision-making 
centers of government. As compared with the tensions of dead-
lock that are often associated with indigeneous pluralism or 
multi-partyism, party dualism reduced malintegrative strain 
(p. 103). 
One other appealing feature of the two-party system is its fit of 
Duverger's natural law of politics. Sartori (1966) points out that 
Duverger has, through his detailed study of political parties, suggested 
a sort of natural law of politics, for according to him: 
Dualism is "natural, 11 and while one does not always find a 
two-party system one almost always finds, all over the 
world, 'a dualism of tendencies'--left-right; conserva-
tive-liberal; majority-opposition; movement-status quo; 
and so on (p. 137). 
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Finally, after an exhaustive study of three multiparty systems--
simple pluralism, moderate pluralism, and extreme pluralism--Sartori 
(1966) came to the conclusions that 
the simple two-party pluralism is the most secure working 
solution to problems of integration in a pluralistic 
society ••• It obliges the parties to perform integra-
tive functions; while discouraging the growth of a highly 
ideologized policy orientation and the polarization of 
the party system. Under these conditions a realistic and 
pragmatic process of orderly change, that is, a gradual 
change which does not throw off balance the equilibrium 
of a political system is very likely to be successful 
(p. 175). 
From the above analysis of the three types of party systems, we 
find that the potential and the net impact of the integrative conse-
quences of the biparty system far surpasses not only its malintegrative 
tendencies, if any, but also greatly outweighs any integrative merits 
that may be associated with either the one-party system or the multi-
party system. The tremendous integrative features of the two-party 
system is the reason why we recommend that Nigeria adopt the two-party 
system in its Third Republic. Common membership in two parties through-
out the 19 states in Nigeria will assist in drawing together the most 
heterogeneous population of the country. The names of the two major 
parties, with time, will thus serve as symbols that will help to unify 
the millions of peoples from the different ethnic groups. 
We recommend that a two-party system should be included in the Third 
Nigerian Federal Republican Constitution as the nation's party system. 
Rather than be like the 1977 Electoral Decree No. 73 (which was restated 
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in the 1979 federal constitution) requirements for the two-party system 
should be quite different. The two parties to be registered must have 
offices in all the states of the federation and the executive body of 
the party must be drawn from all of the states of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria. This requirement will make the parties broad based national 
parties, thus avoiding the parochial, ethnoregional based parties that 
characterized the previous two Republics which fostered subnationalism 
or ethnicism at the expense of loyalty to a central government. 
The idea for the deliberate adoption of a particular party system 
or restricting parties to designated ideologies seems strange. However, 
it is not original with this author. In an effort to reinvigorate the 
decaying single party system in Senegal, President Senghor, in 1977, 
revived multiparty constitutionalism in Senegal through deliberate 
planning. Senghor's plan provided for three parliamentary parties. 
To achieve this goal, he legalized two new parties. Of the three parties 
provided for "one is to advocate liberal democratic policies, another 
to support social democratic or slightly left-of-center policies, and 
a third to put forward extreme left-wing Marxist-Socialist policies" 
(Mazrui and Tidy, 1984, p. 291). In addition to the planned three party 
system, President Senghor also introduced a new electoral law providing 
for a system of proportional representation in the national assembly. 
It is the opinion of this researcher that a two-party system will 
help to promote stability and effective government in Nigeria and these 
qualities will, in turn, help foster national integration. With two 
broad-based national parties, the diverse ethnic, socioeconomic, formal, 
and informal groups in the country will become less polarized. All these 
will help to ameliorate the disintegrative polarization of existing 
cleavages, a feature that had been associated with the previous 
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multiparty systems. With harmony and unity among the diverse groups 
and political stability, the likelihood of the military seizing power 
might be greatly reduced as polarization within the military must have 
also been greatly reduced with the biparty system. 
However, bipartyism will not automatically be a panacea to the 
problems of integration in Nigeria. The effectiveness and workability 
of such two-party system as an instrument of national integration will 
depend very much upon the willingness of Nigerians, the political 
leaders, in particular, to engage in fair play in politics and make the 
party system work. At this juncture, the advise of Weiner and 
LaPalombara (1966) is important to Nigeria's political leaders. They 
must search out other 
a) institutional arrangements that will encourage dialogue 
among the diverse ethnic groups, b) unblock communication 
channels, c) keep political and governmental leaders on 
their toes, d) be more accountable and facilitate the 
articulation and aggregation of conflicting interests and 
in these ways create a sense of political unity out of 
ethnic diversity (p. 418). 
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